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In February 2015 the U.S. Department of Justice confirmed that it had reached an agreement 
with Standard & Poor’s, the largest credit rating agency, so that it would pay a record $1.375 
billion fine for defrauding investors during the Financial Crisis. This record fine has been 
heralded as an indicator of the State’s ability to effectively punish transgressions within the 
financial markets. However, upon closer inspection, the credit rating agencies have continued 
transgressing. Therefore, this thesis aims to show why this discipline has been ineffective in 
terms of impacting upon the credit rating agencies’ appetite, and ability, to transgress. In 
focusing upon one small, yet significant, aspect of the credit rating industry, this thesis 
examines the effect of ancillary service provision upon the conduct of the credit rating 
agencies.  
 
It is found that the revenues and profits garnered from the ancillary service divisions of 
Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s far outweigh the record fines that are being given to them. 
This fact, when combined with the understanding that these divisions have no positive impact 
upon the transparency, or indeed the accuracy of credit rating agency output, means that the 
discipline deemed appropriate by the State is being entirely nullified by divisions that can be 
removed; this thesis therefore calls for that removal and presents a detailed proposal to that 
end. 
 
This thesis embarks upon this endeavour in an attempt to reduce the ability of such a 
critically-important component of the financial sector to transgress. This is important because 
the impact of destructive finance upon society in 2008, and ever since, has not been 
witnessed since the Great Depression. In order to spare society from bearing the brunt of 
another collapse because of the iniquities of the marketplace, this thesis also calls for the 
reimagining of the economic reform process so that the safeguarding of society, and in 
particular the most vulnerable in society, is prioritised over the extraction of wealth by a 
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“This historic settlement makes clear the consequences of putting corporate profits over 
honesty in the financial markets”1 
 
The statement above is taken from the press release in February 2015 from the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DoJ), which was announcing that the DoJ, along with 20 States, had 
reached an agreement with Standard & Poor’s (the largest credit rating agency by way of 
market share), which would see it pay a record $1.375 billion as a fine for its conduct in the 
lead-up to the recent financial crisis. The settlement, which was to resolve allegations that 
‘S&P had engaged in a scheme to defraud investors in structured financial products’ is by far 
and away the largest fine ever given to a credit rating agency. However, the statement above 
contains an issue that is the raison d’être for this thesis; are the consequences that this historic 
settlement ‘makes clear’ enough? 
There is a tendency for those who are concerned with analysing the credit rating industry to 
focus upon the magnitude of the fines that have been imposed, or on the choice between fines 
and other forms of punishment (such as imprisonment) but, although each of those issues 
have some validity when assessing the ratings industry, they both miss the essential point. 
The essential point is this: how, and why, were the agencies able to transgress so 
destructively? Endeavouring to understand the nature and the causes of their transgressions is 
surely essential if we are to properly explain what went wrong, or to offer plausible 
suggestions for better regulating the agencies in the future. This thesis, therefore, endeavours 
to identify, in detail, the forms of misconduct engaged in by the agencies, and the causes – 
including the systemic causes – of such misconduct. It is then able to begin the task of 
                                                 
1 Department of Justice ‘Justice Department and State Partners Secure $1.375 Billion Settlement with S&P for 
Defrauding Investors in the Lead Up to the Financial Crisis’ [2015] Department of Justice: Office of Public 
Affairs (Feb. 3). 
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devising regulatory reforms that address, very directly and specifically, the empirical nature 
of the industry’s failings, and the identified causes thereof. There must be a logical 
correspondence between how the agencies misbehaved, and how we might stop them doing 
so again; my thesis aims to achieve that. It is important to note however that the nature of the 
misconduct is complex and its causes are multiple, yet, and to foreshadow my argument a 
little, I suggest that one key component in explaining the agencies’ misbehaviour includes the 
fact that the largest agencies established non-essential ancillary service divisions in the lead-
up to the crisis. Their doing so, and the levels of income such services generated, almost 
entirely nullified, and continues to do so, any ‘consequence’ that may be derived from the 
fines that are being predominantly used by the State to discipline the industry. 
As a result, the credit rating agencies have been left to proceed in a manner that is a genuine 
threat to the public interest. The notion of ‘public interest’ will be dissected throughout 
section 2.2 The Desired Situation, but for this thesis the aim is to protect the public and make 
large scale social damage a thing of the past; it is simply not an acceptable part of life that the 
misdemeanours of financial actors should have such a devastating impact upon the lives of 
citizens. The reverence attached to the ‘historic fine’ means that for the authorities their work 
is now done with regards to disciplining Standard & Poor’s. However, the profits garnered by 
their ancillary service division, S&P Capital IQ, means that a division that has no bearing on 
the accuracy of their credit ratings has protected the income from their bottom-line; this is 
simply not a deterrent against future transgressions. 
So, the protective capacity afforded to the agencies via their ancillary service divisions is the 
target for this thesis’ reform proposal. This is primarily because whilst other proposals may 
be more gratifying, i.e., heavier fines or prison sentences for offenders, this thesis is operating 
on the basis that only small and incremental proposals are practicable. We shall see the 
reasons for this understanding, because throughout the thesis there is evidence that suggests 
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that the rating industry is extraordinarily embedded, resourceful, and protected. Therefore, 
the thesis will ultimately be defined by its reform proposal: the absolute and irreversible 
abolition of additional service provision within the credit rating industry, with ‘additional 
services’ meaning everything other than rating services. 
In order to understand why this proposal is optimal, the thesis will embark upon an analysis 
that will describe who the agencies are and why they are deemed to be important. Having 
done this it will then be advanced that the agencies actually operate in a different manner than 
what they ought to, which results in the conclusion that any reform proposals, or indeed any 
analysis of the ratings industry, must be focussed predominantly upon what they actually do, 
rather than what we may desire them to do; any use of the desired version of events in 
analyses should only be used to gauge the severity of the agencies’ transgressions. We shall 
see examples of when the actualities of the rating industry have not been considered enough 
by legislators and regulators, which has led consistently to inefficiencies that have been 
exploited by the rating agencies. For this thesis the most important aim is to curb this 
exploitation, and reducing their capability to absorb the only discipline deemed appropriate is 
a workable way of doing so. 
In order to reach this goal of establishing a reform proposal that would see the agencies’ 
capability to absorb financial penalties reduced, the thesis must answer a number of important 
questions. For the purposes of clarity, those questions are:  
 
Research Question 1 - What is the current role and status of the ratings industry, and 
why does that role require regulation? 
 
Research Question 2 - What was the regulatory landscape that surrounded the ratings 




Research Question 3 - What lessons can we learn about the effectiveness of that pre-
crisis regulation? 
Research Question 4 - What regulatory reforms were introduced as a response to the 
financial crisis, and what has been their effectiveness? 
 
Research Question 5 - How does the provision of ancillary services support the 
agencies’ ability to transgress, and what effect would the prohibition of ancillary 
service provision have upon that capacity? 
 
The first task will be to answer the first research question and gain a thorough understanding 
of the target for this proposed reform, so to that end the first chapter will be a ‘primer’ for us, 
in that it describes in detail who the agencies are that make up the rating industry, their 
respective position within the industry, and also the ownership structures of the ‘Big Three’: 
Standard & Poor’s; Moody’s; and Fitch Ratings. Whilst this first chapter will be essentially 
descriptive, it will reveal for us the extraordinary position of the industry when we see that 
some of the world’s most successful and influential figures have large stakes in these 
businesses; Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway is the largest shareholder in Moody’s, for 
example. The reason why this industry has attracted such influential figures to it is revealed 
when we assess the role of the rating industry. In examining its position within the socially-
centralised financial markets, we will quickly realise that these agencies stand as the 
‘gatekeepers’ to the capital markets, which naturally inserts their business into that of bond 
issuers, institutional and ‘retail’ investors, as well as the state; this entangled position has the 
potential to make incredible amounts of money and the biggest players in the market are 
more than aware of this. 
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This position within the socially-vital financial markets is the main reason the rating agencies 
need to be regulated, although that fact only dawned on legislators in the aftermath of the 
Enron scandal, which is an extremely important issue as we shall discuss later in Chapters 1, 
2, and 3. We shall see in Chapter 2 more specifically however that the needs of each vital 
component within the marketplace – the issuer, the investor, and the state – means that 
efficient and impactful regulation is vital if any or all of these parties are to be prevented 
from being exploited by the agencies, or indeed from exploiting the agencies for their own 
benefit; each scenario leads to impressive short-term gains which are swiftly followed by 
rather incredible long-term societal losses as we saw in 2008 and beyond. 
As this thesis is proposing reform that is built upon an alteration in regulatory attitude, 
namely that reform should be incremental yet impactful by focusing upon the actualities of 
the industry, it will be prudent to ask what the regulatory landscape that surrounded the 
ratings industry prior to the financial crisis was, in order to answer the second research 
question. This will be achieved by the analysis in Chapter 1, which provides for us a 
‘snapshot’ of the regulatory framework that has surrounded the industry since it was formally 
regulated in 2005/6 with the Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Relief Act of 2005 and the Credit 
Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006. It is worth articulating now that for this thesis the focus 
will be on the regulatory framework adopted by the United States, primarily because the U.S. 
is the spiritual home of the rating agency as we know it today. Also, the centrality of U.S. 
financial products in the recent financial crisis means that any developments in regulation in 
this area are likely to be undertaken by the U.S. State.  There will also be a discussion of this 
regulatory landscape in Chapter 4 because, as the aim is to look at what has been tried and 
what has failed, it will be important to provide an analysis of the entirety of the industry’s 
relationship to regulators, which spans from the intervention of the Judiciary before the Great 
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Depression to the incorporation of credit ratings into the regulatory framework by the SEC in 
1975. 
In developing this line of enquiry, the thesis will answer the third research question, which 
is what lessons can we learn about the effectiveness of that pre-crisis regulation? When we 
understand that the Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Relief Act of 2005 and the Credit Rating 
Agency Reform Act of 2006 were developed and enacted in response to the Enron Scandal 
(and perhaps the agencies’ involvement with the Asian Financial Crisis of the late 1990s), we 
shall see that one of the biggest lessons we can learn with regards to regulatory effectiveness 
concerns cyclicity; the enactment of legislation five years after the fall of Enron (and 
WorldCom) meant that the legislative body was reacting, which meant it had no chance of 
limiting the damage that would come to light just a year later. Economic cyclicity is a major 
barrier for socially-impactful and beneficial financial regulation, as we shall see throughout 
the thesis.  
This regulatory lag is unfortunately just one cause of the ineffectiveness displayed by pre-
crisis regulations (the same may be said of post-crisis regulations). For this thesis one of, if 
not the main cause of this ineffectiveness is the focussing upon what one believes the 
agencies ought to do, or how the rating industry ought to be. Before the crisis this sentiment 
manifested itself in the form of absolute trust, which we now know was entirely misplaced. 
This trust was afforded to a number of core components of the modern economy, not just the 
rating industry, and revealed itself by way of mass deregulation which enabled the financial 
crisis to occur. We shall see a number of perspectives that argue this point, and some that 
argue against it, but irrespective of viewpoint the result was still the same.  
The extraordinary transgressions of the leading rating agencies, along with other vital 
components of the financial sector, resulted in the largest raft of legislative orders since the 
18 
 
‘New Deal’ era legislative directives incorporated in response to the Great Depression (and 
the Wall Street Crash of 1929). So, in light of this once-in-a-generation development, the 
thesis will answer the fourth research question: what regulatory reforms were introduced as 
a response to the financial crisis, and what has been their effectiveness? To answer this 
question the thesis will provide succinct analyses of two important elements of credit rating 
reform: the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010’s reforms for the ratings industry as a whole, and then 
the specific reforms regarding the agencies’ provision of ancillary services.  
In Chapter 4 we shall see that the Dodd-Frank Act’s aim at the financial sector was incredibly 
wide. Whilst that approach was obviously needed, the scale of reforms required was so large 
that certain concessions had to be made, and herein lies one of the major reasons for post-
crisis regulatory ineffectiveness. We shall see that the post-crisis legislation fails on two 
counts, failures which have been subsequently confirmed by the continuation of the agencies’ 
transgressions even up to the present day. Firstly, legislators made the mistake of not 
amending the current regulatory system whereby legislators delegate a lot of responsibility to 
the regulatory bodies that will be in charge of administering the laws put in place by statute. 
Whilst the thesis does not offer a proposal on how to change that system, the current system 
of ruling that the agencies must act in a certain way but then allowing the SEC to develop the 
way in which this behaviour is to be achieved is a dangerous approach. We shall see that for a 
lot of people the SEC is central to the failings witnessed in the financial sector, so entrusting 
them with developing reforms is potentially paradoxical. Secondly, the legislators still focus 
upon the desired when developing their laws, which results in ineffectiveness. For example, 
we shall see in Chapter 3 that the rating industry is what is known as a ‘natural oligopoly’, in 
that competition is extremely limited and benefit can only be derived by those who deal with 
the agencies because of the lack of competition i.e. costs for the issuers are kept to a certain 
level because investors only require a maximum of 2 ratings to invest in an issuance. Yet, the 
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post-crisis legislations make the idea of increasing competition in the ratings industry central 
to their approach, which is indicative of this misplaced focus that this thesis is attempting to 
correct. 
This ineffectiveness has the result of continuing to allow the rating agencies to transgress, 
which they are doing. This has been confirmed by a continuous stream of investigative 
reporting and court actions against the agencies being initiated around the globe regarding 
the transgressions of the agencies. There are a number of reasons why the agencies can 
transgress, and those will be covered in Chapter 3 when we look at why the agencies 
transgress and what allows them to do so. However, the final two chapters of the thesis will 
be devoted to answering the fifth and final research question: How does the provision of 
ancillary services support the agencies’ ability to transgress, and what effect would the 
prohibition of ancillary service provision have upon that capacity? The reason why the 
provision of ancillary services has been selected for reform by this thesis is for one simple 
reason; out of all the issues it is perhaps the simplest to amend. The remuneration model 
adopted by the agencies, whilst conflicted, does allow for the continued provision of credit 
ratings that are important for the capital markets whereas without it the service could not 
continue at the required levels (arguably). The lack of competition is arguably understandable 
when we assess the actual requirements of interested parties; lowering costs for investors will 
always trump increased transparency that would come from the increase in reputational 
pressure, by way of increased competition. However, the provision of ancillary services 
simply does not affect the accuracy of credit ratings, nor does it increase the transparency of 
the rating process. To remove the issuer-pays remuneration model, of which more will be 
discussed throughout the thesis, would surely take the agencies out of business, as would the 
manufacturing of competition; there are no such dramatic effects with the proposed removal 
of ancillary services.  
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In Chapter 5 we shall see the real issue with the provision of ancillary services. This thesis 
opened with a statement taken from the DoJ that was announcing the record fine of $1.375 
billion given to S&P, a fine which would come to represent the height of the discipline that is 
to be afforded to the rating industry (at the time of writing Moody’s still awaits it fate). Yet, 
these non-essential ancillary service divisions, that the leading agencies incorporated in 
preparation of their involvement with the securitisation debacle that was at the centre of the 
financial crisis, now contribute over $1 billion in revenue annually to S&P and to Moody’s, 
and have done for a number of years. We shall see in Chapter 5 that the economic term for 
this is ‘rent-harvesting’, in that the agencies are taking advantage of their embedded position 
to garner as much money as they possibly can. This ‘harvesting’ measure is actively acting to 
offset the effect of such ‘record’ disciplinary measures, and this is unacceptable for this thesis 
when we take into account the non-essential nature of the provision. 
So, in Chapter 6 the thesis concludes by offering its reform proposal; the absolute and 
irreversible abolition of additional service provision by credit rating agencies. The reform is 
detailed in a way that the lessons of the ineffective legislation incorporated both before and 
after the crisis are taken into account. The reform is purposefully unambiguous and provides 
clear reasons for the measures it proposes. In order to increase the potential impact of the 
reform proposal, the last chapter includes historical precedent for such levels of state 
intervention in the financial sector, looking at the banking sector in the 1930s and the public 
accounting sector in the early 2000s. It also includes two very forthright sections that attempt 
to anticipate the potential benefits of the reform being enacted, as well as the potential 
impediments to it being considered. 
The overarching aim of this thesis is to present a reform proposal that has the capability of 
aligning the output of the rating agencies closer to the ‘public interest’. This notion of there 
being a definable ‘public interest’ is a particularly charged one, and is something that will be 
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discussed in much greater detail in section 2.2.4 ‘Public Interest’ or ‘Public Protection’?. 
However, to attempt to realign the output of the ratings industry requires much more than a 
reform proposal, and this thesis endeavours to answer that call by providing detailed analyses 
of the components of the industry, in addition to the demonstration of there being a 
divergence between what people may desire of the agencies and what they actually do. In 
combining all of these elements the thesis aims to cast a new light upon an industry that 
directly facilitated one of the largest financial crashes, and threats to society, that the world 
has ever witnessed. 
 
0.1 Research Methodology  
 
Whilst there are many variants of research that a project may be classified as, for our 
understanding it would be helpful to start with two seemingly central variants: normative 
research and descriptive (or empirical) research2. Broadly speaking, descriptive research aims 
to describe what is happening, how it is happening, and then what is expected to happen in 
the future, based upon the evidence gathered by what was revealed in the earlier parts of the 
examination, whereas normative research aims to provide guidelines for decision making, in 
outlining what ‘a rational decision maker should do under the identified conditions in order to 
attain a given objective’3. This thesis falls more closely to that of the normative mode of 
research, although as we shall now discuss there are important aspects to consider and 
question, with the most important being that to attach oneself, or a project, to just one 
approach is disadvantageous, as Halperin and Heath suggest: ‘…theory and evidence inform 
                                                 




each other. Seeing either one as entirely divorced from the other generates either fantasy or 
mindless empiricism’4. 
This discussion of a multi-levelled analysis is a very important one. However, such a multi-
levelled approach needs to be considered and critiqued constantly if it is to be effective, 
because as Bauböck notes the two branches can assist each other, although this is not always 
well done. Bauböck argues that empirical researchers too often resort to ‘ad hoc’ normative 
assumptions and normative researchers often rely on hypothetical arguments in spite of 
available empirical evidence, whilst others may interpret empirical research naively without 
the necessary critical knowledge5. There are also major issues in prioritising one method over 
another, and crucially in attributing values to a system without critically assessing it first. 
With regards to normative research, it has been said that a researcher cannot ‘prove that a 
given value has absolute validity’6, so inevitably the foundation of normative research is 
inherently subjective. Alternatively, for empirical research, the trust in ‘knowledge’ is 
perhaps its biggest weakness in that it is arguably naive to accept certain aspects as ‘facts’ 
without critically analysing what underlies the production of those ‘facts’, or the methods 
used in collating such information, with statistics being a classic example; the most famous 
work in this regard is arguably Michel Foucault’s The Archaeology of Knowledge7. 
Onlookers have noted that the push to rid science of ‘values’, by reducing them to ‘emotive 
expressions’8, has not succeeded but has left normative thinking ‘to wither in many parts of 
social science’, which has marginalised normative discourse, weakened our ability to do it, 
                                                 
4 Sandra Halperin and Oliver Heath Political Research: Methods and Practical Skills (OUP 2012) 5. 
5 Rainer Bauböck ‘Normative political theory and empirical research’ in Donatella D Porta and Michael Keating 
Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective (CUP 2008) 40.  
6 Ludvig Beckman The Liberal State and the Politics of Virtue (Transaction Publishers 2000) 11. 
7 Michel Foucault The Archaeology of Knowledge (Routledge 1972). For the original version see Michel 
Foucault L’archeologie du savior (Ėditions Gallimard 1969). 
8 Andrew Sayer Realism and Social Science (SAGE 2000) 157. 
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and in turn has reduced the incentive to adopt the approach in future9. This is a particularly 
negative development within the realm of research because to attribute superiority to one 
mode of research over another fundamentally limits our opportunity to affect real change.  
As will be discussed in more detail later in section 2.2.4 ‘Public Interest’ or ‘Public 
Protection’?, this thesis aims to align the output of the rating agencies closer to the ‘public 
interest’, by which the thesis really means ‘public protection’ in terms of the reduction of 
societal ills like homelessness, poverty, suicides, and disease10. However, whilst one may 
assume that this ideal is shared throughout society, one cannot state that this is definitely the 
case (universally speaking) and this has to be considered as an underlying critique of this 
thesis, as Beckman suggests should always be the case with both normative and empirical 
studies – ‘in neither case does the researcher have clear or unmediated access to reality as it 
is’11. This notion, along with the fact that normative research will be usually designated as 
being more controversial than empirical research, therefore has to be acknowledged. 
However, that does not mean that the results of this thesis’ endeavours should be any less 
valid than those conducted by an empirical researcher, because even though as a society we 
tend to accept empirical findings as ‘true’ before we accept normative findings that are 
concerned with moral stances as being similarly ‘true’, the fact that it is usually harder to 
develop a consensus on what can be taken for granted in a normative analysis should not 
affect the validity of the project, as Beckman states: ‘…the degree to which conclusions are 
controversial does not necessarily depend on the degree to which they are valid. A normative 
conclusion can be valid in the sense that it follows from the assumptions made initially even 
when it is controversial. Quite frequently, this is the case with empirical conclusions too’12. 
                                                 
9 ibid. 
10 See 2.2.4 ‘Public Interest’ or ‘Public Protection’? (fn 59). 




On the face of it the thesis appears to be an amalgamation of ‘critical social research’ and a 
typically normative endeavour. Stubbs describes that critical social research ‘seeks to 
establish what underlies the surface appearance of a phenomenon, to reveal the oppressive 
nature of social relations and to inform social change’13. As this thesis begins with a 
descriptive approach to introduce a foundational understanding of the credit rating industry, 
and then delves into the differentiation between the desired and the actual to understand what 
the reality of the rating industry and its relationship to interested parties actually is, it seems 
as if it clearly fits into the classification of ‘critical social research’. However, there are two 
issues that make this designation somewhat inappropriate. Normative endeavours are usually 
defined by what they establish as what ought to be, which then may or may not provide for 
controversy or debate. But, this thesis does not fabricate this idealised vision of what ought to 
be. What the thesis is calling for is precisely what is marketed by the rating agencies 
themselves. It is not this thesis, but the rating agencies who declare that their role is to make 
financial markets ‘operate more efficiently and transparently’14, yet there is evidence of a 
concerted campaign by leading agencies, as we shall see throughout this thesis, to do exactly 
the opposite of this ‘role’ that they fulfil. In essence, what the agencies ought to do is exactly 
what they say they do; this should not be controversial at all. 
The second reason why this thesis is difficult to classify in terms of research approach is 
because this thesis is ultimately concerned with a much broader issue than either normative or 
empirical research usually aims for. Perhaps the most fitting label for this approach is 
articulated by Max Weber when he describes the concept of Gesinnungsethik15. This concept 
                                                 
13 Julie Stubbs ‘Critical Criminological Research’ in Thalia Anthony and Chris Cunneen The Critical 
Criminology Companion (Hawkins Press 2008) 12. 
14 Moody’s Our Role (2015). 
15 For the discussion on Max Weber’s development of the concept, and the many issues that surround that, see 
Richard Swedberg and Ola Agevall The Max Weber Dictionary: Key Words and Central Concepts (Stanford 
University Press 2005) 90. 
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is supposed to signify purity of intention heedless of actual outcome16, although the many 
issues that come with this notion make attaching oneself to it particularly hazardous. The 
issue that arises again and again is that the simple intention of this thesis does not fall into 
any one category, so the only solution to that is to be as explicit as possible and move 
forward accordingly, even in the face of potential disregard for its simplicity. This thesis 
simply calls for the reduction of social harm that result from fraudulent and misrepresented 
practices within the financial sector. This simple aim will be achieved by describing the 
rating industry, examining its actual conduct in opposition to its desired conduct (of which a 
lot stems from its self-stated conduct), and then proposing a measure which would reduce the 
ability of the agencies to protect themselves against financial discipline. There are a number 
of aspects which will need to be considered along the way, but throughout the analysis that 
follows this simple aim must be remembered; it is this simplicity that can allow for 
meaningful change to be realised so that the horrific consequences of greed and excessive 
self-interest can be condemned to history.   
                                                 

























In essence, the primary role of the rating agencies is to assist a range of investors in making 
informed investment decisions1. In theory, the expert research and analysis conducted by the 
agencies protects investors from ‘unknowingly taking credit risk’2. However, the vast losses 
incurred throughout the Financial Crisis, particularly those involving investments in highly 
rated financial products3, means that to assess the reality of the rating industry’s role is a 
particularly worthwhile endeavour.  
This chapter therefore represents a primer on the credit rating industry. Its aim is to provide a 
sound foundational understanding of what a credit rating agency is; its role within the 
economy; and the regulation that seeks to control the ratings industry. The incredible effect 
that the ratings agencies have4 means that if we are to analyse the intricacies of this unique 
industry effectively, then this elementary assessment will be extremely important. To do this 
                                                 
1 Neil D Baron ‘The Role of Rating Agencies in the Securitisation Process’ in Leon T Kendall and Michael J 
Fishman A Primer on Securitisation (MIT Press 2000) 81. 
2 ibid. 
3 The Financial Crisis, triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, encapsulated the essence of a 
collapsed economy, including financial sectors like financial services, automobiles, and even states and 
countries. For an informative overview of one of the largest collapses on record see Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (GPO 2011). In the report (xxv), the Commission made it very 
clear that the Crisis simply could not have taken place without the facilitation of the rating agencies: ‘We 
conclude the failures of credit rating agencies were essential cogs in the wheel of financial destruction’. With 
regards to the losses experienced as a result of the Crisis more generally, finding even an approximate figure is 
extremely difficult, probably due to the fact that the effects of the Crisis are still continuing to unfold, and that 
collecting and comparing global data is notoriously difficult in itself. Just some attempts to approximate the 
damage include: the U.S. Treasury, that in 2012 estimated the ‘lost household wealth’ in the US alone to be 
$19.2 trillion, see The United States Department of the Treasury The Financial Crisis Response: In Charts 
(2012); a former S&P Chief Credit Officer estimating global losses to be in the region of $15 trillion, see Al 
Yoon ‘Total Global Losses from Financial Crisis: $15 Trillion’ [2012] Wall Street Journal (Oct. 1); and the 
Government Accountability Office that estimated the losses to be in the region of $22 trillion, comprising the 
lost output ($13 trillion) and the paper wealth lost by U.S. homeowners ($9.1 trillion), see United States 
Government Accountability Office Financial Regulatory Reform: Financial Crisis Losses and Potential 
Impacts of the Dodd-Frank Act (GAO 2013). 
4 Charles F Adams, Donald J Mathieson, Garry Schinasi International Capital Markets: Developments, 
Prospects, and Key Policy Issues (International Monetary Fund 1999) 101 ‘credit rating agencies have been 
viewed by many market participants as having a strong impact on both the cost of funding and the willingness of 
major institutional investors to hold certain types of securities’. For further analysis on the role of the agencies 
in the marketplace see Dieter Kerwer ‘Standardising as Governance: The Case of Credit Rating Agencies’ in 
Adrienne Windhoff-Héritier Common Goods: Reinventing European and International Governance (Rowman 
& Littlefield 2002). 
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the chapter will primarily ask three questions: who are the credit rating agencies? What is it 
that they do (including, what is their role within the economy)? And finally what is the 
regulatory framework that governs them? 
Throughout the thesis there will be constant references to ‘the credit rating agencies’ or the 
‘ratings industry’, but those blanket terms conceal dynamics within the ratings industry that 
are very important to understand. For example, an analysis of the global market share and 
ratings distribution (i.e. ratings produced) within the ratings industry reveal an extraordinary 
concentration of power among three agencies; Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch 
Ratings. Analysing these industry dynamics will be very important if we are to answer the 
second the question that the chapter will ask, namely ‘what do rating agencies do and what is 
their role within the economy?’ 
We have already seen that the stated aim for the ratings industry is to ‘assist a range of 
investors in making informed decisions’. However, this is not the only role of this large 
industry. In answering the second question of what it is that the agencies do and what their 
role within the economy is, the chapter assesses who actually uses the output of the industry, 
and for what purposes. Although there is a lot of discussion to be had regarding the role of 
the industry, the validity of their position, and many other aspects, what is not debatable is 
their current significance to the fluidity of the capital markets. With the capital markets being 
the foundation of the modern economy, the usage of credit ratings by large institutional 
investors, banks, and other large financial entities means that understanding the industry’s 
role will be an important but complex affair.  
The complexity of the role means that the task of regulating the industry is extraordinarily 
difficult. It is for this reason that answering the third question posed by this chapter, namely 
what is the regulatory framework that governs them, ultimately means that we can build our 
29 
 
knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of actually regulating the credit rating industry. 
The incredible amount of analysis of the failings surrounding the Ratings Industry and their 
role in the Financial Crisis perhaps points to the conclusion that regulators have failed in 
overcoming such a difficult task. However, in order to assess whether such an understanding 
is correct it will be very important to provide a basic understanding of the regulatory 
framework that governs the industry and its exploits. The regulation of the ratings industry in 
the United States is primarily a statutory endeavour, with the Judiciary and Department of 
Justice being mostly concerned with elements of fraudulent or criminal behaviour5. As we 
shall see, infringements of economically concerned legislation (The Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 20106, hereafter the ‘Dodd-Frank Act’, for example) 
are punished by fines from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) predominantly, 
although the SEC does theoretically have other powers at their disposal. In establishing and 
understanding this regulatory environment within which the ratings industry operates, we will 
be better able to understand any perceived or potential deficiencies in the regulatory approach 
to the conduct of the ratings agencies.  
 
1.2 The Industry: Who They Are 
 
In terms of the global market for credit ratings, there are two important aspects. Firstly, the 
global ratings industry contains over 100 rating agencies, with the vast majority being 
                                                 
5 The Department of Justice recently entered the regulatory picture when it found Standard & Poor’s guilty of 
fraudulent behaviour during the Financial Crisis and beyond, ultimately prohibiting the agency from conducting 
certain business and fining it a record $1.375 billion for losses suffered by federally insured institutions. For 
more see Aruna Viswanatha and Karen Freifeld ‘S&P reaches $1.375 billion deal with U.S. states over crisis-era 
ratings’ [2015] Reuters (Feb.3). 
6 124 Stat. 1376. 
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concerned with local economies or specialised fields7. Secondly, this vast market is 
dominated by only three agencies, with Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch controlling 
over 90 percent of the market between them8. This dominance of the market has been 
recognised as being a de facto oligopoly9, although closer analysis of the precise market share 
and dynamics of the financial markets hints at the existence of ‘a partner monopoly’ between 
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s10, or to be less cynical a cross between a duopoly and an 
oligopoly11. 
Moody’s Corporation is the parent company of two legally separate operating divisions: 
Moody’s Investors Service and Moody’s Analytics12. Moody’s Investors Service (MIS) 
‘provides credit ratings and research covering debt instruments and securities’, whereas 
Moody’s Analytics (MA) ‘offers leading-edge software, advisory services and research for 
credit and economic analysis and financial risk management’13. These services which 
Moody’s Analytics offers are classified for regulatory purposes as ‘Ancillary Services’ and 
are defined by Moody’s as ‘products and services that are not Credit Rating Services, and 
                                                 
7 House of Lords: European Union Committee Sovereign Credit Ratings: Shooting the Messenger? (The 
Stationery Office 2011) 24. 
8 ibid; European Securities and Markets Authority ‘Credit Rating Agencies 2014 Market Share Calculations for 
the Purposes of Article 8d of the CRA Regulation’ [2014] ESMA/2014/1583; Gianluca Mattarocci The 
Independence of Credit Rating Agencies: How Business Models and Regulators Interact (Academic Press 2014) 
121. 
9 House of Lords (n 7); Raquel G Alcubilla and Javier R del Pozo Credit Rating Agencies on the Watch List: 
Analysis of European Regulation (OUP 2012) 6. 
10 There is evidence to suggest this arrangement exists, in that the ratings actions of the leading two agencies 
have an enormous impact upon Fitch’s ratings, but not vice-versa. In addition, it has been noted that Moody’s 
tend to follow S&P’s negative watch/outlook opinions, whilst S&P tend to follow Moody’s positive 
outlook/watch signals, hinting at a partner-monopoly, see Rasha Alsakka and Owain A Gwilym ‘Rating 
Agencies’ Credit Signals: An Analysis of Sovereign Watch and Outlook’ [2012] 21 International Review of 
Financial Analysis 46. 
11 Representative estimates place S&P’s market share at between 39 and 42 percent, whilst Moody’s is between 
34.5 and 37 percent (accounting for variations between American and European estimates). Fitch is represented 
at between 16 and 18 percent, lending credence to the argument of Fitch that ‘currently the industry [is] a 
“duopoly” since S&P and Moody’s “are virtually omnipresent in the investment guidelines of investors”’. See 
House of Lords (n 7) 24; European Securities and Markets Authority (n 8); Robert J Rhee ‘On Duopoly and 
Compensation Games in the Credit Rating Industry’ [2013] 108 Northwestern University Law Review 89 93.  
12 Autorité des Marchés Financiers AMF 2009 Report on Rating Agencies (AMF 2010) 36. As a result of being a 
wholly-owned public company, Moody’s are legally required to submit annual financial reports. It is for this 
reason that Moody’s will be the primary focus of this thesis, although their figures have been recognised as 
being representative of S&P’s position also. 
13 Moody’s About Moody’s (2015). 
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which are market forecasts, estimates of economic trends, pricing analysis, or other general 
data analysis, as well as related distribution services’14, though it is worth noting in addition 
to Moody’s’ self-definition that MA is also the division that controls the sales and marketing 
efforts for the corporation as a whole15. Regulation in light of the recent financial crisis has 
ruled that the activities of the rating and ancillary entities of the ratings agencies that offer 
such services must be kept separated16. 
Moody’s is a particularly vast financial entity in its own right. Its total revenue for the 
financial year of 2014 was $3.33 billion, with an operating margin 43.2 percent17, which 
commentators have been keen to note is much higher than a host of more recognisable 
entities like Google, Microsoft, or ExxonMobil18. MIS rates approximately 130 sovereign 
nations, 11,000 corporate issuers, 21,000 public finance issuers and roughly 76,000 structured 
finance obligations. In order to do this, the firm employs nearly 10,000 people worldwide and 
has a presence in 33 countries19. Organisationally, legendary investor Warren Buffett’s 
Berkshire Hathaway is the majority shareholder with the influential Vanguard Group also 
holding significant shares in the company, perhaps signifying the incredible investment 
opportunity that Moody’s represents. 
Standard & Poor’s is equally as impressive, if not more so20. However, whilst Moody’s is a 
stand-alone public corporation, Standard & Poor’s is not. S&P represents just part of the 
activities of the US-based group McGraw-Hill, which also contains other businesses in the 
                                                 
14 Moody’s Policy for Ancillary and Other Permissible Services: Compliance (Moody’s 2012). 
15 Autorité des Marchés (n 12). 
16 This aspect of the regulatory framework forms the raison d’être for this thesis, so the regulatory requirements 
concerning the said separation will be covered in much greater detail in following chapters (5 and 6 
predominantly). For information on Moody’s regulatory disclosures concerning this separation see Moody’s 
MIS-MA Separation Policy (Moody’s 2011). 
17 Moody’s Annual Report 2014 (Moody’s 2015) 2. 
18 Ross Levine ‘The Governance of Financial Regulation: Reform Lessons from the Recent Crisis’ [2012] 12 
International Review of Finance 1 45. 
19 Moody’s (n 13). 
20 S&P have approximately 1.2 million credit ratings outstanding, rated $4.3 trillion in new debt in 2014 alone, 
and employs nearly 1,400 people across 26 countries, see Standard & Poor’s Who We Are (2015). 
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field of publishing and education21. Standard & Poor’s, though at one time just a division of 
the parent company, was transformed in 2009 into a wholly-owned subsidiary and contributes 
over $3 billion to McGraw-Hill’s total revenue, providing for 44 percent of McGraw-Hill’s 
total22. 
Standard & Poor’s also contains a division that supplies Ancillary Services to the market, 
with their offering being called S&P Capital IQ23, which in a similar vein to their 
counterparts at Moody’s Analytics offers ‘the highest quality financial intelligence covering 
both public and private capital markets’24. Standard & Poor’s must also disclose under 
regulatory rules the pre-emptive actions taken to ensure the separation of rating and 
commercial entities25. 
The third component of the oligopoly that dominates the rating industry is Fitch Ratings. An 
amalgamation of a number of rating agencies26, Fitch Ratings, as part of the Fitch Group, is 
majority-owned by the influential Hearst Corporation, having increased its equity share at the 
expense of the previous majority holder, French conglomerate Fimalac, in 201427. Fitch also 
has its own designated ancillary service provider in Fitch Solutions, which like the 
comparable divisions at Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s requires separation from the 
commercial entities contained within the group as a whole28. Owing to its status as a 
subsidiary of both the Hearst Corporation and Fimalac, gaining any sense of the scope of the 
Fitch Group is particularly difficult, although Fimalac report that in 2013 the Group 
                                                 
21 Autorité des Marchés (n 12) 37. 
22 ibid 38. 
23 Standard & Poor’s (n 20). 
24 S&P Capital IQ Information You Need (2015). 
25 Standard & Poor’s Confidentiality, Conflicts and Firewall: Policy Statement (Standard & Poor’s 2012). 
26 Autorité des Marchés (n 12) 38 The Fitch Group merged with the UK agency IBCA, a bank rating specialist, 
in 1997. It then acquired the fourth-largest US rating agency, Duff & Phelps, and the Canadian bank rating 
specialist Thomson BankWatch in 2000. 
27 See Fimalac Strategic Focus (2015); Hearst Corporation Hearst Corporation to Increase Equity Interest in 
Fitch Group to 80 Percent (2014). 
28 Fitch Ratings 2015 Form NRSRO Annual Certification: Policies and Procedures Adopted and Implemented to 
Prevent the Misuse of Material, Non-Public Information (Fitch Ratings 2015). 
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generated revenues of $982 million29, which in itself clearly demonstrates the disparity 
between Fitch and the two leading agencies in the field. 
As the large financial entities that dominate the capital markets are often required by 
regulation to utilise the ratings of rating agencies, it should come as no surprise that ‘The Big 
Three’ are all registered to both the SEC and the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA). It should come as no surprise because it is perhaps reasonable to assume that the 
state would want to formally oversee the entities that it is forcing upon large and influential 
market actors, although as we shall see in Section 1.3 A Snapshot of the Regulatory 
Framework this formal registration only took place from 2006 onwards. Apart from the Big 
Three, there are a few other registered agencies that may be worth mentioning, although it 
must be noted that the reason for their inclusion into this analysis is to fulfil the aims of 
providing a thorough primer of the industry; their combined market share actually makes 
them rather insignificant when compared to the actions of the Big Three. A.M. Best 
Company, for example, is recognised as being the fourth rating agency, although its 
specialisation in the insurance industry means that it is not in the same category as the 
agencies above it. As an issuer of ‘fixed-instrument debt ratings that cover bonds, notes, 
securitisation products and other financial instruments issued by insurers and reinsurers30’, it 
does have its place within the financial landscape (although the Big Three all conduct more 
business in the Insurance field than A.M. Best do). It is perhaps worth noting that A.M. Best 
do not offer Ancillary Services in the same manner as the Big Three, though they do employ 
                                                 
29 Fimalac Fitch Ratings (2015) 
30 A.M. Best About (2015). 
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the infamous Issuer-Pays revenue model31. On the contrary, Egan-Jones Rating Company, a 
smaller firm still, actively maintains the investor-pays model, an aspect that the company has 
incorporated heavily into its sales pitches in order to define itself from other rating agencies. 
Having started producing ratings in 1995, it is also noted for flagging the failures of Enron 
and WorldCom at an earlier stage than any other agency32. Other noted registered agencies 
include Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS), the Canadian-based agency recently 
acquired by the influential Carlyle Group33, and Morningstar Rating, which is heavily 
involved in Investment Advice and Management34. 
There are of course a number of agencies that are predominantly concerned with the countries 
from which they hail35. However, one cannot fail to notice the dominance of the US based 
agencies in the analysis above. One scholar suggests that the agencies’ knowledge ‘has a 
special salience to it because knowledge emerging from the United States has a higher global 
                                                 
31 The Issuer-Pays model is the revenue model adopted by the Big Three in the 1970s, as opposed to the 
subscriber-pays model that was in effect up unto that point. The Issuer-Pays model denotes the system where the 
issuer of debt will contract and remunerate the agency to formulate a rating; the subscriber-pays model is paid 
for by individual subscribers to the reports of the rating agencies, which contain ratings, as well as reports and 
in-depth analysis of rating decisions. The Issuer-Pays model has a number of advantages and disadvantages; on 
the positive side it helps issuers to have more involvement in the process and disclose more beneficial 
information for all parties, whilst it also allows for the widespread dissemination of ratings information for no 
cost to investors which, in turn, allows the agencies to channel more resources into their operations and should, 
in theory, increase the accuracy of their reports. However, there are negatives which are impossible to ignore. 
Irrespective of any mechanisms the agencies may employ, they simply cannot guarantee insulation from the 
numerous conflicts of interest that are inherent within a relationship where you are paid by the people you are 
assessing. Ratings influence (whether perceived or actual), ratings shopping (issuers purchasing ratings from 
only agencies that provide favourable ratings), and a number of other elements that will be discussed throughout 
are aspects that are prominent in a large number of people’s criticisms of the industry. For just some analysis on 
the dynamics of the revenue model see Deryn Darcy ‘Credit Rating Agencies and the Credit Crisis: How the 
“Issuer Pays” conflict contributed and what regulators might do about it’ [2009] Columbia Business Law 
Review 2; Douglas D Evanoff The First Credit Market Turmoil of the 21st Century (World Scientific 2009); 
Martha Poon ‘Rating Agencies’ in Karin K Cetina and Alex Preda The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of 
Finance (OUP 2012).  
32 Egan-Jones Rating Company (2015). 
33 Dominion Bond Rating Service About (2015). 
34 Morningstar Rating (2015). 
35 Agencies that fit this definition include the Japan Credit Rating Agency, H.R. Ratings de México, S.A. de 
C.V., Feri EuroRating Services AG, CERVED Group S.p.A., and Axesor SA. 
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valuation than that produced by a British, Canadian, or Japanese agency’36, which may 
provide some analytical reasoning behind the unmistakeable dominance of the Big Three. 
Nevertheless, now we know who the major components of this extraordinarily lucrative 
industry are, it is appropriate to ask the question ‘what is it that they do?’ 
 
1.3 The Industry: What It Does 
 
This section aims to provide a first overview of the role of the rating agencies within the 
economy. The aim is to be primarily descriptive, so as to provide a reader who may be 
relatively ignorant of the role performed by the industry insight into its essential functions. 
Chapter 2 A Distorted Reality will continue this endeavour, albeit in much more detail; the 
chapter will have a greater emphasis upon providing a critical evaluation of the actual 
practices of the industry, and also on the potential disparity that exists between the idealised 
role of the industry and the actual deliverance of the rating service.  
A basic understanding of what the rating agencies do would be achieved by the understanding 
that ‘a credit rating is an opinion provided by a rating agency for a fee on the credit risk or 
creditworthiness of the bond issue, which reflects the probability of default of that bond’37. In 
order to be thorough however we must ascertain what lies at the core of the business of the 
agencies. What lies at the core of their business is the bond, which is a debt instrument issued 
by an ‘issuer’ that usually pays a fixed rate of interest over a fixed period of time38, though 
                                                 
36 Timothy J Sinclair ‘Bond-Rating Agencies and Coordination in the Global Political Economy’ in A. C. 
Cutler, Virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter Private Authority and International Affairs (SUNY Press 1999) 160. 
Naciri also notes this in addition to the fact that 71 percent of the Big Three’s global revenues stem from the US, 
see Ahmed Naciri Credit Rating Governance: Global Credit Gatekeepers (Routledge 2015) 15. 
37 Rhee (n 11) 91. 
38 Moorad Choudry Corporate Bonds and Structured Financial Products (Butterworth-Heinemann 2004) 3. 
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this fixed nature of the instrument is not always the way the instrument is constructed39. 
There are four issuers of bonds: ‘sovereign governments and their agencies, local government 
authorities, supranational bodies such as the World Bank, and corporations’40, with the 
largest bond market being the government bond market by far. 
Bonds usually have fixed interest rates, or coupons, that are paid to the investor by the bond’s 
issuer on a semi- or annual basis. The maturity of the bond indicates the date when the debt 
ceases to exist, at which time the issuer must pay the principal and the last remaining interest 
payment to redeem the bond, thus completing the process41. This is the foundational 
understanding of an arena that is defined by its complexity. 
This extraordinarily large system of finance42 has a number of theoretical positives attached 
to it. Corporate issuers, or ‘borrowers’ as they may also be called, issue bonds to ‘raise 
finance for major projects and also to cover on-going and operational expenses’43, whilst 
sovereign entities use the issuance of bonds to alleviate the disparity between the expenditure 
requirements of the country against the income garnered from taxation, amongst other 
                                                 
39 For an foundational analysis of the bond and other structured finance instruments see Les Dlabay and James 
Burrow Business Finance (Cengage Learning 2007) 207; Moorad Choudry An Introduction to Bond Markets 
(John Wiley & Sons 2010); Sunil Parameswaran Fundamentals of Financial Instruments: An Introduction to 
Stocks, Bonds, Foreign Exchange, and Derivatives (John Wiley & Sons 2011) 10. 
40 Choudry (n 38) 3. It must be noted here that the agencies rate an issuer separately from the bond it issues. For 
example, in rating a bond the agency is only concerned with the issuer’s ability to repay that particular debt 
(although they obviously take the health of the issuing firm more generally into account). Agencies therefore 
have issue-specific ratings and issuer-specific ratings which each have their own defining characteristics, see 
Stefan Trueck and Svetlozar T Rachev Rating Based Modelling of Credit Risk: Theory and Application of 
Migration Matrices (Academic Press 2009) 12; Scott McClesky When Free Markets Fail: Saving the Market 
When It Can’t Save Itself (John Wiley & Sons 2010) 90; Giuliano Iannotta Investment Banking: A Guide to 
Underwriting and Advisory Services (Springer Science & Business Media 2010) 106; Thummuluri Siddaiah 
Financial Services (Pearson Education India 2011) 242. 
41 Choudry (n 38) 3; 4. 
42 Mark Mobius Bonds: An Introduction to the Core Concepts (John Wiley & Sons 2012) 1 ‘the worldwide 
value of all bonds outstanding was a record US$95 trillion in 2010, with about US$35 trillion in the US bond 
market’. 
43 Choudry (n 38) 5. 
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revenue streams44. For corporate issuers the advantages are plentiful. In addition to allowing 
for the raising of large amounts of resources for whatever requirement they may have, it also 
serves the company better than raising resources through the sale of stock45. Not only does 
the system benefit the issuer, but it also benefits the investor. The return potential of bonds is 
much lower than that of other investments like stocks. Yet, this is an attractive quality to the 
cautious investor who may take comfort from the relative security of a bond, whilst they may 
also use the bond to anchor their investment portfolio and use the interest payments on the 
bonds they hold to finance more speculative movements in the stock market46. 
These dynamics are the foundations for the modern ratings industry. The explosion of the 
capital markets in the 1970s meant that these dynamics would have to be integrated into the 
essence of the ratings industry, and their methodologies subsequently aligned to them. This is 
because in the wake of the collapse of Penn Central in 1970, both investors and issuers 
required a third-party who, through a perceived reputation-based level of independence, 
                                                 
44 ibid. The rating of sovereign debt is proving to be particularly important with regard to the requirements of 
emerging markets that are now reliant upon access to the capital markets as opposed to the banking sector, see 
Constantin Mellios and Eric Paget-Blanc ‘The Impact of Economic and Political Factors on Sovereign Credit 
Ratings’ in Robert Kolb Sovereign Debt: From Safety to Default (John Wiley & Sons 2011) 325. 
45 Mobius notes that stockholders would theoretically much prefer a bond issuance to a stock sale, noting that 
the sale of shares would dilute the existing stockholder’s equity position, and that the corporation would gain tax 
benefits from issuing bonds whereas they would not if they issued new stock, see Mobius (n 42) 7. The 
theoretical consideration behind this is called ‘Capital Structure Theory’ and is concerned with the positive and 
negative dynamics of the two different types of financing (bond and stock issuances), for more on the theory see 
Stephen Lumby and Chris Jones Corporate Finance: Theory & Practice (Cengage Learning EMEA 2003); 
Arvin Ghosh Capital Structure and Firm Performance (Transaction Publishers 2012). For more on the 
consideration of tax deductions being a factor in selecting a method of financing see Doron Peleg Fundamental 
Models in Financial Theory (MIT Press 2014). For further analysis on the aspect of management losing or 
maintaining control of the company and the methodology of obtaining finance being central to that dynamic see 
P C Tulsian and Vishal Pandey Business Organisation and Management (Pearson Education India 2002) 14-9; 
Theodore Grossman and John L Livingstone The Portable MBS in Finance and Accounting (John Wiley & Sons 
2009) 147. Grossman and Livingstone also talk at length about what is considered to be the seminal work in this 
field written by Franco Modigliani and Merton H Miller ‘The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the 
Theory of Investment’ [1958] 48 The American Economic Review 3. Modigliani and Miller asserted that the 
value of a firm stems from the ‘cash-flow-generating ability’ of its assets, rather than the way in which it is 
financed, although it must be noted that the model the two scholars use is an absolutely ideal scenario rather 
than a real-world consideration. 
46 Mobius (n 42) 8. 
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could signify to the marketplace the creditworthiness of firms and their debt offerings47. 
‘Informational asymmetry’ is the term assigned to the informational gap that exists between 
investors and issuers, and represents the proclaimed justification for the existence and 
continuous usage of the agencies’ services. Investors do not have the resources to perform 
credit risk analysis on each of the issuers they wish to invest in as a rule, and even the largest 
investors who do have adequate risk analysis divisions would find it ineffective to conduct 
such wide ranging analysis when a third-party exists to complement their own 
investigations48. Also, issuers are more inclined to share more information with a third-party 
assessor than they are with individual investors, in turn avoiding duplication costs in the 
gathering and analysis of information, which is of increasing importance given the ever-
increasing complexities within the financial markets49. 
The agencies understand this and have developed their business accordingly:  
Through research, analysis, and information the nationally recognised credit rating 
agencies protect investors against unknowingly taking credit risk. Investment grade 
rating says something very specific. It says a particular instrument will pay interest 
and principle according to the terms of the indenture (contract). If you hold a twenty-
five-year, triple-A bond to maturity, you are assured of getting 100 percent of the 
principal and interest on a timely basis50. 
                                                 
47 Briefly, the collapse of the Penn Central Railroad company in 1970 triggered a systemic lack of trust in the 
creditworthiness of financial entities, meaning that a) investors needed independent assessments of a firm’s 
creditworthiness and b) issuers needed a reputable and impartial party to vouch for their creditworthiness. This 
is the most common hypothesis for the upsurge in the industry’s fortunes post-1970; for more on this see 3.3.1.1 
The Collapse of Penn Central Hypothesis. 
48 Mattarocci (n 8) 1. 
49 Andrew Crockett Conflicts of Interest in the Financial Services Industry: What Should We Do About Them? 
(Centre for Economic Policy Research 2003) 42. 
50 Baron (n 1) 81.  
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Though this level of certainty is a disputable notion51, it is theoretically correct that the 
inclusion of an investment-grade rating will more-or-less guarantee complete repayment, 
particularly with respect to corporate bonds52. The classification of what constitutes 
‘investment-grade’ and ‘non-investment-grade’ (also known as ‘speculative grade’) is the 
same amongst the Big Three, with the investment-grade rating ranging from AAA (Aaa for 
Moody’s) through to BBB- (Baa3 for Moody’s)53. It is worth noting that a change in credit 
rating is by ‘notch’ rather than Alphabetical letter in the first instance. This is because 
agencies attach notches to their ratings to signify more precisely their assessment of a given 
entity or its offerings. The notches are either ‘+’ or ‘-’, or ‘1, 2, or 3’ for Moody’s (this is in 
addition to their market signifiers that signify to the market the sentiment of the agency 
towards the short-term future of the rating54). Whilst it would be tempting to attach a table to 
this thesis detailing each agency’s ratings for us to compare, as some scholars have done, it is 
important that we understand that this would be hazardous for our assessment. It would be 
hazardous because each agency takes different aspects into account when developing their 
ratings. As well as differentiating their ratings based on short-term and long-term outlooks, 
the agencies also base their assessments on either default probability, or on the concept of 
                                                 
51 For a representative argument of the impossibility of guaranteeing certainty in this marketplace see Akos 
Rona-Tas and Stefanie Hiss ‘The Art of Corporate and The Science of Consumer Credit Rating’ in Michael 
Lounsbury and Paul M Hirsch Markets on Trial: The Economic Sociology of the U.S. Financial Crisis, Part 1 
(Emerald Group Publishing 2010) 117. Later in the thesis we will see how this notion of certainty is reputed by 
the industry in broader terms in order to limit the levels of liability it faces (see also Mattarocci [n 8] 2), and that 
the allure of the Triple-A rating only belongs to the corporate and sovereign issuance sectors in light of the 
dramatic failings of Triple-A rated securitised products in the Financial Crisis. 
52 Iain MacNeil ‘Credit Rating Agencies: Regulation and Financial Stability’ in Thomas Cottier, Rosa M Lastra, 
Christian Tietje, Lucia Satragno The Rule of Law in Monetary Affairs (CUP 2014) 180. 
53 Moody’s Rating Symbols and Definitions (2015); Standard & Poor’s Standard & Poor’s Ratings Definitions 
(2014); Fitch Ratings Definitions of Ratings and Other Forms of Opinion (2014). Rhee notes in addition to this 
that these taxonomical divisions which include finer divisions are not opinions of the value of a bond, merely 
the estimation of likelihood of default and failure to meet interest and principal payment; the value of bonds can 
depend on a large number of intrinsic and extrinsic factors, see Rhee (n 11) 91; Adams et al (n 4) 102.  
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expected loss, which incorporates ‘expected recovery in the event of default’55. In light of 
this, and although a unique definition of the ‘rating service’ has yet to be agreed upon, the 
declaration that ‘a rating is a synthetic judgement that summarises, using an alphanumeric 
scale, the main qualitative and quantitative characteristics of an issue or issuer’56 provides us 
with perhaps the simplest understanding of what the main service is that the agencies provide, 
at least providing us with something to build on. 
Understanding the role of the industry is more important still. We have already discussed the 
vast scope and subsequent recompense of the ratings industry, factors that indicate that the 
opinions of an agency have a direct effect upon the global allocation of credit57, which has 
the potential to impact the costs of an issuer dramatically. This in turn transfers the potential 
effect from the individual issuer to the marketplace as a whole, perhaps meaning that the 
opinions of the agencies are, in effect, macroeconomic factors58, not just unrelated 
judgements.  
This issue of ‘judgement’ is also an important factor to consider. The position of the agencies 
within the marketplace, between issuer and investor, has led people to conclude that the 
agencies are, in essence, auditors, similar to accountants or securities analysts. Pallante 
opines that the ‘third-party’ dynamic of the agencies’ position is what relates the ratings 
                                                 
55 Alcubilla and del Pozo (n 9) 59. See also John P Hunt ‘Rating Agencies and Credit Insurance’ in H K Baker 
and Gerald S Martin Capital Structure and Corporate Financing Decisions: Theory, Evidence, and Practice 
(John Wiley & Sons 2011) 300, who confirms that Moody’s ratings reflect the expected loss, and S&P’s reflect 
the risk of default. Hunt goes on to make the point that ‘although the agencies do not assert that their ratings are 
comparable across agencies, regulations and users often treat ratings as comparable’, a sentiment that draws 
explicit warning from Stebler who suggests that any results from a comparative study ‘should be interpreted 
with due care’, see Roman Stebler ‘Performance and Consistency of Credit Ratings in Structured Finance’ in 
Simone Westerfeld, Beatrix Wullschleger, and Pascal Gantenbein Proceedings of the Second International 
Conference on Credit Analysis and Risk Management (Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2014) 163. 
56 Mattarocci (n 8) 2. 
57 Naciri (n 36) 44. 
58 Manfred Gartner, Bjorn Griesbach, Florian Jung ‘PIGS or Lambs? The European Sovereign Debt Crisis and 
the Role of Rating Agencies’ [2011] 17 International Advances in Economic Research 288. 
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industry to the industries of recognised auditors59, although others have maintained that 
‘ratings are not audits of the entities being rated, nor are they designed to catch or prevent 
fraud’60. While this claim may be somewhat true, at least in the most rigid sense, it is 
somewhat ‘disingenuous’61. It is perhaps disingenuous because, as Darbellay makes clear, the 
regulatory rules established by the Dodd-Frank Act ‘result from the appreciation that CRAs 
play a fundamentally commercial role, thereby implying that they have to be subject to 
similar standards to other gatekeepers such as auditors and securities analysts’62. So, whilst 
they are not explicitly regarded as ‘auditors’ in the traditional sense, their positioning 
between issuers and investors has dictated that they are treated like an auditor. 
This position between the two pillars of the modern economy - the issuer and the investor - is 
a fascinating one. The dynamic between them is precarious at times, and the services offered 
by the agencies help each party to protect and advance their position. Alcubilla and del Pozo 
note that there are three main aspects to the agencies’ role with regards to issuers and 
investors. Firstly, they help mitigate the fundamental information asymmetry between the 
two parties. Secondly, the agency problem that is inherent within the modern economy can 
potentially be solved. With the largest investors being institutional investors (pensions funds, 
life insurers etc.), the ratings of the agencies can be used by the investors to dictate what 
investments the managers of the institutional investor (agent) can make on their behalf, which 
is one reason why most institutional investors are restricted to investing in AAA rated bonds 
and securities only63. Thirdly, the scholars suggest that the ratings can solve collective action 
problems in that the dispersed investors can use the ratings as a trigger for debt restructuring 
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without the administrative efforts that would be needed without the centralised views of the 
agencies64. 
The role the industry plays in the capital markets is important to understand, but can only 
really be understood when analysed in conjunction with how the market participants both use 
and view them. The investors, irrespective of their requirements (whether long- or short-term) 
use the ratings of the agencies as a common standardised benchmark to measure the credit 
risk of securities, whilst issuers request ratings only because investors use them. By paying 
the price for the ratings, issuers in turn lower their cost for placing their securities in the 
market place, by way of reducing interest rate payments65. Issuers also benefit from the 
arrangement by conveying to the market the effect of information that is confidential, via the 
authority of the intermediary (the rating agency)66. 
It has been noted that it may be useful to think of the issuers as the agencies’ ‘suppliers’, 
whilst investors are their ‘consumers’67. Because issuers rely upon the agencies to ensure the 
lowest rate of interest possible by way of a top-tier rating, issuers usually prefer to have more 
than one rating attached to their bond issuance, with there being examples of issuances 
containing three ratings in order to prove the creditworthiness to the market. Conversely, 
investors usually require fewer ratings, particularly institutional investors, as it has been 
argued that these sophisticated investors use the ratings as additional inputs into an already 
complicated risk analysis machine rather than the sole criteria for an investment decision. In 
this sense there is such a thing as too much information68. This notion of issuers being 
‘suppliers’ has had an effect upon how they conduct their business. Crockett notes that 
issuing companies often structure their issuances in order to achieve a desired rating. They 
                                                 
64 Alcubilla and del Pozo (n 9) 5. 
65 Alcubilla and del Pozo (n 9) 12. 
66 Mattarocci (n 8) 1; Crockett (n 49) 43. 
67 H K Baker and Sattar A Mansi ‘Assessing Credit Rating Agencies by Bond Issuers and Institutional 
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also create special-purpose entities that are specifically tailored for a designated investor who 
may have restrictions on what they can invest in, which in turn would reduce their borrowing 
costs69. 
While the processes of the agencies may seem to place the advantage with the issuer, the 
investor also uses ratings to their advantage, perhaps even more so than the issuer. The usage 
of ‘rating triggers’ are particularly useful for the investor when entering into contract with a 
borrower. These contractual provisions may include such aspects as the right to terminate the 
credit availability, accelerate credit obligations, or force the borrower to post collateral in the 
event of a rating change (downgrade)70. Though this has the potential to encourage a liquidity 
crisis on a vast scale, it nevertheless offers protection to the investor in a relationship where 
their resources are at stake. 
 
1.3.1 The Rating Process 
 
So far we have analysed the intricacies of the industry, in terms of what it does, its role within 
the marketplace, and how and why the two pillars of the capital markets use its services. Now 
though it is very important that we seek to understand the processes involved in the rating 
industry. Abrahams and Zhang remark that ratings ‘should reflect an unconditional view and 
be forward looking and independent of the economic cycle. In other words, a wide range of 
future economic conditions should be factored into the credit rating process’71. How agencies 
                                                 
69 Crockett (n 49) 41. 
70 Alcubilla and del Pozo (n 9) 13. The scholars note that most triggers are relatively harmless for the issuer, 
with increased interest rates providing a common example. 
71 Clark R Abrahams and Mingyuan Zhang Credit Risk Assessment: The New Lending System for Borrowers, 
Lenders, and Investors (John Wiley & Sons 2009) 227. 
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go about performing this difficult task will help us to assess the justification of the agencies’ 
position within the financial marketplace. 
The rating process differs between the leading agencies. Some agencies may follow the 
process of analysts forming reports based upon qualitative and quantitative factors, which 
they then submit to a rating committee for final evaluations. Though most agencies have 
rating committees, some agencies tend to place more emphasis upon statistical modelling 
programs which results in a more mechanical process72. This reliance upon statistical 
modelling has been recognised as being central to the structured finance instrument rating 
process also73. We have already seen how the dynamics of the oligopoly are affected by 
disparities between the rating processes, with Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s being defined 
by their differing characteristics74. However, MacNeil argues that although there are clear 
differences in their approach to rating, there are three distinct similarities between the rating 
agencies. Firstly MacNeil asserts that the ratings are characterised by the agencies as ‘an 
ordinal measure of credit risk rather than specific estimates of credit risk metrics such as 
default probability or expected loss’. He then argues that all three agencies distinguish 
between investment- and non-investment grade, which they do, and finally that rating 
stability is the primary objective of all of the CRAs75, which in light of the Financial Crisis 
has become a point of debate. 
Nevertheless, each agency does have its own procedure, but many aspects are indeed 
common. Firstly, the agency will have statistical models ready that contain algorithms that 
predict the statistical outcome of a given scenario, an example being what may happen to an 
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airline if the price of oil rose to $100 per barrel76. When an issuer requests a rating for their 
issuance, an analyst (or perhaps more depending on a number of factors) is assigned to that 
issuance. Analysts usually concentrate on one or two industries only, which allows for an 
accumulation of specific expertise77. The analyst then uses their expertise and whatever 
methods they deem appropriate, which may involve liaising with the management of the 
issuer78, to formulate a report that is to be presented to a convened rating committee. Rating 
committees vary according to the size and sensitivity of that particular rating. 
 
The Rating Committee 
 
The rating committee is championed as a vital part of the process. After the committee hears 
and debates the rating proposed to it by the analyst, it then casts a vote on what should be the 
final rating. This process is designed so that no one individual can have undue influence over 
the rating process. It is also championed as being the antidote to the issuer-pays conflict of 
interest, as agencies maintain that the committee has no revenue goal and therefore cannot be 
influenced by the will of the agency. However, McClesky rightly points out that it could be 
argued that although it is true that the analysts do not have specific revenue goals, their first- 
and/or second-level supervisors do, thus diminishing the desired effect79. Once the committee 
has come to an agreed rating, the issuer is given the option of appealing the decision based 
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upon the delivery of new information; the appeal process usually only spans a day or two80. 
After this period the rating is either released to the public or given to the issuer to release as 
an official corporate rating. 
 
1.3.2 Signalling to the Market 
 
Earlier we heard how the desired methodologies of the rating agencies would incorporate 
forward-thinking, cyclically immune considerations. The agencies attempt to meet this 
demand, though they also offer a different rating in order to cater for other investors. 
Although they represent the extremes of the rating methodological scale, both the point-in-
time (PIT) system and through-the-cycle (TTC) system are important endpoints to consider. 
A good description of what these endpoints achieve for the investors is that a ‘PIT-PD 
(Probability of Default) describes the actual creditworthiness within a certain time horizon, 
whereas TTC-PDs also take into account possible changes in the macro-economic 
conditions’81. It is rare however that an agency would rate an entity solely within the 
parameters of just one of these endpoints. 
In order to have a greater range of flexibility with regards to their placing of the ratings 
within the economic cycle, agencies have addendums to their ratings. These signals are 
attached to the ratings in order to signify to the investor the agencies’ belief in the current and 
future creditworthiness of the issuer and/or the issuance. These addendums come in two 
categories and have different purposes. Firstly there is the rating outlook, which represents 
the agency’s opinion on the development of the credit rating over the medium term. Then 
there is the rating watchlist, which is a stronger, more concerning statement for the issuer and 
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focuses upon a much shorter time horizon, usually around three months82. The watchlist 
comes into effect when a deviation from an expected trend takes place or is expected to take 
place, in which case additional information is required based upon the given scenario83. 
Bannier and Hirsch note that while rating downgrades alert the market to issuers’ lack of 
capability to maintain their credit quality, ‘watchlist-downgrades allow to inform market 
participants of borrowers’ lack of success in the attempt to do so’84.  
These market signifiers are of crucial importance in the capital markets as the fluidity of the 
marketplace requires constant attention. Any delay in action or information could cost vast 
sums of money for those exposed to certain circumstances; this is clearly evident within the 
securitisation process85. Though this chapter will not go into tremendous detail regarding the 
securitisation process, it is worth mentioning the role of the industry86 in the process in light 
of the analysis above. In doing so we may then be able to better understand the regulatory 
analysis that follows. 
Asset securitisation involves the pooling of a certain category of loans into a pool that is then 
sold to investors. The interest and principal payments of these loans are paid to investors in a 
particular order, dependent upon which slice, or ‘tranche’ (French for slice) of the pool they 
purchase (this process is known as ‘credit enhancement’, as it allows the agencies to attach 
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higher ratings to the product as a whole and thus make it more marketable). Credit rating 
agencies give the most secure tranches their highest rating, which in turn encourages risk-
averse and regulatory constrained investors to partake in the process87. The pool is divided 
into particular categories of tranches, with the senior category being followed by the 
mezzanine tranches and then finally by the equity tranches, with the investors in the equity 
tranches the least likely to be paid in the event of a pool-wide default. For the process to work 
investors must invest into each division of the pool. With regards to Residential Mortgage-
Backed Securities that came to define the Financial Crisis, the Banks invested in the senior 
tranches, the insurance industry invested in the mezzanine tranches (still rated A by the 
agencies), and the hedgefunds invested in the equity tranches, chasing the huge returns their 
clients demanded of them88. 
It is worth noting the fee structure that agencies adopted, primarily through this extraordinary 
and complicated89 process. In 2007, a representative fee for a long-term corporate bond issue 
ranged from 2 to 4.5 basis points of the principal for each year the rating was maintained, and 
12 basis points for Collateralised Debt Obligations (Structured Finance Instruments used in 
the securitisation process)90. A basis point represents 1/100th of 1 percent, so an issue of $1 
billion would cost the issuer $1.2 million at 12 basis points, for example. Though this rate 
looks inconsequential, the trillions of dollars’ worth of securitised products that were rated 
during such a short period demonstrates the precise reason for the record-breaking revenues 
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collected by the agencies since the turn of the century. For corporate and sovereign issues the 
fees are much more modest, though still extremely lucrative91. 
 
1.3.3 Credit Rating Agencies and Issuers: A Two-Way Street 
 
It is worth considering that although the issuers depend on the agencies to facilitate the 
distribution of their issuances throughout the capital markets, agencies depend upon the 
issuers to maintain their position. Whilst it is argued that agencies preserve the value of their 
ratings by maintaining a good reputation for the accuracy of their service92, this remains a 
controversial issue, as we shall see in the following chapters. However, what is true is that 
despite the criticisms of the agencies, their reputation is dependent upon the truthful 
disclosure from the issuing party93. Though there are regulations to force this from the issuer, 
the agencies are still at the mercy of the issuing party, a fact proven by the Enron scandal94.  
In addition to this, there are two competing views as to the informational value of the ratings 
produced by the agencies. One side argues that the agencies are specialists in procuring and 
processing financial information, ultimately generating previously unknown information for 
the financial marketplace. The other side however argues that the agencies merely process 
                                                 
91 Moody’s and S&P have listed prices of 3.25 basis points on issues going up to $500 million, with a maximum 
fee of $125,000 (S&P) and $130,000 (Moody’s). Both firms then charge an additional 2 basis points on amounts 
exceeding $500 million, see Tony Van Gestel and Bart Baesens Credit Risk Management: Basic Concepts: 
Financial Risk Components, Rating Analysis, Models, Economic and Regulatory Capital (OUP 2008) 153. 
Sovereign fees tend to range from $60,000 to $100,000, see Naciri (n 36) 16. 
92 Howell E Jackson ‘The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Establishment of Capital Standards for 
Financial Institutions in a Global Economy’ in Eilis Ferran and Charles A E Goodhart Regulating Financial 
Services and Markets in the Twenty First Century (Hart Publishing 2001) 312. 
93 Orkun Akseli ‘Was Securitisation the Culprit? Explanation of Legal Processes Behind Creation of Mortgage-
Backed Sub-Prime Securities’ in Joanna Gray and Orkun Akseli Financial Regulation in Crisis?: The Role of 
Law and the Failure of Northern Rock (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011) 11. 
94 For analysis of the Rating Agencies’ involvement in the collapsing of Energy giant Enron Corporation in 
2001 see Macey (n 106); Hill (n 106). For more on the collapse more generally see Denis Collins Behaving 
Badly: Ethical Lessons from Enron (Dog Ear Publishing 2006); Malcolm S Salter Innovation Corrupted: The 
Origins and Legacy of Enron’s Collapse (Harvard University Press 2008); Frank Partnoy Infectious Greed: 
How Deceit and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets (Profile Books 2010). 
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publicly available information that results in a general lagging in the financial marketplace 
with respect to information95. Whilst these arguments each have merit, the introduction of 
regulatory reliance fundamentally altered the character and trajectory of the industry. It is at 
this point that introducing the nature of the regulatory parameters that theoretically constrain 
the ratings industry will be beneficial to our understanding of the industry as a whole. 
 
1.4 A Snapshot of the Regulatory Framework 
 
Before this section begins it would be perhaps useful to draw a distinction between two 
different connotations when the word ‘regulation’ is introduced to the credit rating 
discussion. On the one hand credit ratings are used by regulators to affect other parts of the 
economy. For example, banking regulators have, since the 1930s, required that banks only 
hold assets that are considered ‘investment grade’ by the leading rating agencies (it is 
acknowledged that after the Dodd-Frank Act this is technically not the case anymore); this 
may be known as ‘regulatory usage’ of credit ratings. On the other hand is the regulation of 
the credit rating agencies, which dictates actions they must take to be considered as a 
registered and usable rating agency. 
Now that this distinction has been made, it must be stated that credit ratings have a variety of 
uses in terms of regulatory usage, and are utilised by regulatory agencies across a broad 
spectrum of financial industries. They are used to identify or classify assets, provide a 
credible evaluation of the credit risk associated with assets purchased as part of a 
securitisation offering, determine disclosure requirements, and also to determine prospectus 
                                                 
95 Roman Kräussl ‘The Impact of Sovereign Rating Changes During Emerging Market Crises’ in Michael 
Frenkel, Alexander Karmann, Bert Scholtens Sovereign Risk and Financial Crises (Springer Science and 
Business Media 2013) 92. 
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eligibility, though the most common usage by the authorities is to use them to determine 
capital requirements96. This is in relation to the usage of the ratings to designate the 
permissible or required investments of certain financial institutions, like banks or institutional 
investors97. The ratings are used to ensure that risks are ‘properly managed, disclosed and 
priced, as well as supported by sufficient capital to protect certain classes of claims holders, 
including depositors and policy holders’98. This concept of protection is also witnessed in the 
fact that structured securities are rated by ‘one or more credit rating agencies, especially 
when they are sold to retail (non-professional) investors’99. 
With regards to the regulation of the credit rating agencies, and in keeping with the 
characteristic of complexity that seems to be inherently attached to the provision of credit 
ratings, the regulatory environment is, and perhaps always has been a complicated affair. One 
of the main reasons for this is that up until 2006 the Ratings Industry was not extensively or 
directly regulated. Before this the Industry was subject to being used in regulations and legal 
considerations regarding a number of different areas of the economy, but was never directly 
regulated whilst being elevated to such an influential position. For example, before the Great 
Depression it was the Judiciary who were mainly involved with any sort of ‘oversight’ of the 
industry, although that mostly took the form of actions against the agencies for defamation 
arising out of the content of their publications100. In the wake of the Great Depression, 
regulators such as the Comptroller of the Currency began to incorporate the ratings of the 
                                                 
96 Alcubilla and del Pozo (n 9) 16. 
97 ibid 17; United States Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Wall Street and the Financial 
Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse (GPO 2011) 27. 
98 Crockett (n 49) 43. 
99 Alcubilla and del Pozo (n 9) 17. 
100 The ‘Reports’ of the Credit Reporting Agencies, the precursor to the modern day rating agency, and the 
ratings of the very early rating agencies such as John Moody’s Companies, Standard Statistics, and Henry 
Poor’s Company, were regularly the object of the Judiciary’s considerations in libel cases. For more on this 
fascinating era for the Industry see Marc Flandreau and Gabriel G Mesevage ‘The Untold History of 
Transparency: Mercantile Agencies, the Law, and the Lawyers (1851-1916)’ [2014] Enterprise and Society 220. 
The vast majority of the cases held that the products of the agencies did not represent ‘privileged 
communications’ owing to the fact that the agencies could not guarantee that the details could be restricted to 
the purchasing subscriber. The authors detail the methods used by the agencies to circumvent this legal barrier.  
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agencies into their regulations of certain financial markets101, embedding them into important 
financial sectors whilst the industry remained free from direct regulation. This practice 
continued, with the Industry being directly excluded from the landmark pieces of legislation 
that defined the post-Depression era102. In 1973, the SEC promoted ‘Rule 15c3-1’ (later 
promulgated in 1975), which had the effect of attaching the ratings of the agencies to the Net 
Capital requirements that constrained brokers and dealers by way of ‘haircuts’103. 
This Rule however subsequently introduced the first element of regulation concerning the 
Industry directly, although to call it regulation is slightly misleading. In order to clarify which 
agencies’ ratings were to be used when formulating the ‘haircuts’, the SEC attributed the 
term ‘Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating Organisation’ (NRSRO) to a small number of 
agencies104 through a process known as the ‘no-action letter’, which entailed SEC staff not 
recommending ‘enforcement action against broker-dealers who used the agency’s ratings for 
purposes of complying with the net capital rule’105. This attribution in turn conferred the 
NRSRO status throughout all other US statutes and regulations were it was deemed 
appropriate. 
This was the environment up until 2005. The emphasis began to change for a number of 
reasons, although two are logically more relevant than any others. Firstly, it has been widely 
                                                 
101 In 1931 the Comptroller of the Currency John W. Pole began a procedural change in the Office’s valuations 
of bonds in national bank portfolios, namely that bonds held by these banks rated below the BBB threshold 
could no longer be held and had to be written off, for more see Herwig P Langohr and Patricia T Langohr The 
Rating Agencies and Their Credit Ratings: What They Are, How They Work, and Why They are Relevant (John 
Wiley & Sons 2010) 429; Marc Flandreau and Joanna K Sławatyniec ‘Understanding Rating Addiction: US 
Courts and the Origins of Rating Agencies’ Regulatory Licence (1900-1940)’ [2013] 20 Financial History 
Review 3 238.  
102 The Banking Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 only specified that the regulations of 
the given regulatory body (the OCC) be confirmed by those laws. 
103 17 C.F.R. 240.15c3-1; H David Kotz, the Inspector General for the SEC from 2007 to 2012, describes a 
‘haircut’ in relation to Rule 15c3-1 as the ‘Rule that requires that a broker-dealer, when computing net capital, 
deduct from its net worth a certain percentage of the market value of its proprietary securities position, known as 
a “haircut”’, see H David Kotz ‘The SEC’s Role Regarding and Oversight of Nationally Recognised Statistical 
Rating Organisations’ [2009] 458 Securities and Exchange Commission: Report of the Inspector General. 
104 The term was declared by the SEC in the amendments to Rule 15c3-1, see Notice of Revision Proposed 
Amendments to Rule 15c3-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 34-10, 525, 1973 SEC 
LEXIS 2309 (Nov. 29, 1973). 
105 Alcubilla and del Pozo (n 9) 6. 
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noted that whilst rating agencies are not technically set up to detect fraudulent activity, their 
performance in the Enron scandal was far from desirable, particularly as up until four days 
before declaring bankruptcy Enron’s debt was still rated as ‘investment grade’ by all of the 
major agencies106. When we include the involvement of the ratings industry in the Asian 
Financial Crisis of the late 1990s107, together with the fact that The Big Three’s revenues and 
profits were consistently rising since the turn of the century, it is clear to see why legislators 
felt the need to introduce legislation for this industry for the first time. 
The Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Relief Act of 2005108 was primarily concerned with the 
resolving of what was recognised as a ‘Catch-22’ situation whereby new entrants to the 
industry had to be nationally recognised in order to gain a licence, yet could not be nationally 
recognised without having been granted a licence. The Duopoly Relief Act’s proposed 
resolution was to remove the SEC’s designation system and introduce a system whereby an 
agency that had been registered and operating for no less than three years could be granted 
NRSRO status109. The Duopoly Relief Act also sought to increase the capability of the SEC 
to interfere with the processes of the agencies, in spite of the Act’s admonition of the SEC for 
its role in creating an artificial barrier to entry. However, this was vehemently opposed and 
eventually diluted in the final version of the Act so that the SEC could not interfere with 
aspects such as rating methodology. The Act was eventually enacted in 2006. 
The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 was enacted to ‘improve ratings quality for 
the protection of investors and in the public interest by fostering accountability, transparency, 
                                                 
106 Claire A Hill ‘Regulating the Rating Agencies’ [2004] 82 Washington University Law Review 1 43. See also 
Jonathan R Macey ‘A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate Concerning the 
Relative Efficiency of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules’ [2003] 81 Washington University Law Quarterly 329 
for further analysis of the failings of the CRI in relation to Enron’s collapse. 
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Joseph Stiglitz ‘The Procyclical Role of Rating Agencies: Evidence from the East Asian Crisis’ [1999] 28 
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and competition in the credit rating agency industry’110. The CRA Reform Act recognised the 
importance of the industry to the health of the economy, in what it termed its importance to 
‘interstate commerce’, and that the SEC required ‘statutory authority to oversee the industry’ 
(something which the SEC had been calling for itself)111. It granted the SEC this authority by 
requiring all NRSROs to officially register with the SEC for the first time. 
However, with the CRA Reform Act being retroactive, in that it was promoted as a result of 
findings from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002112 (SOX), it did not prepare the regulatory 
environment for what was to happen just two years later. In fact, the only mention of 
mortgage-backed securities in the CRA Reform Act was that agencies were prohibited from 
threatening an issuer with a ratings downgrade or withdrawal in the event that the agency was 
not to rate the entire pool of assets (a process referred to as ‘notching’)113.  
The legislative framework surrounding the ratings industry was therefore strengthened by the 
Dodd-Frank Act, which was a wide ranging piece of legislature enacted in direct response to 
the systemic crisis experienced in 2007/08. With regards to the Ratings Industry, the Dodd-
Frank Act was particularly extensive, amending numerous elements of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934 that had been the dominant statute up unto that point (taking into 
consideration numerous amendments throughout the years of course). Just some of the 
highlights of the Dodd-Frank Act included removing regulatory reliance upon the ratings of 
the industry by way of striking references to NRSROs within laws and regulations; increasing 
disclosure to the SEC; increasing internal compliance structures; changes in the rules 
governing the relationship between agency members and issuer members; and crucially the 
removal of legislative protection regarding their liability against legal action (in that the 
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products of the agencies do not merely represent ‘journalistic opinions’ unreservedly 
protected by the First Amendment, as was previously the case), although there are many 
more. The Dodd-Frank Act also instructed the SEC to introduce the Office of Credit Ratings, 
to ‘monitor the activities’ and conduct examinations of registered NRSROs to ‘assess and 
promote compliance with statutory and Commission requirements’114. 
The legislation covering the practices of the rating agencies are therefore administered and 
monitored by the regulatory body, the Securities and Exchange Commission. Non-
compliance with these rules may be subject to fines or a withdrawal of registration. However, 
the presence of potentially fraudulent activities concerning the rating agencies’ role in the 
securitisation process115 means that these punishments are simply not appropriate, in theory. 
When fraudulent activities are suspected, with there being enough evidence to indict, the US 
Department of Justice is apparently the body that enters the regulatory framework. The issue 
of fraudulent activity within the financial markets comes under the collaborative mandate of 
the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force116, with the DOJ taking the lead role in 
prosecuting those accused117. The difference in penalty is no different it appears, given the 
recent settlement between the DOJ and Standard & Poor’s when S&P was fined a record 
$1.375 billion for its role in the losses of federally insured institutions118. During the 
investigation S&P had accused the U.S. Government of indicting the agency simply because 
S&P had lowered the United States’ sovereign rating, which perhaps indicates the level of 
effrontery that exists within the Big Three. Unfortunately, as part of the settlement S&P were 
                                                 
114 Securities and Exchange Commission About the Office of Credit Ratings. 
115 The Senate Committee charged with investigating the causes of the crisis referred to the word ‘fraud’ 157 
times during their investigation across the whole spectrum of the financial arena with respect to the Financial 
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[2014] The Huffington Post (Jan. 14). 
116 The Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force was created in 2009 by President Barack Obama and consists 
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the task force and its composition see Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force About the Task Force (2015). 
117 Department of Justice Offices of the United States Attorneys: Securities Fraud (2015). 
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allowed to deny any violations of the law, although it did sign a statement of facts 
acknowledging that its executives delayed implementing new models that produced more 
negative ratings in 2005119. This was accompanied by an agreed upon apology by S&P for 
accusing the government of foul play. 
Although this thesis is predominantly focusing upon the regulatory framework surrounding 
the ratings industry in its host jurisdiction, the United States, one international body is 
seemingly important to the framework in terms of setting standards that national legislators 
then incorporate. The International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) is an 
international body founded in 1983 and based in Madrid, Spain, that ‘brings together the 
world’s securities regulators and is recognised as the global standard setter for the securities 
sector’120. Before the Crisis it laid out its principles regarding the rating industry, firstly in 
2003 with its ‘Statement of Principles Regarding the Activities of the Credit Rating 
Agencies’, and then in 2004 with its ‘Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating 
Agencies’121. Led by a Commissioner of the US SEC (Roel C Campos), IOSCO affirmed 
four key principles: that rating actions should reduce information asymmetry; should be 
independent; should pursue transparency and disclosure, and should maintain in confidence 
all non-public reports122. 
While the principals are important, it is the Code of Conduct Fundamentals that is of most 
interest. Revised in 2008 and again in 2015123, it originally prescribed that the CRAs should 
each ‘adopt, publish, and adhere to its Code of Conduct’124. This is demonstrable of the issues 
that surrounded the ratings industry prior to 2006. The Code of Conduct Fundamentals, as 
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well as the Principles, is referred to as ‘Soft Law’125, meaning that they are not legally 
binding. The organisation allows for a great deal of discretion on behalf of the agencies in 
light of this fact126, and operates a ‘comply-or-explain’ principle with regard to the adherence 
of their prescribed regulations127. While one could be forgiven for thinking that such a 
permissive framework would lead to noncompliance, the agencies were already in 
compliance (and even more so) with the proposed regulations before they were enacted by 
the IOSCO128, which may hint at the level at which the proposals were pitched. 
In the aftermath of the Crisis the organisation revised their regulations with the 2008 version 
of the Code of Conduct Fundamentals. In that version they sought to strengthen the rules 
aimed at preventing or limiting conflicts of interest, the separation of analysts from the 
commercial side of the ratings business, and rating methodology transparency with particular 
regard to the separate definition of rating symbols for structured products129. Whilst their 
regulations may be non-binding, they did have a tremendous effect upon regulations that 
were being constructed at the time, particularly in the US and the EU. This multilateral 
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The aim of this chapter was to provide a primer on the credit rating industry. Having 
established this elementary foundation, the thesis can now embark upon more complex 
arguments regarding the nature of the industry and the provision of ratings moreover, all for 
the purposes of introducing a reform proposal that may be able to address deficiencies in the 
provision of ratings and redress the Industry’s role in the economy for the good of the wider 
public. The chapter was tasked with answering three main questions: Who are the Rating 
Agencies? What is it that they do (and what is their role)? And finally what is the regulatory 
framework that governs them? 
Firstly we were introduced to the ‘Big Three’: Moody’s; Standard & Poor’s; and Fitch 
Ratings. These three agencies are extraordinarily dominant in the global provision of credit 
ratings, and have capitalised upon their position to become major factors in the global 
economy. Furthermore, we saw how these agencies have diversified their business models in 
response to the securitisation boom in that they now all offer ‘Ancillary Services’, which 
include many important influential elements rather than just being ‘products and services that 
are not credit ratings’ as we heard from Moody’s. The divisions actually play a vital role in 
building the fortunes of the agencies, in that they not only provide additional lucrative 
services that are essentially addendums to the business of producing credit ratings, but they 
control and manage the company’s sales and marketing elements as well. This is a 
particularly important consideration for this thesis. 
The next challenge for the thesis was to detail and analyse the role of the industry within the 
economy. This endeavour also included assessing what the agencies actually did, who uses 
their output, and how they conducted their business; the answers to these questions result in 
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an interesting conclusion. Whilst the many criticisms that will be incorporated into the rest of 
this thesis regarding the credit rating agencies are for the most part valid, it is extremely 
important to remember that the ratings industry plays a crucial role in the modern economy. 
In section 1.2 The Industry: What It Does, we saw a wide range of elements that attest to this 
understanding; the agencies are perhaps ‘all things to all men’. Investors find them extremely 
useful and use them strategically to protect and advance their position, whereas issuers rely 
on the agencies to facilitate their existence and provide the mechanism (debt issuance) to 
support their organisational requirements. The vast capital markets also rely upon the 
agencies, in that the trust to commit to the exchange, whether by investing or issuing, is 
fundamentally tied to the trust in the accuracy of the rating agencies’ output. We shall also 
see in the next chapter how the role of the Industry is ideologically important to this market-
driven modern society130. These assertions provide great examples of why the regulation of 
these entities has to be flawless. 
The multilateral regulatory framework that governs the credit rating industry is fascinating. It 
is fascinating simply because it is tasked with regulating a truly unique industry. We saw in 
1.3 A Snapshot of the Regulatory Framework a system that has a number of competing 
viewpoints and agendas. The SEC have been tasked with being at the forefront of regulating 
and monitoring the ratings industry, as prescribed by the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 
of 2006, and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. Yet, a large number of the prescribed rules that the 
Commission must ensure compliance with came from the collaborative efforts of the IOSCO. 
Whilst the internationally collaborative efforts of the IOSCO sound appealing, different 
jurisdictions are exposed to the positive and negative elements of the ratings industry in 
differing levels; this inclusion of competing perspectives has the potential to impede effectual 
                                                 
130 This issue forms a major part of the next chapter. For a basic overview of this importance see Gregory 
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development. Furthermore, when things become sensational, the SEC is removed out of the 
equation131, indicating a regulatory framework that is dominated by competing pressures 
rather than a shared vision. 
Perhaps in light of this, there is a continued criticism of the regulatory framework that 
governs the ratings industry. The response to the era-defining Financial Crisis has had a 
number of effects. Firstly, it has illustrated the serious flaws that existed before the crisis. The 
sheer number of aspects included in the Dodd-Frank Act concerning credit rating agencies 
suggests that the regulatory framework pre-crisis was simply not good enough; the 
understanding that the industry was not directly regulated before 2006 is perhaps shocking in 
itself. Secondly, it has illustrated the response that is viewed by those who can affect change 
as being appropriate or achievable. In finding that the leading agencies conducted their 
business fraudulently, deceiving and failing large and important institutional investors, the 
fact that the only viable option available to the United States Department of Justice was a 
$1.375 billion fine is perhaps representative of the state of affairs, particularly when we 
consider that the DOJ was originally seeking to fine S&P $5 billion132. The fact that 
continued claims of deliberate fraudulent activity have not resulted in any criminal 
prosecutions is telling. What it may also represent is the parameters within which any reform 
proposal aimed at correcting imbalances within the Ratings Industry should be placed. This 
thesis is mindful of this and aims to consider its reform proposal within exactly these 
parameters. 
                                                 
131 Two examples provide evidence of this. Firstly, the establishment of the US Treasury Department (together 
with the Federal Reserve) as the leading agency in resolving the Financial Crisis was extremely telling, see 
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Now that we have an understanding about who the credit rating agencies are, what it is that 
they do, their role within the economy, and the regulatory framework that governs them, it is 
now important to ask more probing questions. If the proposal that rating agencies be forced to 
choose between producing credit ratings or providing ancillary services, in order to align their 
output to the public interest more closely, is to be communicated effectively, then 
understanding the dynamics of their position is clearly important. Now we shall assess not 
only the role of the agencies, but crucially how that role is intellectually created and 
perceived, rather than it being a natural role that they inhabit. In addressing the creation of 
that role and how it is perceived, patterns emerge that suggest that the escalation of the 
agencies’ position despite having their regulatory assistance withdrawn is due to a historical 
belief in the capability of the ratings industry to serve anything other than itself. 
Unfortunately, regulators and legislators are badly misguided in this belief. 
The next task of the thesis is to address what may be termed the ‘normative’: to identify what 
role the credit rating agency ought to play, both in terms of what is expected from them from 
a number of parties and what they themselves profess to do. Having achieved that, we can 
then go on to measure the extent to which, in actual reality, agencies have failed to measure 

























As was stated in 0.1 Research Methodology, this thesis can be categorised as a normative 
endeavour. Whilst the approach of establishing what is and then advancing a projected 
version of what ought to be is the quintessential normative approach, this thesis, as discussed 
in 0.1, requires a slightly different approach, simply because of the nature of the ratings 
industry. In order to advance the sentiment of the thesis, it will be necessary to firstly 
establish what ought to be, then evaluate how and why the agencies do not meet this standard, 
and then prescribe a measure which may contribute to the agencies actually performing in a 
manner which resembles what was previously advanced as what they ought to be doing. 
However, this simple endeavour becomes a little convoluted when one understands that the 
normative vision for the agencies, i.e. what they ought to be doing, is precisely what it is the 
agencies say they do; one does not have to develop a new idea here. So, in essence, the aim is 
to make the agencies behave how they say they do. 
This Chapter will begin by doing two things. Firstly, it will establish what certain parties who 
are irrevocably tied to the agencies would be reasonably expected to desire from the 
agencies. It is worth pausing for a moment here to make this point as clear as is possible: 
sections 2.2.1; 2.2.2; and 2.2.3 are describing the desires of issuers, investors, and the state, as 
if they were purely acting how one may reasonably expect them to, almost in the mode of a 
survey. For example, when we see the desired situation for the state, it is entirely reasonable 
that the state would want to advance the fortunes of society and not actively seek to harm it, 
with the state being the manifestation of society. Whilst these quintessential positions are 
admittedly contentious in certain areas (how the state should seek to advance the fortunes of 
society may be different to different people for example), it is a useful foundation for us to 
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show the divergence that exists with regards to the ratings industry. That divergence will be 
demonstrated when we go through 2.3 The Actual Situation, because we shall see that nearly 
all of the parties act in a very different manner to how one may reasonably believe that they 
should; this then provides us with the basis to assess whether legislation considers the actual 
performance and character of the parties, or whether it looks to bring about the desired 
situation whilst ignoring the actual, which will inevitably result in no development at all.  
With what is to be reasonably expected of these parties being established in the first three 
subsections, the second aim of 2.2 The Desired Situation will then be met. The normative 
aspect of this Chapter actually lies in the subsection, 2.2.4 ‘Public Interest’ or ‘Public 
Protection’?, because all that went before it, i.e. the desired situation for issuers, investors, 
and the state, all essentially form a survey of what any rational thinker may expect of each 
party. In 2.2.4 however, the thesis will raise its metaphorical head above the parapet and 
declare what it believes should be the way forward for economic reform in general. This 
takes the form of discussing what is meant by the term ‘public interest’, because, for the 
thesis, it is a concept that is easily manipulated to serve certain people to the detriment of the 
public at large. So, with that in mind, the thesis will call for a change in sentiment with 
regards to economic reform, so that the notion of ‘public protection’ is placed at the forefront 
of legislators’ thinking in order to safeguard the most vulnerable in society from the iniquities 
of the financial sector.    
Essentially, the point of this Chapter is not to establish how far the agencies have deviated 
from what they ought to be doing in order to paint a fatalistic picture. The point, which is a 
key sentiment for the communication of this thesis, is that in order to have any chance of 
implementing impactful change for the protection of the public we must understand how 
powerful, entrenched, and callous the agencies are; we must understand our point of 




2.2 The Desired Situation 
 
Before we proceed, the point established in the introduction to this Chapter must be repeated. 
What follows, in terms of the desired situation for issuers, investors, and the state, is purely 
what one may reasonably expect these parties to desire, given the pressures that affect their 
outlook i.e. investors want returns on their investment, and the state wants to reduce its costs 
whilst maintaining economic safety. Ultimately, it will help our understanding of what can be 
done to reform the agencies if we start by understanding the environment within which they 
operate; as these three parties represent the most important aspects of the environment to the 
largest rating agencies, understanding what they ought to expect will show us how the 
agencies ought to act, which is the foundation required for developing this notion of there 
being a divergence that needs to be incorporated into rating agency reform. 
 
2.2.1 The Desired Situation for Issuers 
 
In the first chapter it was established that credit rating agencies serve a number of important 
functions with regards to the advancement of an issuer. Initially, we saw how companies 
would need to engage with credit rating agencies in order to enter the capital markets. Just 
one reason why a company would want to enter the capital markets in order to raise funds to 
meet financial requirements is because it represents a viable alternative to issuing stock in the 
company which, as a system of financing operations, has a number of potentially undesired 
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consequences1. Additionally, once the company has decided that it will attempt to raise 
capital through the issuance of bonds rather than stocks, it requires the rating of a rating 
agency in order to signal its capacity to repay its obligations and in turn lower its rate of 
interest upon its payments to the creditor2.  
This issue of reducing the interest payments upon its debt is obviously a crucial aim for any 
company issuing bonds in the capital market. If we take the quintessential issuer and analyse 
how it would ideally look at the capital markets, then it is reasonable to come to the 
conclusion that the aim would be to signal the capacity of the company to repay its debts to 
the entirety of the marketplace and thus allow for its maximum exposure to the marketplace, 
which would theoretically have the effect of driving down its interest payments due to the 
wide variety of potential creditors. Therefore, what is referred to as ‘Signalling Theory’ is an 
important aspect for us to consider. 
When we analysed the concept of ‘information asymmetry’ earlier it was done under the 
guise of the credit rating agencies reducing that asymmetry for investors, in terms of 
providing a rating that simplified and standardised complex financial information about 
issuing companies and their bonds3. Synergistically, the same role of the ratings industry 
positively affects the issuer.  While reducing informational asymmetry allows investors to 
theoretically invest with greater confidence in the levels of risk they are undertaking, it also 
allows issuers access to investors and allows them to drive their interest payments down 
depending upon the quality of rating they can attract. Rousseau notes that the sheer presence 
of a high quality credit rating, AAA for example, denotes not only the capacity of the 
company to repay its debt, but its position within the economy owing to the fact that the high 
costs of obtaining a rating to low-standard issuers make it highly likely that only a large and 
                                                 
1 See 1.3. The Industry: What It Does (n 45). 
2 ibid (pg 18). 
3 ibid (n 48). 
67 
 
successful entity is able to achieve such a high rating in the first place4; there are very few 
companies in the world that hold such high credit ratings5. 
So, ‘Signalling Theory’ basically details the process whereby issuers who have a good credit 
quality can communicate this fact to investors to receive a higher market valuation6. This is 
done by issuers divulging sensitive information to the third-party (the rating agency) who can 
then ‘transform’ this information into a manner that reveals the implications of that 
information without revealing its detailed content7. This process relies upon both publically-
available information and the amount of detail divulged by the issuing company; it is usual 
practice that the Investment Relations Officer of a given firm will have a very close 
relationship with the rating agency and will provide information in great detail whilst also 
communicating why certain decisions have been taken by the management of that 
organisation8. 
There is however a danger for issuers when issuing new debt instruments, which is why it is 
extremely important for them that reputable and trusted rating agencies rate their issuances. It 
is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, the cost of obtaining a rating is particularly 
high. Secondly, excessive issuance by a company has the potential to demonstrate an air of 
financial difficulty or the need of the business to avoid traditional financing options i.e. 
financing from banks that have strict lending practices (theoretically)9. So, reducing the cost 
(by way of reduced interest payments) through obtaining a high rating from a reputable 
                                                 
4 Stéphane Rousseau ‘Enhancing the Accountability of Credit Rating Agencies: The Case for a Disclosure-based 
Approach’ [2005] Capital Markets Institute 8. 
5 At the time of writing only three American-based companies hold AAA ratings: Johnson & Johnson; 
Microsoft; and ExxonMobile Corp, see Mark Morelli ‘These 3 Companies Have Debt Rated “AAA” But Not 
All Are Buys’ [2015] Seekingalpha.com 
6 Yair Listokin and Benjamin Taibleson ‘If You Misrate, Then You Lose: Improving Credit Rating Accuracy 
Through Incentive Compensation’ [2010] 27 Yale Journal on Regulation 96. 
7 Gianluca Mattarocci The Independence of Credit Rating Agencies: How Business Models and Regulators 
Interact (Academic Press 2014) 1. 
8 Steven M Bragg Running an Effective Relations Department: A Comprehensive Guide (John Wiley & Sons 
2010) 169. 
9 Mattarocci (n 7) 18. 
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agency alleviates any concerns regarding the motive for issuing in the first place, thus making 
their securities more marketable10. 
It is clear to see why rating agencies are considered vital to the health of issuing companies. 
They stand at the precipice with regards to the navigation of companies through economic 
cycles. For the issuer, credit rating agencies serve a number of vital functions. Through 
allowing the company to disclose sensitive information to the marketplace without being at 
risk of that information being used against them by competitors, the rating agencies allow 
issuers access to considerable amounts of potential capital with which to fund their 
operations. They also significantly reduce the level of cost for the issuer by attaching their 
reputation to the process which reduces their costs by way of monetising the trust that 
investors have in the agencies. As one can plainly see, the desired situation with regards to 
the issuer is irrevocably dependent upon trust. Issuers rely upon the trust that investors have 
in the capability of rating agencies to produce impartial financial information, whereas the 
rating agencies must rely upon the issuers to reveal the correct (and full) information in order 
for them to formulate accurate ratings, and thus preserve the agencies’ reputation. However, 
this understanding of what is desired is just that; in reality the situation is widely different, as 
we shall see in 2.2 The Actual Situation. 
 
2.2.2 The Desired Situation for Investors 
 
In the first chapter we saw how credit ratings were seemingly integral to the approach of the 
investor when deciding where to invest and how to manage that investment. As the majority 
of investors, of varying levels of capability, have expansive portfolios, the inclusion of highly 
                                                 
10 Neil D Baron ‘The Role of Rating Agencies in the Securitisation Process’ in Leon T Kendall and Michael J 
Fishman A Primer on Securitisation (MIT Press 2000) 83. 
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rated investments allow them to balance their portfolios so that riskier ventures are 
counterbalanced by the low-yield but highly dependable interest payments accrued from 
highly rated debt issuances11. This concept of providing relative security for an investor was 
repeated when we assessed the notion of ‘agency’. In analysing how dispersed shareholders 
(and stakeholders) of large institutional investors like pension funds and mutual funds sought 
to control the actions of their managers, we saw how shareholders utilise credit ratings to 
impose restrictions on the investment opportunities that managers can engage with12. 
Investors can also use ‘rating triggers’ to determine a point at which the issuing company 
must forfeit the original agreement and settle what is owed with the creditor. We learned that 
the reason for this was to protect the creditor against an issuing company whose ability to 
repay its debt is tumbling i.e. once the debtor falls below a certain level (rating), repayment 
(or a restructured agreement) is put into effect13. 
It should be already clear that for the investor credit ratings are an intrinsic part of their 
operations. Ultimately, investors desire a number of things, arguably perfectly reasonable 
things, from the rating agency. Firstly they require impartiality. They require impartiality in 
order to be able to trust the ratings of the agencies, and as was asserted above, trust is the 
underlying principle to the efficient administration of this entire process. They also require 
transparency14 in order to be able to check the workings of these third-parties, third-parties 
who they do not pay for the service, in order to maintain a level of trust to keep the process 
running. They also require timely information, as the entire system is predicated upon the 
understanding that ‘securities are traded quickly’15. 
                                                 
11 See 1.3. The Industry: What It Does (n 46). 
12 ibid (n 63). 
13 ibid (n 70). 
14 Thummuluri Siddaiah Financial Services (Pearson Education India 2011) 260. 
15 Baron (n 10).  
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They require all of these aspects mainly to assist them with their aim of making the right 
investment for their operation. What is right for the investor, and how they will utilise the 
ratings produced by the agencies is dependent upon their capability; this is often referred to 
as the difference between a ‘sophisticated’ and an ‘unsophisticated’ or ‘retail’ investor16. 
Retail investors will invariably combine the ratings of the agencies with other statistical 
features, such as the rate of return, to select the best investment opportunities for their 
position17. Mattarocci notes that ‘the user considers the mean default rate related to the rating 
class and computes the expected return corrected for the default risk for each available 
instrument’18. For sophisticated investors, the analytical role of the ratings is supplementary; 
it is often the case that these investors have specialised and dedicated offices charged with 
examining risk within the marketplace (often to a greater extent than the rating agencies 
themselves)19. Perhaps the most obvious reason then for their usage by institutional investors 
is because they are bound to use them by either their shareholders or regulations, although the 
regulatory bind has technically been eradicated since the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in 
2010; this will be covered more in Chapter 3 Why the Agencies Transgress and What Allows 
Them to Do It as this simplistic understanding is not quite correct because, as we shall see, 
the forced usage of ratings as mandated by regulations may have been technically ended with 
The Dodd-Frank Act by removing all references to the agencies within financial regulations, 
but their implementation is so embedded after over 80 years that requiring that institutional 
investors must not solely rely on agency ratings was always unlikely to result in the reduction 
in reliance; the result was that investors no longer had recourse to complain that they had 
been forced to rely on ratings from dishonourable agencies by the state. 
                                                 
16 The differentiation between the two categories is far more complex than this simple understanding, and also 
has a long legal history. For more on the legal history of the differentiation, and the impact of it, see Jennifer G 
Hill ‘Images of the Shareholder – Shareholder Power and Shareholder Powerlessness’ in Jennifer G Hill and 
Randall S Thomas Research Handbook on Shareholder Power (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 58. 





It is worth pausing here to consider Husisian’s exercise, which contemplates what the 
situation would be if credit rating agencies did not exist. Although, to be sure, there are many 
factors which make this exercise only theoretical, it is still useful just to imagine this 
theoretical role of the agencies. Husisian argues that in the event that rating agencies did not 
exist, then the capital markets would be plagued with high information costs. Such 
information costs would inhibit action from investors which is, of course, the driving force of 
the modern economy. He continues by stating that to find profit opportunities within the 
capital markets ‘the investor must spend time and money evaluating the riskiness and 
potential return of various investment opportunities. The returns from investing in research, 
however, are likely to be too small to justify much investment. The returns are small because 
the debenture landscape is so cluttered with differing issues that risk evaluation is very 
difficult’20. This alludes to the fact that the rating agencies, in a perfect scenario, act to 
facilitate the fluidity of the capital markets, through allowing investors to participate in the 
process by making it economically viable to do so. 
Credit rating agencies are clearly important to the investor. However, when we analyse the 
perfect model then there are questions raised as to how important rating agencies are for 
sophisticated investors, although that analysis is not appropriate for this section. Yet, ideally, 
they are vitally important to facilitating the fluidity of the marketplace. If we then consider 
that modern society is intrinsically attached to the market and its fortunes, the importance of 
the rating agencies becomes abundantly clear. It is this notion of structural (and therefore 
societal) importance that forms the next part of this section. 
 
                                                 
20 Gregory Husisian ‘What Standard of Care Should Govern the World’s Shortest Editorials? An Analysis of 
Bond Rating Agency Liability’ [1989-90] 75 Cornell Law Review. 
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2.2.3 The Desired Situation for the State 
 
These two pillars of modern society - the issuer and the investor - are clearly important for us 
to examine with regards to the financial system and the conduct of the rating agencies. 
However, the role of the state in facilitating, and now unreservedly protecting the economy 
makes it perhaps the most important element to consider. We saw in the first chapter how the 
marketplace requires constant attention, and that how any delays with regards to information 
or structurally-impactful decisions could cost vast sums of money for interested parties (and 
sometimes parties that do not have a direct stake in these financial dealings, like the general 
public for example)21. 
The assumed and attributed position of the state as the lender of last resort (LOLR) makes the 
state’s position the most difficult, the most dynamic and the most important. Langley 
succinctly suggests that ‘it is only because of (state) sovereignty that the endemic crisis 
tendencies of finance do not realise the ultimate collapse of money, markets, and 
capitalism’22. If were are to accept this understanding, then it is clear that we must 
acknowledge the potential effect that this dynamic may have upon the likelihood of 
establishing impactful reforms that may protect the public more, as opposed to facilitating 
economic movement (many would argue that these are the same thing); this understanding 
raises the question of where the state’s priority lies. 
The events of the Financial Crisis made it abundantly clear that the maintenance of the 
market is the absolute priority. This relates to the widely held notion that a wider social 
benefit will be the natural result of the maintenance of the market, which is often cited as the 
rationale for intervening in financial matters, usually at a great cost to society (quantitative 
                                                 
21 See 1.3.2 Signalling to the Market (n 85). 
22 Paul Langley Liquidity Lost: The Governance of the Global Financial Crisis (OUP 2015) 19. 
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easing leading to austerity measures, for example)23. The impact of this dynamic is important 
for our understanding, but it will be more appropriate to discuss it in 2.3 The Actual Situation, 
mainly because this dynamic has the potential to warp the approach taken by influential 
market actors, with the obvious example being that excessive risks will be taken by market 
actors who know that the institutions they represent are simply ‘too-big-to-fail’. For now 
though, it is enough simply to suggest that safeguarding the system is the highest priority for 
the quintessential ‘state’. 
When discussing the notion of the ‘state’ and the ‘system’, it is very difficult not to move into 
the direction of theories concerned with capitalism. The intricacies of the social system 
referred to as capitalism are extraordinarily complex and require much more analysis than 
this thesis can afford. Yet, one line of reasoning may allow us to move into assessing why the 
credit rating industry has become so prominent. Tae-Hee Jo suggests, with regards to his 
systemically centred analysis of business cycles, that business enterprise and the state 
actively pursue the same goal – ‘the stability of the economic system and the existing social 
order’24. As this suggests a common goal, it is interesting that he then notes that ‘the state 
regulates markets primarily in order to protect private enterprises from the macro-uncertainty 
and –instability’25. If this is so, that the state’s highest priority is the protection of private 
enterprises, then the natural question to ask in light of this understanding is how the state 
would go about performing such a vital task? There are two issues here that will move us 
towards our analysis of the credit rating industry. Firstly, whilst this society is undoubtedly 
defined by the market, there are other important elements of society that the state must give 
its attention to, with societal welfare, threats to its citizens’ safety (terrorism for example), or 
                                                 
23 ibid 16. 
24 Tae-Hee Jo ‘A Heterodox Microfoundation of Business Cycles’ in Joëlle J Leclaire, Tae-Hee Jo, and Jane 
Knodell Heterodox Analysis of Financial Crisis and Reform: History, Politics and Economics (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2011) 114. 
25 ibid 117. 
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dynamics between sovereign states being good examples. The second issue is that, as we 
have already seen in 1.3 The Industry: What It Does, the onset of the credit rating industry’s 
dramatic rise coincided with the explosion of the capital markets in the 1970s26. This 
explosion had the effect of increasing the macro- and micro-instability within the system due 
to the rapid increase in participants within the financial system (which increased the systemic 
exposure to risk), and the amounts being traded (which increased the severity of that risk and 
the consequences of failure)27. These factors contributed to the lessening of the state’s 
capability to fulfil its protectionist obligations. 
Therefore, with its capability to protect the system by using its own means declining because 
of external factors like those mentioned above, the state responded reasonably (in theory) by 
seeking to outsource these responsibilities to specialist market actors (in the same way 
investors would constrain mutual fund managers). In continuing our analysis in the section 
from within the quintessential parameters set earlier, there are a number of valid reasons for 
why the state would want to recruit and incorporate specialist third-parties into the financial 
stability framework. If we use the example of the credit rating industry, the ability to define 
the parameters that certain financial sectors can operate within (as we saw earlier with the 
‘haircut’ requirement for broker-dealers28) is arguably ‘understandable from a public policy 
standpoint’29. It is even more understandable if we were to accept, as the House of Lords 
suggests30, that credit ratings are considered to be: easy to use; easily accessible; independent; 
relatively stable; have a successful track record; and are ultimately non-discriminatory in 
their publications to the market. This ability to set and maintain prudential standards31 
                                                 
26 See 1.3 The Industry: What It Does (n 47). 
27 Jo (n 24) 117. 
28 See 1.4 A Snapshot of the Regulatory Framework (n 103). 
29 House of Lords Banking Supervision and Regulation: 2nd Report of Session 2008-09, Vol. 2: Evidence (The 
Stationery Office 2009) 77. 
30 ibid. 
31 Anjali Kumar, Terry M Chuppe, Paula Perttunen The Regulation of Non-bank Financial Institutions: The 
United States, the European Union, and Other Countries, Parts 63-362 (World Bank Publications 1997) 17. 
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without bearing the entirety of the cost related to that role is obviously an attractive 
proposition for the state. 
The act of outsourcing this responsibility also confers a crucial responsibility upon the market 
actor. With reference to the credit rating industry (as with the accounting industry, to provide 
just one other example), this role is commonly referred to as being a ‘gatekeeper’. In 
outsourcing this responsibility, the states requires, or at least desires that the rating industry 
performs a certain number of tasks. In discussing the gatekeeping function of the credit rating 
industry, Mohammed Hemraj asserts that essentially the role is that of a decision maker 
(which would have been the state’s decision to make had it not outsourced the responsibility). 
He goes on to declare that ‘it is a gatekeeper who decides which information will go forward 
and which will not. Gatekeeping is therefore a “process of culling and crafting countless bits 
of information into the limited number of messages that reach people every day”… this 
process determines not only which information is selected, but also what the content and 
nature of the message, such as news [or ratings], will be’32. Similarly, Coffee defines the 
gatekeeper as ‘some form of outside or independent watchdog or monitor – someone who 
screens out flaws or defects or who verifies compliance with standards or procedures’33. 
It is worth noting that the state does not just have one financial gatekeeper in its arsenal; 
different gatekeepers have different tasks which, theoretically, should all contribute to a 
tightly-knitted regulatory framework that is much less expensive for the state to coordinate 
than were it to shoulder the responsibility itself. For example, Credit Rating Agencies are 
continually at pains to declare that their purpose is not to detect fraud within organisations34; 
that role in the framework has been afforded to the accounting industry. So, whilst rating 
                                                 
32 Mohammed Hemraj Credit Rating Agencies: Self-Regulation, Statutory Regulation and Case Law Regulation 
in the United States and European Union (Springer 2015) 4. 
33 John C Coffee Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance (OUP 2006) 2. 
34 See 1.3 The Industry: What It Does (n 60). 
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agencies are not expected to detect fraud, the state does desire that they provide market-based 
verification that will assist investors in making allocation decisions35, in addition to providing 
bench-marks for certain market actors. However, with that trusted position comes a certain 
power, and that power usually stems from the penalties that come with non-compliance with 
that particular gatekeeper. For example, should an agency withhold its cooperation or 
consent36, then not only would an issuer’s interest payments rise with a lower rating, but 
larger investors cannot even attempt to purchase debt that is not of a certain category of rating 
which means that a large amount of capital is not available to poor-quality issuing companies. 
Their position as a gatekeeper is just one element to why rating agencies are considered to be 
very important by the state. When we consider the state’s mandate as discussed earlier, 
namely that they must seek to protect and advance the system, then the reasons for desiring 
that the agencies perform their tasks to the best of their ability are clear and reasonable. Their 
verifying role, when combined with the availability of their products, mean that they are 
vitally important to allowing access to the capital markets (this is where the term ‘gatekeeper’ 
is directly appropriate), allowing a wide range of entities access to the markets which is 
touted as increasing the fluidity, and therefore the health of the economy37. The tendency to 
promote the perceived relationship between economic health and societal health makes this 
aspect of the rating agencies’ role very important indeed. 
This aspect of increasing (or at least maintaining) the fluidity within the economy is 
potentially the most important factor of the rating industry’s role from the viewpoint of the 
state. Mattarocci notes that perhaps the key role within the economy for the credit rating 
agencies is that the information they produce has the theoretical effect of increasing the 
                                                 
35 Mads Andenas and Iris H Y Chiu The Foundations and Future of Financial Regulation: Governance for 
Responsibility (Routledge 2013) 193. 
36 Coffee (n 33). 
37 James Ciment ‘Credit Rating Agencies’ in James Ciment Booms and Busts: An Encyclopedia of Economic 
History from Tulipmania of the 1630s to the Global Financial Crisis of the 21st Century (Routledge 2015) 192. 
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overall amount of information within the marketplace more generally, whilst also making the 
prices of financial instruments more consistent with the real risk-return profile of the issuer 
and issue38, thus reducing the potential for any price imbalances within the marketplace. This 
notion of balance is something that one may rationally expect the state to pursue in its 
management of the economy. 
These issues discussed in this subsection demonstrate a version of what the desired situation 
is for the state. In essence, the aim is to reduce the costs for the state without reducing the 
influence or capability to affect the direction of the economy. However, this desired situation 
is predicated upon certain elements existing and being prevalent within the operation of a 
given entity. For example, rating agencies must be independent to be justifiably considered as 
an acceptable form of what has come to be termed ‘quasi-governance’39. This then raises the 
questions ‘if they are not (at least perceived to be) independent, then does that affect the 
authority of the state?’ and ‘if the state’s authority is reduced by outsourcing, who is then 
influencing the direction of the market?’  
The state therefore has a number of factors that it should be considering, all of which should 
translate to the protection and advancement of society. However, the protection of society 
and the advancement of society are not the same thing. For far too long it has been the 
prevailing theory that if the market is prepared favourably for advancement, then society will 
analogously advance also. Now, before we discuss the actual situation with regards to 
investors and the state in relation the rating industry, it will be important to address this 
notion of ‘public interest’, because coming to a clear understanding as to what one means by 
this, in terms of society overall, allows for the reasons for one’s actions to become clear.  
 
                                                 
38 Mattarocci (n 7) 18. 
39 Andenas and Chiu (n 35). 
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2.2.4 ‘Public Interest’ or ‘Public Protection’? 
 
The normative discussion regarding the credit rating agencies is potentially very 
straightforward. Whilst others may seek to fundamentally change the industry, or remove it 
altogether, it is arguable that if they just performed how they say they perform then there 
would be very little criticism. So, if that (potentially) covers the issues of how the agencies 
ought to behave, and how the industry ought to be, then is there anything more to be said in 
this regard? In making the jump from discussing a normative vision for the agencies in 
particular, to discussing the issue of regulating the agencies more broadly, so that the desired 
performance stands a better chance of being realised, this section will now conclude with its 
normative vision for the regulation of the credit rating agencies. However, whilst the final 
chapter of the thesis details a precise proposal for regulating a particular component of the 
industry, this section will look at the broader issues with regard to sentiment. 
It is widely held that the agencies’ output, and the regulation of them, is in the ‘public 
interest’40. Yet, if we apply a critical lens to this understanding, then the question must be 
what connotations does the attachment of that term have upon the effectiveness of regulating 
such an important part of the financial system? When legislators consider what may be in the 
public interest, within what framework are they operating? It is argued here that any decision 
that is taken by legislators, or any of the powerful for that matter, are done so within the 
parameters of the marketplace, rather than society moreover. The effect of this is that we are 
left exclusively valuing the measurable, rather than regulating for the valuable41. 
                                                 
40 Herwig P Langohr and Patricia T Langohr The Rating Agencies and Their Credit Ratings: What They Are, 
How They Work, and Why They are Relevant (John Wiley & Sons 2010) 429. 
41 Mike Feintuck ‘Regulatory Rationales Beyond the Economic: In Search of the Public Interest’ in Robert 
Baldwin, Martin Cave, and Martin Lodge The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (OUP 2012) 45. 
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Whilst this view may be contentious, given the dominance of the market upon everyday life, 
it is certainly not original. In describing the reasons why this market-centric view is 
problematic, Feintuck states that ‘the frame of reference of the market is too narrow to 
encompass properly a range of social and political values which are established in liberal 
democracies and can be seen as constitutional in nature’42. To pre-empt the discussion at the 
end of this subsection for one moment, for this thesis there needs to be scaling-back of the 
values that Feintuck alludes to here, so that for decision-makers only purely humanistic ills 
are considered first and foremost, like the marked reduction in ills related to financial crashes 
i.e. homelessness, suicides, diseases, and increased poverty. To continue, it is absolutely 
essential that we all remember that the economy is not a natural phenomenon, to which we 
are all indebted, as Sunstein correctly declares: ‘markets should be understood as a legal 
construct, to be evaluated on the basis of whether they promote human interests, rather than 
as part of nature and the natural order…’43. 
This dominance of the market ideal on everyday consciousness has been attributed to a clear 
alteration in thought that blossomed in the 1980s, shared between the British Government 
headed by Margaret Thatcher, and the U.S. Administration led by Ronald Reagan. This ideal 
of economic efficiency driving regulatory policy44 is the foundation to what Feintuck views 
as the purposefully-created divergence between the interests of the citizen as a consumer, and 
the interests of the citizen as a citizen45; this helps us to understand the point made earlier 
regarding what one may mean when they say they are making decisions with the ‘public 
interest’ in mind – is it in their interests as a consumer, or a citizen? The market-centred 
                                                 
42 Feintuck (n 41) 39. 
43 Cass Sunstein Free Markets and Social Justice (OUP 1999) 5. Linarelli concurs, noting that ‘Financial 
markets are, however, totally of our doing. We create them. Our social practices and our actions determine who 
gets what, who loses, and who gains’, see John Linarelli ‘Luck, Justice and Systemic Financial Risk’ [2015] 
Journal of Applied Philosophy. 
44 Cento Veljanovski ‘Economic Approaches to Regulation’ in Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, and Martin Lodge 
The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (OUP 2012) 25. 
45 Feintuck (n 41) 59. 
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theories that underpin this movement are many, as we shall see later in the thesis46, and they 
are dominant, but they are not absolute47. What appears to be the case is a clear theoretical 
and philosophical divide between those who seek to incorporate fundamental human values 
into society, and those who perceive there to be little need to focus on such large-scale 
endeavours, following the sentiment declared by Margaret Thatcher that there is ‘no such 
thing as society’48. 
For the viewpoints that are concerned with the notion of society, there are two interesting 
concepts for our discussion. The first is the notion of ‘stewardship’, which admittedly is 
usually attributed to environmental concerns. As Lucy and Mitchell tell us, the concept is 
derived from religion, with Lucy and Mitchell focusing on the Bible, with the concept 
stemming from the relationship between man and God in relation to the Earth. The notion of 
‘stewardship’ has been enlarged from this initial understanding of man having absolute 
domain over the resources of the planet (i.e. ‘…have dominion over the fish in the sea, and 
over the fowl in the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth’), to one 
where man is not despotic but rather seeks to act responsibly, and rather than do it for God do 
it for the wider human community49. Feintuck correctly attaches the notion of ‘future 
generations’ to this concept of stewardship50, which is particularly relevant to the discussion 
here; the sentiment of this thesis is that we must consider more than just what we can see, and 
that includes future generations as well as those who are cast adrift by society because of 
destructive finance. 
                                                 
46 2.3.2.2 Deregulation – A False Diagnosis 
47 For just some scholars who oppose the market-based view see Feintuck (n 41); Mark Sagoff Price, Principle, 
and the Environment (CUP 2004); Sunstein (n 43). 
48 Feintuck (n 41) 60. 
49 William N R Lucy and Catherine Mitchell ‘Replacing Private Property: The Case for Stewardship’ [1996] 55 
The Cambridge Law Journal 3 583. 
50 Feintuck (n 41) 58. 
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This cross-generational sentiment is both the greatest strength of the ideal of stewardship, yet 
it is its greatest weakness51. It is a weakness for the advancement of the ideal because it is 
arguably impossible to come to a consensus regarding what future generations may require, 
or even what they may want. It is for this reason that the calls of this thesis to eradicate 
fundamental social ills that are the result of destructive finance are so basic; it was noted 
earlier in the introduction to the thesis that one cannot have absolute knowledge regarding 
what is best for everyone, but, problems such as homelessness or poverty in the western 
world (at first instance) are so basically inexcusable that any calls for them to remain would 
make for fascinating reading. 
The second viewpoint that is concerned with society is one aspect of ‘public interest’ which 
is usually classified in a trio of accounts. The three accounts of the public interest – the 
preponderance, the common interest, and the unitary account – are all understandings 
developed by Virginia Held in 197052, and all address the notion of public interest and how to 
satisfy it. However, for this discussion we will focus mainly on the Unitary Account; the 
preponderance account describes that the public interest is ‘equivalent to the greatest sum of 
individual interests’53, whilst the common interest account is defined by the understanding 
that ‘what is in the public interest is always in one’s individual interests (although the reverse 
is not necessarily true)54.  
The unitary account, however, holds that the public interest ‘can be formulated without 
recourse to individual interests at all and, second, that the assertion that something is in the 
public interest is an assertion that it is universally morally right or good’55. Also, the unitary 
account differs to that of the others because it recognises that determining what is in the 
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‘public interest’ is a purely normative endeavour. Lucy and Mitchell continue by stating that 
the account holds that there can be no conflict between individual interest and the public 
interest; in the case of conflict one must be mistaken56. It is here, though, that the potential 
problems with this mode of thought begin to appear, because as Held identifies: ‘to assert that 
someone involved in such conflicts is always misguided, or that one of any two conflicting 
positions must be evil, is to close one’s sensitivities to the actualities of human affairs’57. This 
idea of an ideal being in the interests of the public, based on a moral footing, and that 
conflicting ideas must be ‘wrong’, has a long history and has been associated with some of 
the most revered philosphers like Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel. However, it has also been 
(rightly) associated with the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany as the basis for their 
persecutions of non-conformists or those classified as ‘different’, and to the Church with its 
persecution of female healers (witches), to provide just three examples58. 
The call that this thesis makes, that we should consider eradicating a number of social ills 
when deliberating on economic reform, is most likely classified as falling within the unitary 
account. The examples given above of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and the Church, are 
excellent examples of the power of man to warp the notion of the public interest, which is 
why the notion of this thesis is so basic, perhaps even rudimentary. The notion that we must 
strive to eliminate the connection between financial crises and social ills like homelessness, 
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suicides, mass unemployment, family breakdown, and even cancer-related deaths59, is almost 
impenetrable to the iniquities of man. Therefore, this thesis operates on the basis of reducing 
the social damage that destructive finance causes, and develops a reform proposal to assist in 
that aim - it is perhaps better to think of this ideal as ‘public protectionism’, rather than 
striving for what is in the ‘public interest’. The normative vision for this thesis is that the 
rating agencies are to be constrained so that they have no option but to operate how they say 
they do. Then, and only then, can the goal of reducing the impact of fraudulent, 
dishonourable, illegal, and ultimately immoral finance upon society as a whole, and in 
particular the vulnerable, be realised. 
 
2.3 The Actual Situation 
 
In the previous section the emphasis was placed upon understanding what certain parties 
required of the credit rating industry within a perfect environment. We saw how issuers need 
rating agencies in order to signal their health to the marketplace, which subsequently allows 
them access to a wide range of investors whilst also reducing the amount of interest they will 
have to pay in servicing that debt. We saw how investors require an independent rating 
agency to compile and classify information so that they can incorporate that synthesised 
analysis into their own investing approach. Finally we looked at the requirements of the state, 
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which requires that the rating industry performs its tasks in a genuine and precise manner, 
which then allows the state to effectively delegate the authority to verify confidential and 
complex data to the marketplace. In the perfect environment, the state utilises these market 
actors to coordinate a framework of checks and balances that it can then incorporate into a 
wider systemically-concerned policy. 
As was stated in the concluding remarks of the last section, the issue here is that this ‘perfect’ 
situation is idealistic. What is desired by these parties is proving to be unachievable in the 
real world. Nevertheless, this understanding has not stopped the incessant quest for attaining 
it, which is the reason why this chapter plays an important role in communicating the ideas of 
this thesis. In this section we will see that the actual version of events is plagued with 
imbalances that warp the resulting outputs. Even a cursory analysis of the actual will reveal 
that the divergence between the actual and desired is so far apart that it makes the concept of 
attempting to achieve the desired without addressing the actual a clearly fruitless endeavour. 
The reasons for this wide divergence will be covered in the next chapter; for now though 
there are some important aspects to the actual that need to be clarified before we progress any 
further. 
This section will not follow the same path as the last section. The last section differentiated 
systematically between the requirements of the quintessential investor, issuer and the 
quintessential state. Whilst that was helpful then, what is required now is defined by the 
actualities of the financial crisis. Talking broadly about the position of the investor and the 
issuer may be beneficial in certain circumstances, but the aim here is to assess the conduct of 
the culpable components in the once-in-a-generation event that was the financial crisis. The 
reason why assessing the financial crisis is so important is because it allows for an 
extraordinary and perhaps unique insight into the true nature of the respective parties. The 
actions taken in creating and participating in the financial crisis, together with the way in 
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which these parties evaded punishment, represents an opportunity to analyse the true nature 
of events that is rarely witnessed to such an extent and therefore cannot be overlooked. 
So, certain elements need to be clarified in light of this analytical framework that will 
constrain the following section. Firstly, not all investors partook in the pre-crisis 
securitisation system that was at fault, so in that sense the issues raised within this section are 
not completely representative of the relationship between ‘the investor’ and ‘the agency’. 
Similarly, the Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) market was dominated by 
only a few issuers, which had the effect of changing the dynamic between ‘the issuer’ and 
‘the agency’60. In this sense more specifically, the relationship between the issuers of Asset-
backed securities and the agency during the build-up to the financial crisis is not precisely 
representative of the usual relationship between the issuer and the agency. What makes the 
assessment in this section relevant, in spite of these issues regarding representativeness, is 
that the financial crisis is in itself representative of a situation that can cause systemic 
damage, which has obvious benefits for normative analyses. It also serves to highlight, in an 
extreme fashion, the disposition of the rating agencies (the term ‘Big Three’ has been 
purposefully omitted here as other rating agencies have also partook in this systemic abuse of 
their position61, allegedly). 
Therefore, even though there have been claims that the rating agencies can on occasion even 
act against the issuer, by way of not factoring into their analysis the constitution of the 
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creditor in the arrangement62, it will be more appropriate to focus on the effects of the rating 
agencies upon two parties: the investor and the state. Whilst the majority of investors can 
quite rightly claim to be victims of the agencies’ conduct, there is a line of reasoning that 
suggests that investors, particularly the sophisticated investors, have no real claim to being an 
innocent victim in the process, given their expertise. Also, whilst the state is presumed to be 
solely interested in systemic balance and safety, there is a staggering amount of evidence to 
suggest that behind almost every crisis lays the state, which creates the fertile ground for such 
devastating damage (whether they do this knowingly or unknowingly is inconclusive). This 
research, particularly with regard to the state, has important connotations for what may be 
possible in terms of reform, so investigating further will be particularly important. 
 
2.3.1 Where Loyalties Lie – The Relationship between the Investor and the Agency 
 
In the previous section we learned that investors, irrespective of their capability, require a 
rating agency to be independent. They require the agency to be independent so that they can 
trust the information that they are incorporating into their investment decisions. However, 
this perfectly rational requirement has not been met by the credit rating agencies, particularly 
in the build-up to the crisis within the RMBS market. The main reason for this divergence 
between expectation and reality is the fact that rating agencies are predominantly paid by 
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issuers under the issuer-pays model, and therefore have a ‘vested interest’63. Whilst agencies 
will contest that under normal conditions the conflict of interest inherent in this model is 
relatively small and also manageable64, the dynamics of the RMBS market that dominated the 
financial landscape for over a decade prior to the financial crisis alters that perception 
immeasurably.  
Within the securitisation process, the RMBS products needed to be endorsed by financial 
entities, predominantly investment banks, through a process known as ‘underwriting’65. 
However, the size and scale of these products meant that only a handful of companies had the 
capability to perform such a vital function, which leads to perhaps the underlying issue with 
regards to the distasteful conduct of the rating agencies. The SEC noted that whilst 22 
different ‘arrangers’ (issuers of asset-backed securities) underwrote subprime RMBS deals 
(based on a sample of 642 deals), 12 arrangers accounted for 80% of the total number of that 
sample, in both number and dollar volume. Furthermore, for 368 Collateralised Debt 
Obligation (CDO) products accounted for by the sample taken from the Big Three, of the 26 
different arrangers who underwrote these products only 11 accounted for a total of 92% of 
these deals at 80% of the dollar value (12 of the 13 largest RMBS underwriters were also the 
12 largest CDO underwriters which served to further concentrate the underwriting 
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function)66. The SEC went on to make the obvious deduction that ‘the combination of the 
arrangers’ influence in determining the choice of rating agencies and the high concentration 
of arrangers with this influence appear to have heightened the inherent conflicts of interests 
that exist in the “issuer pays” compensation model’67. 
This dynamic-altering detail is where our analysis of how the agencies differed so much from 
what was expected of them can begin. We have already seen how the dynamic changed for 
the credit rating industry in the early- to mid-1970s when the SEC inducted them formally 
into the regulatory framework68. Having grown at an unprecedented rate as a result of this 
induction, the agencies were in a prime position to take advantage of the next external factor 
which was the explosion of the asset-backed securities (ABS) market. Partnoy noted that 
having been invented in the mid-1970s, the total issuance of ABSs in 1987 stood at just $9 
billion. Yet, just ten years later the total issuance would be between $100 and $150 billion. In 
1995 alone the total issuance was just over $109 billion69. This extraordinary rate of increase 
would be the signal for all the concerned parties within the securitisation chain to begin 
positioning themselves to take maximum advantage of their respective positions. 
Writing in 1999, Partnoy describes a process that demonstrates the issuers’ preparedness to 
manipulate the rating agencies into giving favourable ratings for the structured products being 
sold, even to the extent that the largest issuers had a ‘side-business’ that advised clients on 
how to prepare and ‘window dress’ their products before courting the agencies for the 
required ratings70. Partnoy suggests that this highlights the fact that the issuers considered the 
agencies to be easily manipulated. However, whilst this notion is indeed revealing, 
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particularly given how long this process must have been occurring, hindsight suggests that 
rather than being manipulated by devious issuers, the rating agencies were completely willing 
participants in the larger scheme. 
Tymoigne and Wray suggest that the Basel I regulations71, that were put forward in 1988 and 
were to be fully enacted by 1992, were the main motive for the innovations in the field of 
security underwriting72. What was quickly realised by the major players within the 
securitisation process was that the credit rating agencies would take centre stage in the 
process as a result of the regulations. As a result, ‘major innovations had to occur in the credit 
rating methods because asset-backed bonds cannot be issued without ratings’73. 
Unfortunately, rather than being prudent and accepting the great responsibility that came with 
this pivotal role, the agencies actively went out of their way to incorporate models that were 
suspect in order to garner the business of the concentrated issuers. Initially they simply set 
arbitrary default correlations and default rates based on data available for proxy securities74. 
However, the sheer number of individual assets (mortgages within the RMBS products) that 
were being packaged together meant that agencies required a method that would both reduce 
the time it took to come to a decision about the underlying risk, and also give the desired 
rating that their clients demanded. That method was to be the ‘Gaussian Copula Formula’75. 
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This formula, which under specific conditions was able to produce a single number that was 
apparently representative of the underlying risk of all the collected claims within the 
product76, was perfect for the rating agencies in meeting their clients’ demands. However, 
even though the formula was fully incorporated into the rating system of the major agencies 
in August 2004, the formula had crucial limits and the agencies knew it. The issue was that 
whilst the formula allowed them to rate these exotic financial products, they were doing so 
with little to no underlying data. In order to rectify this potentially fraudulent behaviour the 
agencies turned to the financial markets for assistance, taking the signals from Credit Default 
Swaps (CDS) and Equity Default Swaps (EDS) premia, meaning that the amount of 
protection buyers in securities were paying in premiums was now being factored into the 
rating process on large pools of individual claims77. The issue with this approach however 
was that the premia of the CDSs and the EDSs were themselves dependent upon the 
underlying credit ratings. The result of this was a highly procyclical, unreliable and 
completely inappropriate system of finance that was inherently destined to collapse, leading 
Tymoigne and Wray to liken the system to a Ponzi scheme78. 
Clearly then the protection of investors (or the taxpaying public) was the last thing on the 
minds of the agencies. Put simply, the agencies were determined to meet the requirements of 
only one party; the one that pays the most. There is a technical argument that these agencies 
should not act in such a mercenary-like manner because their reputation could suffer79, 
although there are a number of factors that have contributed to the decreasing effect of this 
‘reputational capital’ deterrent, as we will see throughout this chapter. Furthermore, 
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Tymoigne and Wray cite a former employee of Moody’s who suggests that a cultural change 
took place that completely altered the mind-set of Moody’s (and we can safely infer that the 
other members of the Big Three would follow suit with it being an oligopoly/duopoly)80.  
In what is arguably the most important study conducted on the rating industry, purely for the 
fact that as an entity the United States Senate can acquire information that no one else can, 
the United States Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations’ report on the causes 
of the financial crisis makes for compelling reading. Within this report the notion of cultural 
change around the turn of the millennium is repeated. The report states that a number of 
analysts who worked for Moody’s during the 1990s and into the 2000s informed the 
Subcommittee that a ‘major cultural shift took place at the company around 2000’, from 
being academically oriented and conservative in its ratings to anything but81. Rather 
unfortunately the Subcommittee, acting on reference from the members of Moody’s, attribute 
this cultural shift to the rise of Brian Clarkson, who would go on to become the Chief 
Operating Officer of Moody’s. However, this timeline coincides with the arrival of a much 
more influential figure, and arguably one whose arrival is the clearest signal of all that it was 
understood in the corridors of power that there was serious money to be made in this era.  
One of the world’s richest people, and widely regarded as one of, if not the greatest investor 
of modern times is Warren Buffett82. In 1999, Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway 
purchased Dun & Bradstreet. The interesting aspect was that Dun & Bradstreet was not 
considered to be a great investment at the time because its business of credit reporting was 
not particularly profitable, even though it was credit reporting that was the ancestor to the 
modern day ratings industry. But Buffett rarely invests in a speculative manner, and it was 
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not Dun & Bradstreet that was his primary target. Dun & Bradstreet had purchased Moody’s 
in 1962 after John Moody’s death83 and in 1999 was the parent company of an entity that was 
the key to unlocking the extraordinary profits that were available in the markets, as we have 
already seen. In an incredible demonstration of stock arbitrage, something Buffett is famous 
for, he increased his stake in Dun & Bradstreet to 24 million shares for a price of $499 
million (at $21 a share), which gave him the power to spin-off the company; the spin-off 
subsequently took place in September 2000. Under the conditions of the spin-off, Buffett’s 
shares in Dun & Bradstreet were converted into 24 million shares of the standalone Moody’s 
Corporation, which also left him with 12 million shares of Dun & Bradstreet. In the following 
three years Buffett sold his 12 million shares in Dun & Bradstreet for an average price of $30 
a share, resulting in a total of $360 million. This incredible move reduced his overall cost in 
the stock of Moody’s to $139 million, or just $5.56 a share84. 
The reason why this information has been included is because it is vital for our understanding 
of the aims of the credit rating agencies in the pre-crisis era. Rather than attributing the 
cultural change to internal managers, this is clear evidence that shows the world’s most 
influential people were scrambling to be a part of what was about to happen. What it also 
does is identify for us that the only consideration for the agencies was profit; Buffett does not 
invest to contribute to societal balance. This incessant quest for profit is at odds with 
everything that was required of the agencies as we saw in the last section. There are many 
examples of the agencies actively operating against the interests of the investor and systemic 
stability; although at this stage it would be helpful to continue to focus on this incredible 
collusion between the agencies and the small amount of issuers that brought the world to its 
knees. 
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Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 the largest of investors were legally bound to invest only 
in products that were rated at least investment-grade, if not simply AAA. Also, many money 
managers were bound by the investors they represented to invest only in highly rated 
products, which relates to the agency-related benefits of credit ratings as we discussed 
earlier85. The clear issue here is that in order to tap into this lucrative market, issuers needed 
the very highest of ratings for their ‘exotic’ products. It is worth noting that the majority of 
investors at this level are ‘institutional investors’, which means that they are usually 
representing a large number of policy holders or individual investors (i.e. pension funds or 
mutual funds for example). That these entities were bound to only invest in securities deemed 
worthy by rating agencies is indicative of the responsibility placed upon the agencies. If we 
operate for a moment on the hypothesis that rating agencies are only concerned with profit 
and their own advancement, then these factors of issuers willing to pay extraordinary 
amounts, investors being forced to go through the agencies to invest in securities, and a 
system that meant even if the agencies’ reputational capital was reduced they would still 
survive all contribute to a seemingly inevitable result. As Senator Richard Shelby declared in 
the aftermath of the crisis: ‘…it seems to me that money is trumping ethics…’86. 
Yet, it is arguably the brazenness of the agencies in colluding with the issuers against the 
investors which is the most relevant aspect. This approach is a telling sign, and one that this 
thesis argues has to be remembered every time a policy decision regarding the regulation of 
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the agencies is being considered. What it does for concerned onlookers is display, without 
doubt, where the priorities for the agencies are; they are not with investors, and they are not 
with the health of the system. 
The fact that the agencies clearly colluded with the concentrated issuers of these ‘exotic’, or 
more precisely ‘toxic’ financial products is widely recognised87. Farlow, in making an 
excellent analogy that suitably describes the whole situation, states that ‘just as the 
manufacturers of meat products find clever ways to make the last extruded, and most 
unprepossessing, bits of offal taste quite palatable, the manufacturers of structured products 
worked closely with the credit rating agencies to make sure that the bits that got into each 
rating tranche just about made the grade’. In continuing this notion of a Ponzi-like system, he 
continues by stating ‘by such a ruse, structured products had on average more favourable 
ratings than corporate bonds. So long as plenty of buyers were prepared to take the financial 
products that oozed out of the end – often referred to as collateralised debt obligations - this 
was an ideal vehicle to pull in more funds to feed the creation and sale of yet more financial 
products88. While the role played by the investors is important and will therefore be covered 
shortly, the fact still remains that the rating agencies circumvented all of their professional 
standards in order to participate in this Ponzi-like scheme. 
 
2.3.1.1.1 ‘Stockholm Syndrome’ 
 
So whilst it is acknowledged that collusion was taking place between the rating agencies and 
the issuers, it is appropriate to analyse some of the specific details to add further weight to 
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this claim and also provide us with more insight as to the inherent nature of the rating 
agencies. In order to do this it will be useful to depend on the large post-crisis examination 
conducted by the US Senate, solely because of its ability to coerce information from the 
agencies. 
In the last chapter we saw how the structure of the securities was created so that different 
classes of investors could simultaneously invest in them89. In fact, the differing levels were 
absolutely crucial to maintaining the system and garnering the huge levels of investment that 
the system was devised for. This structuring is called ‘subordination’, which is just one aspect 
of what are collectively known as ‘credit enhancements’90. As was stated earlier, the aim of 
subordination was to be able to advertise each section of the security as being protected from 
suffering from losses with relation to the investor’s regulatory constraints, so AAA investors 
were to be protected first from suffering losses whilst the predominantly unregulated Hedge 
Funds could invest in the lowest (equity) tranche, which contained the possibility of high 
returns but little protection. The issue for the issuers was that they did not want to spend 
unnecessarily in order to be as efficient (and profitable) as possible, so it was important that 
they liaised with the rating agencies to calculate the minimum amount of protection required 
so that the higher tranches could receive the required ratings to lure the regulatory 
constrained investors; the rating agencies duly obliged91. The same aim can be seen when we 
understand that the issuers would arrange the product so that the total amount of revenue 
expected to be garnered from the product was much more than was to be paid out to each 
tranche, also known as ‘over-collateralisation’92. The resulting excess was to be factored into 
the Equity tranche to absorb losses first, which in theory would amount to more protection for 
the higher tranches. Again, the issuers needed to know the minimum amount of collateral 
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required that would enable the agencies to award the ratings required and leave the excess to 
be removed from the process. 
The extraordinary fees that were being paid by these issuers meant that the emphasis of the 
Big Three was solely on meeting the requirements of the issuers, with those from the 
agencies surveyed for the Senate report confirming that there was a strong emphasis ‘on 
relationships with issuers and investment bankers’93, as opposed to researching new and 
potentially more accurate and efficient rating approaches. In developing an extraordinarily 
appropriate analogy, the employees at S&P demonstrated their frustration through internal 
emails at what they referred to as ‘a kind of Stockholm syndrome’. The employee 
complained that ‘they’ve become so beholden to their top issuers for revenue they have all 
developed a kind of Stockholm syndrome which they mistakenly tag as Customer Value 
creation’94. The Senate report goes on to confirm this notion by detailing that on a number of 
occasions the result of an issuer complaining about rating methodologies, criteria, or even 
rating decisions was that they were often granted exceptions or favourable treatment95. There 
was even documented proof that in some cases where the arranger was not exerting any 
pressure, the agency still went above and beyond to make the process as cooperative as 
possible for the issuer96. 
This analysis of the agencies’ pandering to the issuers is clearly important in illustrating just 
where the agencies’ priorities actually lie. However, perhaps more important is what they 
were prepared to do in order to meet the requirements of these issuers. The report declares 
that some of the factors that fall into this category included rating models that failed to 
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96 ibid 284. This section of the report details a deal between UBS and S&P on a ‘Vertical CDO’ were rating 
analysts were showing frustration that their managers were going out of their way to accommodate UBS despite 
little pressure to do so from the bank, and very little cooperation on their behalf. This incident is indicative of 
their mind-set during this period. 
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include the relevant mortgage performance data, unclear and highly subjective criteria that 
was to be used in producing ratings, failing to apply updated rating models to existing rated 
transactions, and a failure to adequately staff the relevant departments which resulted in a 
reduction in the effectiveness of rating and surveillance services (at a time when the agencies 
were recording record revenues)97. The point made here regarding the agencies being aware 
of underlying problems in the mortgage market is very important. The report found that even 
though the agencies were fully aware of the high-risk nature of the loans being issued98, the 
lax lending standards and even outright mortgage fraud, they simply continued issuing the 
ratings that were required to get these products entered into the system. The committee 
simply concluded that the agencies did this because ‘it was not in the short term economic 
self-interest of either Moody’s or S&P to provide accurate credit ratings for high risk RMBS 
and CDO securities’99.  
This damning evidence continues. Only 6 months prior to the collapse did Moody’s begin to 
factor in the quality of the mortgage originators and servicers; S&P did not factor these 
elements in at all100. We already know through our analysis of the incorporation of the 
Copula Formula that the agencies had no interest in spending the necessary time to evaluate 
the soundness of the underlying assets. Again, this evidence points to the requirements of 
quantity over quality as being the foundation for the agencies’ approach. This is also the 
reason that the necessary re-tests were not conducted. 
                                                 
97 ibid 244. 
98 The highest-risk loans were (are) what is known as ‘NINJA’ loans, which stands for ‘No Income No Job or 
Assets’. For more on this extraordinarily awful approach to finance see Whitney Tilson and Glenn Tongue More 
Mortgage Meltdown: 6 Ways to Profit in These Bad Times (John Wiley & Sons 2009) 12. 
99 United States Senate (n 81) 244. This sort of fraudulent negligence can also be seen in the extraordinary case 
of Moody’s who, in 2007, discovered that a bug in their computer models had generated ratings for products in 
2006 which resulted in Aaa ratings, which upon correction should have been up four notches lower. The ratings 
in question were not corrected, see Kolb (n 87) 219. 
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Before we move on to analysing some of the actual cases of this negligent and fraudulent 
approach to conducting their business, one revelation from an S&P employee deserves to be 
mentioned. In the last chapter under the banner of The Rating Committee, we saw how the 
rating committee is championed by the agencies and their supporters as being the one process 
that guarantees rating analysts’ independence and should inspire confidence from the rating’s 
users that the process is free from bias or external influence. With what we are learning about 
the ethical conduct of the agencies, the following should come as no surprise: 
Two years earlier, in May 2005, an S&P analyst complaining about a rating decision 
wrote: ‘Chui told me that while the three of us voted “no”, in writing, that there were 
4 other “yes” votes… [T]his is a great example of how the criteria process is NOT 
supposed to work. Being out-voted is one thing (and a good thing, in my view), but 
being out-voted by mystery voters with no “logic-trail” to refer to is another… Again, 
this is exactly the kind of backroom decision-making that leads to inconsistent 
criteria, confused analysts, and pissed-off clients’101. 
Rather than inserting their institutional preference into the rating process at the decision 
stage, which is so obvious that it has the potential of backfiring, the management at S&P 
cleverly realised that it was not necessary to intervene at such a late and pronounced stage; 
one can simply interfere and set the parameters at the beginning so that the desired rating will 
always result as a matter of policy. This extraordinary revelation should leave one with very 
little doubt that the rating agencies did not ever consider the investors’ wellbeing in their 
deliberations. There can also be very little doubt that the agencies did not consider the 
systemic effects of their detestable actions. One may go one step further and argue that there 
is very little doubt that any of this has changed as a result of the financial crisis. Whilst this 
assumption may seem well grounded simply by assessing the reported financial data from the 
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Big Three since the financial crisis, it is also supported by the fact that as result of this 
mountain of documented evidence of negligence and fraud, of which there is much more as 
we shall see throughout the rest of this chapter, there was very little punishment for their 
conduct (particularly with regards to the people directing the agencies at that time). What we 
will see now are some key examples of that ‘punishment’ which will hopefully allow us to 
understand whether the leniency displayed is contributing to the continuation of the agencies’ 
contempt for their position. 
 
2.3.1.1.2 Appropriate Punishment? 
 
This notion of ‘punishment’ is a precarious one. On the one hand there has been punishment 
administered for crimes committed during the financial crisis, but on the other hand many 
have argued that the punishment in not enough or not appropriate. To examine these issues 
this section will look at what has actually been administered in the form of a ‘punishment’ to 
attempt to come to a conclusion on whether it has been appropriate. However, to analyse 
fully the reasons for any perceived misgivings will require much more analysis, particularly 
with regards to the potential mind-set of those tasked with punishing the offenders, the likes 
of which will be factored into 2.3.2 The Pivotal Role of the Guardian – Where the Emphasis 
Lies for the State. 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, senior officials within the United States Judiciary were 
questioning why there had been no convictions for crimes committed during the financial 
crisis, even though the Senate Subcommittee charged with investigating the collapse referred 
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to the word ‘fraud’ on no less than 157 occasions102. In actual fact, at the time of writing there 
has only been one instance of someone being given a custodial sentence for their involvement 
in the financial crisis, although this figure represents those from the very large and well-
known banks; in terms of convictions relating to the financial crisis the Inspector General of 
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) confirms that as of 2016 there has been 35 
bankers who have been sent to prison for their crimes, albeit from local banks103. Yet, this 
brings us to an important issue which unfortunately cannot be addressed in this thesis; the 
overwhelming issues attached to the concept of ‘white-collar crime’ dictates that to study a 
topic that has an entire field devoted to it would not be appropriate104. So, whilst this section 
will not analyse the intricacies involved with prosecuting ‘white-collar criminals’, it will 
examine the most impactful ‘punishments’ that have been administered against the rating 
agencies, which are few and far between.  
In preparation for the next section that seeks to examine the actual role of the state, this 
section will promote the idea that the agencies are being treated leniently by regulators. This 
idea is based on two aspects: firstly, that no one from the agencies has been prosecuted for 
what seems for all intents and purposes consciously fraudulent behaviour; and secondly, that 
aside from the issues surrounding fining corporate entities rather than prosecuting 
individuals, the levels of these fines are in no way a deterrent against future fraudulent 
behaviour, particularly as the agencies have sought to take advantage of their position and 
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and Strategy in Business Enterprises (Universal-Publishers 2010). For some perspectives specifically concerned 
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develop extra-curricular type revenue sources that serve to buffer the effect of the fines 
(Ancillary Service Provision for example). The purpose of this section is to simultaneously 
examine the ‘punishments’ afforded to the agencies but through that process understand 
exactly how the agencies acted against the interests of investors for their own gain; every one 
of the following examples was brought on behalf of an investor who had been wronged by 
the agencies. So, the section will examine a number of lesser known indictments of the 
agencies before arriving at what is being championed by the state as a victory for the state 
and for investors; the case of CalPERS against Standard & Poor’s. 
 
2.3.1.1.2.1 Rhinebridge (and Cheyne Finance) SIVs 
 
So far we have heard about the rating agencies doing all that they could to enable the 
concentrated issuers to take their RMBSs and CDOs to the marketplace quickly, and with 
minimal investigation into the assets that were at the heart of these complex financial 
products. The cases of ‘Rhinebridge’ (and ‘Cheyne Finance’) are representative of a slightly 
different situation however. These Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs), amongst a number 
of others, were in fact created, operated, and rated by the Big Three, as opposed to simply 
providing a supposedly third-party verification of their creditworthiness105. On this basis two 
institutional investors initiated legal action against Moody’s, S&P, and Morgan Stanley for a 
variety of charges, including misrepresentation and Breach of Fiduciary Duty. For the 
purposes of this section only the Rhinebridge case will be assessed, although the Cheyne 
Finance case is almost identical. 
                                                 
105 King County, Washington, and Iowa Student Loan Liquidity Corporation v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 
Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., The McGraw Hill Companies, Inc., Fitch, Inc., and Morgan Stanley & Co. 
Incorporated [2012] 863 F.Supp.2d 288 (May 4). 
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Before we understand the intricacies of the case and the conclusion of it, a small detour will 
be very useful indeed. Although it will also be factored into the next section regarding the 
State, there is one aspect to the regulations surrounding this level of SIV operation that is 
demonstrable of why understanding the actual is vitally important, rather than being lost and 
deluded in the pursuit of the desired. SIVs are special purpose vehicles that borrow money 
from investors and then invest in longer-term securities with varying levels of income-
producing assets packaged within them. Judge Scheindlin who was presiding over the case 
surmised that ‘the SIV business model resembles that of a bank in that its goal is to earn a 
spread between its borrowing interest rate and its lending interest rate. Like banks, SIVs have 
both assets and liabilities’106. 
Earlier, the claim was made that ‘behind almost every crisis lays the state’. While this may 
seem controversial, it was also declared that whether they do this knowingly or not is 
inconclusive, simply because it is extraordinarily difficult to uncover the underlying rationale 
for promoting policy changes within a government. The reason why this is important in this 
case is that the claimants, King County and the Iowa Student Loan Liquidity Corporation, are 
what is referred to as ‘Qualified Institutional Buyers’ (QIBs), as was declared by Rule 144A 
of the Securities Act of 1933 (it should be stated however that the Rule was adopted in 1990, 
not 1933)107. The Rule essentially dictates that only entities that own over $100 million in 
investable assets may be sold to by brokers or dealers who are operating in accordance with 
Rule 144A; entities that have over $100 million in investable assets are usually institutional 
investors. What should be clear here is that the state has funnelled institutional investors, who 
are socially embedded, into a dishonourable system of finance where they are the only 
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available targets. When we understand this, whilst also remembering the despicable practices 
that were integral to this system of finance, then the state must be held up to be thoroughly 
examined; this is not just simply a case of a dishonourable financial culture on Wall Street or 
the City of London. 
Getting back to the case, the judge declared that ‘the Rating Agencies collaborated with IKB 
and Morgan Stanley to draft key selling documents, determine which assets the SIV could 
hold and what structural protections to put in place, and investigate and recommend securities 
for the SIV’s portfolio’108; these are not aspects that the agencies declare are part of their 
operations. Not only did they ‘help’, they also had the right to veto management changes, 
veto funding changes, modify its operations and set its investment guidelines (which they 
did). As the judge concludes, ‘the Rating Agencies did not merely provide ratings; rather, 
they were deeply entrenched in the creation and operation of Rhinebridge’109. 
For our assessment of the actual situation between investors and the agencies, and the 
divergence that exists between what is required and what is delivered, what the judge 
discussed next in the case is incredibly illustrative of these issues. The SIV issued varying 
products for investment, like nearly all SIVs do, ranging from CDOs to more focused 
products like ‘Senior Notes’. Senior Notes in this instance was the term used for short-term 
commercial paper that had maturities of up to 364 days; these notes were given the highest 
ratings that the agencies could give. In displaying their callous and contrived nature, the 
agencies ‘knew that the Senior Notes could only be offered to QIBs and QPs (Qualified 
Purchasers)’110. Even worse, not only did the agencies recognise this, but the claimants 
                                                 





actually informed the agencies that ‘they relied on credit ratings to make investment 
decisions’111. A phrase that comes to mind here is ‘like lambs to the slaughter’. 
With the belief in the rating scales being that AAA-rated entities were extremely unlikely to 
default on their obligations112, the AAA ratings given to the Rhinebridge SIV on or about 
June 27th 2007 was inexplicably downgraded to ‘Junk’ or ‘Non-investment grade’ on the 18th 
and 19th of October 2007. So, in less than four months the SIV was left almost worthless. As 
a result, the claimants initiated legal action for the purposes of finding the defendants guilty 
of causes of action for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, as 
well as aiding and abetting with respect to those claims. In the June 7th hearing of the case, 
the Judge dismissed all the claims except negligent misrepresentation, allowing that claim to 
proceed. However, as we shall see, the agencies will do anything to not appear in court. The 
airing of their business and potentially being found guilty as a result prompted them to 
continue an approach they have always utilised113, which is to find a resolution that is private 
in nature by any means necessary. Before the case could be heard the defendants, Moody’s, 
McGraw-Hill and Morgan Stanley settled with the claimants for a total of $225 million 
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divided between them, with the details of the settlement remaining private114. The agencies 
did exactly the same thing with the Cheyne Finance case115. 
A rational person may be forgiven for assuming that the agencies, having partaken in the 
systemic pilfering of investors’ resources, would have stopped such detestable practices once 
the hubris of the era had come to a crashing standstill and their role had been found out, as we 
have seen so far in this section. However, we shall now see that their manipulative and 
deceitful practices continued unabated after the height of the Financial Crisis, which may lead 
to an understanding that the penalties and attack on their reputation were completely 
ineffective, and most importantly that examining the nature of the agencies is imperative, 
rather than categorising their actions as part of a wider degeneration of ethical standards.  
 
2.3.1.1.2.2 The SEC’s ‘Cease and Desist’ Order against S&P 
 
With the Financial Crisis came the end of the creation of irresponsible mortgages (for the 
most part), like the NINJA loans we looked at earlier116. However, we shall now see why the 
examination of the agencies and their role in the securitisation process is still important, as 
the financial crisis brought to an end just one source of the securitisation process, not the ills 
of the process itself. Between 2010 and 2011, Standard & Poor’s had changed its rating 
methodology of certain financial instruments so that the amount of credit enhancement 
required to achieve an investable grade was lowered, without publicly declaring the 
amendment. This is telling, as we have already seen that this aspect of their approach was one 
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of the main issues before the crisis, so clearly the financial crisis had very little effect upon 
the practice of the agencies117. 
In order to provide some context for this claim we will now examine the SEC’s recent 
‘Cease-and-Desist’ order against S&P concerning rating certain products. The subject of this 
cease-and-desist order was S&P’s business of providing ratings for ‘Conduit/Fusion 
Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities’118 (C/F CMBS), products that consist of 
geographically diversified pools of at least 20 mortgage loans made to unrelated borrowers. 
Rather than homes, these products contained mortgages for ‘Commercial Properties’, which 
for the purpose of the securitisation was divided into five categories: retail, office, 
multifamily, lodging, and industrial’119. The subject of the SEC’s investigation was S&P’s 
methodology for calculating ‘Debt Service Coverage Ratios’ (DSCRs), which is the ratio of 
the annual net cash flow ‘produced by an income-generating property, divided by the annual 
debt service payment required under the mortgage loans’, with the ultimate aim being to 
provide a measure of the property’s ability to cover debt service payments120. 
The SEC note that S&P’s market position for rating these types of products had declined 
following the financial crisis, which had the knock-on effect of subduing the issuance of new 
CMBS products. However, the Big Three are reactionary, and serve to capitalise upon trends 
so that they can extract as much profit as possible, even if this means relegating any ethical 
standard to do so. When issuers increased their CMBS output in 2010, S&P’s CMBS Group 
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decided that the fact the company’s market share had not grown in sync with the level of 
issuance was solely due to ‘conservatism of the firm’s criteria’ in rating CMBS products121. 
This deplorable willingness to sacrifice quality and accuracy to garner profit and not lose 
market share to competitors, who S&P naturally assume are also willing to lose any 
standards, is the clearest picture of all that shows that the agencies cannot be trusted to hold 
anyone’s interests dear other than their own. 
In a lot of these cases the fraud perpetrated by the agencies is clear, but not so completely 
obvious that calls for individual prosecution would have any considerable weight. The case 
with agencies circumventing their rating process by setting rating standards that were 
favourable to issuers before the decision process is a good example of appropriating 
negligence, but pinning individual fraud charges would be very difficult, unfortunately. 
However, this case of the cease-and-desist order is entirely different. DSCRs have the effect 
of lowering the amount of credit enhancement required to obtain a top rating, which is a 
factor we have analysed throughout this section and is clearly an aspect that would garner 
business from issuers. In late 2010, S&P changed its methodology for calculated DSCRs to 
realise this exact dynamic for issuers. Between February and July of 2011, S&P published 
eight CF CMBS reports that ‘failed to describe its changed methodology’. Not only did they 
not declare the change to interested investors, they included DSCRs that were calculated 
using the prior methodology122 (which had the effect of portraying conservativeness that no 
longer existed). This was not simply an error, because on at least four out of the eight 
occasions the CMBS group communicated the details of the revised DSCR model to the 
issuers of the products, which not only gives the issuers a distinct advantage but also proves 
collusion between the agency and the issuers. For this the agency received just over $7 
million for the rating of six transactions. 
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To compound this Faustian relationship, the Senior Management of S&P responded to 
investor questions about low Credit Enhancement levels by stating that the ratings were 
‘consistent with S&P’s rating definitions’, with the SEC confirming that ‘these publications 
did not inform investors of the effect of the change in methodology on required CE levels’123. 
In a perfect environment, one free from lobbying influence, the political protection for white-
collar criminals and a narrow societal definition of ‘crime’, this fact of conscious 
misrepresentation alone would lead to the indictment of the senior management of S&P for 
fraud, along with the leading figures of the CMBS division124. But this is not a perfect 
environment, which is sadly and brutally confirmed by the leniency of their punishment for 
this attack upon investors.  
The SEC found the agency guilty of no less than four serious violations of major financial 
legislation. The punishment for this extensive crime was an overall fine of $42 million (rising 
to $80 million) and a 12 month suspension from the business of providing ratings on any CF 
CMBS transactions. The SEC did however allow the agency to publicly deny the findings of 
the SEC’s investigation and admit no fault. As we have seen already, and will continue to 
see, the agencies are determined to settle any case away from public scrutiny and are insistent 
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upon denying any wrongdoing, primarily for the purposes of reducing any future legal action 
for the same offence. 
This issue of leniency and inappropriate punishment is one that will be considered later in 
Chapter 3 Why the Agencies Transgress and What Allows Them to Do It, mainly because it is 
the by-product of certain aspects that are enforcing this divergence between what is desired 
and what is actually occurring. There are a number of instances around the world where 
rating agencies are being found guilty of fraudulent behaviour against investors and are being 
prosecuted as a result. In Australia, the Courts have found the agencies (predominantly S&P) 
to be guilty of ‘deceptive and misleading conduct’, awarding a claimant $18.8 million in the 
process125. In Europe, the European Markets and Securities Authority has issued its first 
monetary punishment since coming into force after the financial crisis, fining DBRS $33,360 
for failing to comply with record keeping requirements (concluding that the agency had 
‘acted negligently’)126. Whilst these legal actions are welcome, it is clear that fines of $42 or 
$18 million are not going to influence the decision making process of an entity that records 
revenues in the billions of dollars. In response to the $18 million fine in Australia S&P 
spokesman Richard Noonan characterised the agency’s view on such matters: ‘It is bad 
policy to enforce a legal duty against a party like S&P, which has no relationship with 
investors who use rating opinions, yet impose no responsibility on those investors to conduct 
their own due diligence’127. Whilst Noonan’s claim of the agency having no relationship at all 
with investors is obviously not correct as we should now be aware, his claim regarding 
investor responsibility will certainly need to be considered before we end this section 
regarding the actual situation between the agencies and the investor. However, before we can 
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do that there is one series of events that needs to addressed, as it resulted in the largest fine 
ever to be imposed upon a rating agency. The concept of fining agencies may be distasteful to 
some, but the breach the billion-dollar barrier signifies the level of fraud/negligence that was 
found by prosecutors. 
 
2.3.1.1.2.3 The Case of CalPERS 
 
In 2009 the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) filed a complaint 
against Moody’s, S&P and Fitch on the grounds of negligent misrepresentation and negligent 
interference with prospective economic advantage128. The claimant initiated the actions based 
on the rating agencies’ granting of their highest ratings to three SIVs (Cheyne Finance, 
Stanfield Victoria Funding, and Sigma Finance), which the claimant invested in in 2006. 
Having invested in the AAA-rated SIVs in 2006, the three SIVs subsequently defaulted on 
their payment obligations in 2007 and 2008, resulting in the loss of around $1 billion for 
CalPERS alone. 
There is very little need to analyse the intricacies of this fraud by the agencies because the 
cases of Cheyne, Stanfield Victoria and Sigma are identical to the Rhinebridge case we 
assessed earlier in this section. The difference with the CalPERS case is that whilst the 
investor pursued its own lawsuit, the Department of Justice took action (based upon the 
CalPERS situation and the complaints of over 20 states for similar offences). The 
introduction of such a powerful entity fundamentally altered the rules of engagement for the 
rating agencies. Whilst they had used their tried-and-tested legal approach to emerge 
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relatively unscathed from the previous legal actions taken against them, they would surely not 
be able to intimidate or manipulate the United States Department of Justice in a similar 
manner. This is a rational conclusion to come to, although in assisting our understanding of 
the unique nature of the agencies, the fact that S&P decided to fight back against the DoJ is 
representative of their attitude and their inherent nature. 
CalPERS settled with Fitch first. The terms of the settlement are fascinating, and hint at the 
actual situation of the rating industry being a duopoly, rather than an oligopoly. Under the 
terms of the settlement Fitch handed over confidential documents to CalPERS that would be 
crucial for the investor to continue to pursue its claims against Moody’s and S&P; no money 
changed hands129. While it may admittedly be a stretch to claim that as members of an 
oligopoly the agencies would protect each other, Fitch’s willingness to absolve themselves of 
potential financial punishment by providing the investor with crucial and unobtainable 
information is extraordinarily telling of the dynamics of the industry today. 
Meanwhile, the DoJ had picked up on the ascent of the CalPERS case through the courts and 
on this occasion took the lead for CalPERS, for itself as the representative of the Federal 
Government, and for 20 states against Standard & Poor’s. After initial settlement talks broke 
down, the DoJ sought to sue S&P for a record $5 billion on the grounds of ‘defrauding 
investors’. In response, and in what can only be described as terribly advised or 
extraordinarily egotistical approach, the rating agency accused the DoJ of pursuing the 
lawsuit purely because the firm had downgraded the United States’ sovereign rating shortly 
before. This naturally riled the Attorney General Eric Holder who stated that punishing the 
agency was ‘important to me’ and dismissed the allegation as ‘utter nonsense’130. This 
incredible approach hints at a number of potential actualities concerning the ratings industry 
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130 A Primer on the Credit Rating Domain (n 5). See also Ryder (n 103). 
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at present. Firstly, it signifies that the agencies believe that their conduct is acceptable and 
does not warrant punishment. Secondly, it perhaps details their arrogance as a private party to 
go against the state (and arguably the most powerful state in the world), particularly in the 
manner that they did. Lastly it demonstrates their belief, founded upon continued success, 
that irrespective of their conduct they can find a way out of being punished by a variety of 
methods. However, in this instance these factors resulted in the largest fine ever conferred 
upon a rating agency (albeit not at the initial $5 billion that was pursued). 
Through extensive dialogue the DoJ and S&P finally agreed on a settlement package of 
$1.375 billion131. In a settlement of the private lawsuit between CalPERS and S&P the 
agency paid $125 million132, thus taking the total outlay on the 3rd of February 2015 to $1.5 
billion for defrauding investors. The settlement with the DoJ was split between the Federal 
Government ($687.5 million), and the 20 states ($687.5 million split according to an 
agreement between the states). The DoJ also insisted that the agency would not be able to do 
what it was used to doing in denying the facts. The agency admitted misrepresenting key 
information to investors, being aware of delinquent loans and not informing the public, and 
that decisions were not taken because of the potentially negative effect upon their business 
with paying issuers. Additionally, S&P acknowledged that ‘the voluminous discovery 
provided to S&P by the United States in the litigation does not support their allegation that 
the United States’ complaint was filed in retaliation for S&P’s 2011 decisions on the credit 
rating of the United States’, with the agency formally retracting the claim from the 
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with S&P for Defrauding Investors in the Lead Up to the Financial Crisis’ [2015]. 




litigation133. CalPERS have taken action against other fraudulent actors and have been able to 
retrieve almost $900 million for its efforts. 
Some have suggested that the decision to prosecute S&P and not Moody’s, who acted in 
exactly the same manner, is proof that the S&P litigation was a retaliation for their lowering 
of the United States’ credit rating, as Moody’s did not lower the rating134. Time will only tell 
whether this assumption is correct, although it is widely believed that there is enough 
evidence to indict Moody’s in a similar fashion and also that there is the appetite to do so135. 
For our analysis of the actual relationship between the agency and the investor, these 
examples of Rhinebridge, Cheyne, and other SIVs, together with the SEC’s cease-and-desist 
order against S&P (and a long list of other smaller examples), provide us with more than 
enough evidence to confidently claim that in actual fact the agencies are operating against the 
investors, especially when there are substantial amounts of profit to be made from working 
with highly unstable financial products. This claim may be viewed as controversial, or at the 
least considered to be relying on extreme examples of the agencies’ operations. However, it is 
precisely such extreme examples that demonstrate the true position of the agencies. 
 
2.3.1.1.2.4 Are Investors Completely Innocent? 
 
Before this section concludes, the claims made by the S&P spokesman Richard Noonan 
deserve to be assessed. The focus of this thesis is predominantly on the agencies for their 
conduct and the state for its mentality towards that conduct. However, as this section is 
                                                 
133 United States Department of Justice (n 131). 
134 The Wall Street Journal ‘A Poor Standard of Justice’ [2015] (Feb. 8). 
135 A range of respected news outlets are simultaneously suggesting that the DoJ’s indictment of Moody’s for 
the same offences is imminent, for the original story see Timothy W Martin ‘Justice Department investigating 
Moody’s Investors Service’ [2015] Wall Street Journal (Feb. 1).   
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concerned with the actual situation between the agencies and the investors, the analysis 
would not be complete without turning our attention towards the conduct of the investors. Is 
it correct to claim that investors (particularly institutional investors) were irresponsible in 
relying so heavily upon the ratings of the agencies? Should institutional investors take much 
more care when investing, as their resources are predominantly from the public and have a 
systemic importance? These types of questions clearly signify the reality that the investors 
naturally played a part in the system; the important question is whether they took these risks 
knowingly and are now looking for a scapegoat to facilitate the recuperation of their losses, 
or whether they were forced into a system whereby those who forced them into it did not 
adequately check the safety of the system first.  
Andrew Farlow has suggested that the actual situation is closer to the first of these two 
scenarios. He argues that the securitisation system that dominated the pre-crisis financial 
landscape was an ‘agreeable way to make money’ and as such ‘investors never asked 
awkward questions about the underlying collateral’136. Whilst some have argued that it is 
more the case of investors believing in the purpose and function of the CRAs, and 
subsequently suffering the consequences for this misplaced understanding137, Farlow is 
unequivocal in his stance that in actual fact investors made huge returns on these 
fundamentally risky endeavours, and they took this risk because they knew that when the 
defaults came they would not be punished and be financially supported by the state; Farlow 
labels this scenario ‘Heads they had won; tails they would win’138. 
Apart from alluding to the Too-Big-To-Fail issue that is dominating the modern marketplace, 
Farlow also makes the point that Governments reaped huge financial rewards in short-term 
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taxes that were related to the securitisation system (in addition to reaping the rewards that 
come with a market experiencing a large boom). He is arguably correct in claiming that the 
investors did not ask enough questions when investing the money of millions upon millions 
of people139. He is also arguably correct in claiming that the investors knew that the 
government, on behalf of taxpaying citizens, would rescue them if they all partook in the 
system. But, what these views do not consider is the parameters for their actions. Yes they 
could have done more but the situation regarding the legal funnelling of institutional 
investors into an unregulated financial system is deplorable. The actions of Government 
Sponsored Enterprises like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, in pursuing institutional investors 
and making the terms of their investment almost irresistible, is surely more important. The 
conscious relegation of laws that had protected the United States, and arguably the world, 
from systemic financial collapse for over 70 years cannot be ignored.  
When assessing the conduct of the issuer, of the rating agencies, and of the investor, it 
becomes quickly apparent that underneath all of the factors that are often discussed (i.e. 
industry dynamics, organisational structure) lies the state, and its approach is pivotal in 
decided the navigation of the eras. For this reason we shall now assess what the actual 
situation is for the state. We saw in 2.2.3 The Desired Situation for the State that its aim 
should be to promote and maintain systemic balance, as its position as the guardian for public 
health dictates that it must foster balance within the economic realm (given the centrality of 
the market in modern life). In this sense then there are two deductions that can be made: 
either the state simply failed in its mandate in 2007/8, in which case we could confidently say 
that the financial crisis could be categorised as the largest failure of the state (as an ideal) in 
                                                 
139 This sentiment is not exclusive to the rating scenario. Sergakis notes that with respect to proxy advisors, 
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the modern era; or they produced the situation for a variety of reasons, which means that 
what we understand its mandate to be, i.e. the desired situation, does not exist and we should 
recalibrate our focus accordingly.  
Earlier it was stated that it is extraordinarily difficult to know if certain policies were enacted 
with an aim in mind, which makes proving the culpability of the state almost impossible (at 
least beyond any reasonable doubt). However, this should not dissuade one from assessing 
the actions of the state from within such parameters, as to refuse to do so would limit the 
analysis and distort any potential conclusions that this thesis may come to. The reform 
proposal that dominates this thesis is practicable, but controversial. It is not controversial in 
the sense that it is not deserved, because as we are seeing the conduct of the agencies has 
been, and continues to be quite frankly appalling. It is controversial in the sense that the 
likelihood of it being, at the very least, considered, is solely dependent upon the state’s 
inclination to affect lasting change in a field where societal safety is often spoke about but 
rarely established. The abusing of their position by the agencies to defraud investors is clear, 
so it is entirely reasonable to suggest that the desired situation for investors (i.e. 
independence and transparency) is unattainable and for the most part a fallacy; but, is it really 
the case that the desired situation for the state is also unattainable and a fallacy? We shall 
now investigate whether this is indeed the case, although it must be noted before that 







2.3.2 The Pivotal Role of the Guardian – Where the Emphasis Lies for the State  
 
It would be prudent to operate on the basis that the financial system, within the modern 
context, is certainly part of the public domain140. With the financial system being central 
within modern society, the state is charged with supervising an arena that contains organised 
and concentrated power, whilst having to balance that against the interests of dispersed and 
diverse entities such as citizens. When we also consider that the globalised nature of the 
modern world means that financial policies can, and often do, affect other countries outside 
of one’s own jurisdiction, then the precarious nature of the state’s role is clear.  
However, this role is accompanied by the defining power of being able to direct the 
progression of the market, and therefore modern society. In this section we shall see how the 
state, in its many forms, has arguably acted against their desired role as imagined by the 
general public and society moreover (or at the very least what the understanding of the 
quintessential role of the state is). Again, it is very important to state that whether this is done 
consciously or not cannot be accurately determined, but the facts can be established to build a 
picture of whether the approach of the state can be predicted. We shall see shortly how the 
incredible events of the financial crisis were directly facilitated by state intervention, and 
how, essentially, such expansion in the market and the inevitable decline that follows can 
only be created by the state; private actors simply do not have the power to control the 
direction of the marketplace as a whole. Peter Swan argues that understanding this dynamic 
can fundamentally alter one’s philosophical parameters. For example, the financial crisis is 
widely held to be one of the largest failures of the state in modern times, however for Swan 
‘it was not a failure of regulatory policy, but the very success of regulatory policy by 
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successive administrations and Congress that had created the subprime crisis’141. This 
incredible understanding means that whilst it is right to focus on the conduct of rating 
agencies, banks, investors, and all the other culpable parties in the financial crisis, it is 
erroneous to focus just on them because if Swan’s understanding is to be accepted then they 
were all actively encouraged to do what they did. 
The opposing argument may be that the state sought to increase productivity and economic 
output by loosening the financial constraints that had been in place since the Great 
Depression, and that this innocent motive had been abused by dishonourable parties. 
However, the sheer amount of evidence that exists from recent history that proves that banks 
and rating agencies will always attempt to maximise their potential returns at the cost of 
reducing their ethical and moral standpoint renders that opposing argument simply invalid; 
their conduct was to be expected. So, whilst it would be imprudent to accept Swan’s 
argument in full, it is appropriate to continue in the vein of not rejecting such a controversial 
but fitting idea. It is in this theoretical light that this section will seek to assess how different 
the actual actions of the state are to that which is desired of them, from the perspective of 
societal balance at least. Doing so will serve the aim of being able to predict the theoretical 
likelihood of the reform proposal of this thesis being established. 
 
2.3.2.1 Setting the Scene 
 
The power of the state to direct the market, and therefore society, manifests itself through the 
ability to regulate the capabilities of market actors (through legislation and financial 
regulations). If the state deems it appropriate to ban a practice outright then that practice 
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simply cannot continue, irrespective of the influence of the targets (we saw this with the 
forced separation of Commercial and Investment Banks in the 1930s – a regulatory approach 
that is vitally important for this thesis). Alternatively, if the state deems it appropriate to 
facilitate the proliferation of certain business practices, then usually that area is opened for 
business and tends to generate incredible activity due to the fresh potential for sizeable 
returns; this process is known simply as deregulation. 
In charting the actions of the state in the lead up to the crisis we can examine the role it plays 
in setting the direction of the marketplace, with the aim being to reveal patterns that can 
illuminate us as to their potential motives for taking particular actions. It is worth noting 
before we continue that Neil Barofsky, who was the Special (United States Treasury 
Department) Inspector General charged with overseeing the Troubled Assets Relief Program 
(SIGTARP), declared that ‘I was to learn while at SIGTARP that “adopting a narrative” was 
a tried-and-true tactic in Washington: define the status quo as a success, and ignore all 
evidence that suggests otherwise’142. This method needs to be incorporated into our 
understanding of the possible methods the state may use to justify their systemically-
concerned decisions because should the evidence point to this being a reality, that the state 
actively promotes a narrative that will help it achieve a set goal irrespective of the evidence, 
then it will have a huge impact on our assessment of what parties the state seeks to embolden 
at the cost of others.  
The Senate Subcommittee report that has proven to be useful to our analysis so far will be 
useful again, as it details how in the mid-1990s the pieces were put in place for the systemic 
escalation of risk to begin. Damon Silvers, in describing these pieces with regards to the 
mortgage market, states that ‘the pieces were in place in a deregulated mortgage market for a 
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wholesale shift from 30-year fixed mortgages to short-term mortgages. Securitisation, largely 
unregulated mortgage companies driven by executive pay linked to their stock prices, and 
regulators who did not believe in regulating at the Federal Reserve were all in place’143. 
Furthermore, the ability for large banking institutions to partake in the system was 
determined by key pieces of legislation, which was a crucial factor in dictating the potential 
size of the bubble that would inevitably burst. 
To briefly provide some context we have to go back to the turn of the 20th Century. At this 
time the burgeoning United States was dominated by just a few expansive banking houses, 
chief amongst which was the empire controlled by J. P. Morgan144. However, to counter the 
influence of this financial oligarchy unofficially led by Morgan, the state (under the auspices 
of the administration of President Coolidge) enacted the McFadden Act of 1927145, with the 
aim of rebalancing the national banking market so that large overpowering banking 
conglomerates were not unfairly dominating the State-wide banking organisations within 
each state. This prohibition on interstate banking, however, did not have the desired effect 
because the large banking institutions had the distinct advantage of being able to combine the 
resource-generating commercial banking entities with the speculative (and potentially very 
profitable) investment banking entities, a system also known as ‘Universal Banking’.  
In 1929, however, the situation changed for large banking houses, and changed dramatically. 
Their role in the Wall Street Crash, which was an important factor but by no means the only 
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one146, turned public opinion against them to such an extent that politicians sought to take 
impactful action against them. The politicians and legislators wanted to reduce their 
speculative capability, with the intention of fostering systemic balance, and also to make the 
infamously opaque banking institutions as transparent as possible; up unto this point J.P. 
Morgan had never issued a financial report for examination147. To digress for one brief 
moment, it is worthwhile noting the famous words of Machiavelli: ‘Whoever wishes to 
foresee the future must consult the past; for human events ever resemble those of preceding 
times. This arises from the fact that they are produced by men who ever have been, and ever 
shall be, animated by the same passions, and thus they necessarily have the same results’148. 
This sentiment was clearly not in the minds of legislators and politicians in the mid-1990s 
when they sought to dismantle these New Deal-era legislative principles as we shall see very 
shortly. 
To continue, in the New Deal era of the United States, the state, under the auspices of the 
Roosevelt administration, sought to finally reduce the overwhelming presence of the largest 
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banking entities149. In enacting the Banking Act of 1933150, more commonly referred to as the 
Glass-Steagall Act after its Senatorial sponsors and certain important sections within the Act, 
the state had brought an end to ‘universal banking’ and forced the previously almighty 
banking establishments to choose between registering as a commercial bank or an investment 
bank151. The state also sought to remove the redeemer-status that J.P. Morgan and his 
affiliates had donned after the Panic of 1907 intervention, arguably unenthusiastically152, by 
introducing deposit insurance which fundamentally (although not entirely) reduced the risk of 
national ‘runs’ on banking institutions153. This concept of facing the challenge of regulating 
against powerful entities is an extraordinarily important one to this thesis, and arguably 
should be vital to every other normative analysis of the financial sector. This incredible era 
initiated over 70 years of financial balance (for the most part), which has come to be referred 
to as the ‘Quiet Period’. Gary Gorton argues that this Quiet Period shows that ‘properly 
designed bank regulations can prevent financial crises for a significant period of time’154. 
However, in adapting Gorton’s analysis and combining with it Swan’s analysis from earlier, 
perhaps it could be stated that properly designed deregulation can also generate similar levels 
of success, albeit within in a purely alternative context. Irrespective of the heated debate that 
surrounds this issue of the relevancy of deregulation, the seemingly coordinated series of 
legislative events can help us to understand further the potential causes of the crisis. The 
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Senate Subcommittee, in continuing its examination across the eras suggests that up until the 
mid-1990s the New Deal era statutes were having the intended effect: ‘U.S. banking 
consisted primarily of thousands of modest-sized banks tied to local communities… this 
broad-based approach meant that when a bank suffered losses, the United States could 
quickly close its doors, protect its depositors, and avoid significant damage to the U.S. 
banking system or economy’155. However, 1994 was the beginning of the end for the Quiet 
Period. In that year the state, under the Clinton administration, introduced the Riegle-Neal 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994156, with the result being that banks 
could now begin to establish branches across the country and also buy other banks across the 
country. Supporters of the Act argued at the time that it would ‘allow banks to become more 
efficient as they grew bigger, reducing costs, lowering loan rates, and accelerating economic 
growth’157. We know now with hindsight that this was a short-sighted and dangerous 
analysis, although if we ignore the pleasantries of affording these supporters the protection of 
hindsight for just one moment, it is worth noting that it is these sorts of misguided and naive 
sentiments that add support to dangerous movements (and this doesn’t just apply to financial 
regulation – and we shall see further evidence of this phenomena next in 2.3.2.2 Deregulation 
– A False Diagnosis); the responsibility that comes with being a reputable commentator 
should inhibit one’s prevalence for placing trust in untrustworthy sectors (the Machiavellian 
quote from earlier is again very much applicable here). 
In 1987, the same year that Alan Greenspan assumed the Chairmanship of the Federal 
Reserve, the ‘Fed’ began to allow banks to establish affiliates that dealt in short-term 
commercial paper securities, although they established the restriction that these dealings 
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could not contribute more than 5 percent of the bank holding company’s revenues158. But, in 
1997, which was the same year the Riegle-Neal Act was to be fully implemented, the Federal 
Reserve (still under the stewardship of Greenspan) voted to raise the limitation to 25 percent. 
The Federal Reserve also allowed the Citicorp-Travelers merger which opened the floodgates 
for excessively large conglomerates to reappear. Furthermore, the state formally repealed the 
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999159, which essentially 
‘eliminated the Glass-Steagall prohibition on banks engaging in proprietary trading and 
exempted investment bank holding companies from direct federal regulation’160.  
The deregulatory phase was completed with the enactment of the Commodity Futures 
Modernisation Act of 2000161, which ‘barred federal regulation of swaps and the trillion-
dollar swap markets, and which allowed U.S. banks, broker-dealers, and other financial 
institutions to develop, market, and trade these unregulated financial products’162. These Acts 
were all either developed or supported by now-infamous figures within the financial world. 
Senator Gramm, who was a leading proponent of the deregulatory legislation that bore his 
name in 1999, was a key instigator in the CFMA 2000 Act for ensuring that the SEC was to 
have no oversight over swaps (something which he insists to this day was the correct thing to 
do incidentally)163. U.S. Treasury Secretary Larry Summers was instrumental in rushing 
through the legislation whilst the ‘extraordinary bipartisan consensus’ had been formed164. 
Robert Rubin, who preceded Summers in leading the Treasury was the key advocate of 
leaving the derivatives market unregulated, overriding the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission Chairman Brooksley Born in the process to lead a bipartisan effort with the 
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aforementioned Senator Gramm to ensure that the derivatives market was open for business; 
Rubin subsequently joined Citigroup who would go on to be one of the biggest recipients of 
TARP funds165. This is what is referred to as the ‘revolving door’ and will be covered in more 
detail in 2.3.2.3 Mechanistic Importance. 
This concerted phase of deregulation, developed by prominent members of the financial elite, 
is of course extremely worrying. Silvers makes the note that if the New Deal era statutes were 
designed to smash the House of Morgan, the deregulatory phase in the late 1990s was 
designed to rebuild it. In fact, once the dust had settled from the turbulent period of 2007 and 
2008, there were only four giant banking institutions left standing in the United States: J.P. 
Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo166. The lessons learned by 
‘FDR’ in the midst of the Great Depression were conveniently forgotten. Claims such as 
those from James K Galbraith, that this version of the state represents ‘the predator state’, are 
particularly hard to argue against. Galbraith defines the predator state as one that 
‘systematically turned regulation over to the industries to be regulated, and not just to them 
but to their lobbies, which tended to represent the most aggressively anti-government, 
antiregulation, and antistabilisation aspects of each industry’167. Yet there are those that do 
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2.3.2.2 Deregulation – A False Diagnosis 
 
There is a line of reasoning, advanced by a number of prominent scholars and politicians, that 
suggests the argument that deregulation was a key cause of the crisis is, to put it bluntly, 
‘dead wrong’168. The protagonists of this belief are predominantly strongly pro-market, and 
believe that governmental intervention should only occur when the potential effects of failure 
are truly large in scale169. So, rather than castigating the state for deregulating the 
marketplace, this point of view castigates them for determining the abhorrent practices 
witnessed in the creation of the Financial Crisis through regulation rather than deregulation. 
As we shall now see, the leading protagonists suggest that all of those entities criticised in the 
wake of the collapse, from investment banks and insurers to rating agencies and mortgage 
brokers, were simply adhering to policies that the state had conjured up years before the crisis 
began.  
Charles Calomiris is particularly active in promoting this notion of deregulation being a 
positive element rather than a negative one. Calomiris argues that the deregulation narrative 
adopted in the wake of the crisis ‘made no sense’, mostly because the involvement by banks 
in the subprime mortgage market and within mortgage securitisation moreover was ‘in no 
way affected by the deregulation of the last two decades’170. Furthermore, he argues that 
instead of threatening the security of the economy, deregulation in fact ‘cushioned the 
financial system’s adjustment to the subprime shock by making banks more diversified and 
by allowing troubled investment banks to become stabilised by becoming, or being acquired 
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by, commercial banks’171. In what is at best a rather ‘unique’ understanding of events he 
continues by suggesting that in opposition to previous crises, where ‘shocks have not been 
mitigated by the raising of capital by financial institutions in the wake of losses’, the response 
of the U.S. financial system to such a devastating collapse was an improvement which 
emanated from deregulation, consolidation, and globalisation172. This ‘improvement’, i.e. the 
appropriation of over half a trillion dollars of tax-payers money to prop up a system that has 
been officially labelled as systemically fraudulent, is according to Calomiris ‘appropriate, and 
allows monetary policy to be “surgical” and more flexible’173. He also concludes that, in what 
he sees as a positive element, the acquisitions of Bear Sterns and Merrill Lynch by J.P. 
Morgan Chase and Bank of America respectively would not have been possible without the 
repealing of Glass-Steagall. 
There is a slightly more palatable argument advanced by Jeffrey Friedman and Wladimir 
Kraus, who contest that looking solely at the role deregulation played directly within the 
securitisation process has to lead to the conclusion that this argument is deficient. The 
technical understanding that no bank got into trouble because of a securities affiliate is indeed 
true. Also, the understanding that the banks that suffered losses did so because they held low 
quality mortgages which was an activity that was always permitted by Glass-Steagall is also 
arguably true174. However, even though Friedman and Krauss call for us to look beyond 
‘narrow intellectual horizons’175, which is obviously a welcome call, both they and Calomiris 
do not follow that advice. The deregulatory phase may have not had an absolutely direct 
impact upon the securitisation system like Calomiris explains, but the systemic escalation of 
profits and risk that resulted from widespread deregulation did have a direct effect upon the 
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potential of the inevitable collapse enveloping the global community. As we shall see after 
examining the next main component of this school of thought, not looking beyond such 
narrow intellectual horizons has perhaps made their understandings particularly dangerous 
with regards to capitalising upon the financial crisis to promote stark realities. 
Calomiris blames ‘regulatory failure’, particularly with respect to the Government-Sponsored 
Enterprises (GSEs) like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and also prudential banking regulation, 
as the key contributor to the Financial Crisis. This sentiment is echoed by another prominent 
protagonist, Peter Wallison. Wallison, who was a prominent Republican under President 
Reagan, was the leading dissenting opinion in the Majority Report of the Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission. For Wallison the fault lies with the government, although not for the 
deregulatory measures it imposed years before the crisis but for its housing policies instead, 
which is more or less the same argument as Calomiris’ (they rely upon the same research as 
we shall see shortly). 
He ultimately argues that the government-induced growth of the subprime mortgage market 
inevitably resulted in a decline of underwriting practices176. Through the Housing and 
Community Developing Act of 1992177 and the re-enforcement of the Community 
Reinvestment Act of 1977178 (in 1995), Wallison argues that Non-Traditional Mortgages 
(NTMs) became hot property and the overwhelming presence of the two GSEs meant that 
underwriting practices had to deteriorate in order to meet the legal requirement to hold such 
mortgages. The stated aim of the government was to increase the availability of loans for 
mortgages to middle- to low-income applicants by changing the standards for applicability 
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i.e. the down-payment percentage required was reduced to just 5% and the applicant only had 
to have a satisfactory credit history spanning the previous 12 months179.  
Wallison cites these figures, and the fact that only Lehman Brothers ranked in the top 5 of 
MBS issuers at the height of the market in 2005 as being the proof for the claim that banking 
deregulation was not to blame for the crisis; the rest of the top five was made up of other 
subprime issuers like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This ultimately led Wallison to conclude 
that ‘it would be more accurate to say that Wall Street followed Fannie and Freddie into 
subprime lending rather than vice versa’180. This version of events advanced by Wallison 
details a false system, whereby the laws forced GSEs, subprime lenders and banks into 
funnelling more and more funds into the MBS market so that instead of defaults occurring 
earlier and the crisis coming to view, the incessant pumping of funds into increasingly lower 
quality loans meant that those who would normally be delinquent borrowers were able to 
refinance and prolong the system.  
This argument is completely rational, and is supported by the facts of the securitisation 
system and the effects of the legislation that was passed. However, in attributing blame, 
Wallison seeks to pardon a wide range of market actors and simply focus on the government, 
which is an extraordinary mistake. He argues that the Commission’s report is wrong for 
criticising ‘firms, regulators, corporate executives, risk managers and rating agency analysts’ 
because the information about the composition of the mortgage market ‘was simply not 
known when the bubble began to inflate’181. This sentiment is particularly distasteful in light 
of the fraudulent behaviour by those market actors Wallison pardons. However, there is one 
aspect to Wallison’s understandings that raises enough suspicion to warrant an alternative 
viewpoint; the GSEs were not completely regulated and only shared their financial 
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information with regulators voluntarily. This is important because, in essence, their mandate 
was to guarantee loans for NTMs on the basis of meeting the government’s quotas and 
regulations, not for profit. This perception, according to Wallison, led market participants to 
believe that the loans held by the GSEs were ‘prime’ loans, as their quasi-governmental 
status had always resulted in their conservatism in making financial decisions. What had 
actually happened was in order to meet the demands of the state the GSEs had subverted such 
policies and were actually holding millions more NTMs than the market knew (because they 
did not have to disclose their records)182. The result of this was the contagion witnessed in the 
privately created MBS market, which subsequently spread across all mortgages because 
mortgages are all related by house prices. So, the shock at the losses in the private MBS 
market was amplified to a spectacular degree because the market then realised that Fannie 
and Freddie held much more NTMs than they had initially realised. This was why in 
September 2008 the placing of both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship 
signalled the commencement of the actual ‘crisis’. 
So this understanding places the blame squarely at the feet of the U.S. government. It is 
difficult to argue against this perception because the facts of the crisis allude to it being the 
correct evaluation. However, to suggest that market actors who are relied upon to know 
certain elements of the economy better than anyone else (i.e. credit rating agencies and 
securities analysts) simply could not have known is irresponsible. A key aspect in responsible 
economics is to analyse trends and not just accept figures at face value, which is something 
Wallison seems to overlook; it was not impossible for rating agencies and market analysts to 
have known that the bubble was not based on solid foundations. The key issue here is that 
whilst it was not impossible, it was extremely profitable to accept figures at face value and as 
we have seen already in this chapter: ‘money triumphed over ethics’. 




Wallison’s viewpoints are perhaps narrow, but they are at least critical. The viewpoint held 
by Calomiris however is particularly different. Whilst it is prudent to remain objective, it is 
important to use Calomiris’ views (and the school of thought he represents) as an example of 
the dangers in misappropriating the reverence for scholarly commentary. This school of 
thought that suggests the suspension of accepted regulatory principles and the appropriation 
of over half-a-trillion dollars of tax-payer money to pump into irresponsible institutions is not 
only acceptable but should be praised, is exceptionally dangerous. It provides the intellectual 
support for a societal shift that possibly may affect the direction of human history. The events 
of the financial crisis set an extraordinarily bad precedent; it was no ordinary ‘crash’. When 
we align this fact to the understanding that very few have been prosecuted, and the leading 
figures of the process have become significantly wealthier than they already were, then the 
school of thought should be understood as contributing to the advancement of that agenda. 
Calomiris stated in 2009 that ‘those of us who argued in the 1980s that nationwide branching 
would allow commercial banks to serve as platforms for universal banks with large 
relationship economies of scope can now say we told you so… Bank of America, J.P. Morgan 
Chase, and Citibank have all weathered the financial storm’183. Through the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program the three institutions received $115 billion of tax-payer money. Those that 
can say we told you so must accept their share of responsibility in contributing to the largest 
and most widespread financial collapse on record.  
Calomiris and Wallison pay particular attention to one source of research. Edward Pinto, who 
was a former executive vice president and chief credit officer for Fannie Mae until he was 
dismissed ‘without reason’ in the late 1980s184, is a particularly staunch critic of the GSEs 
and their involvement in the financial crisis, probably best characterised by his many works 
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on behalf of the American Enterprise Institute185 and his many testimonies to official hearings 
in the wake of the crash. The issue is however that Pinto’s research is doubted in the same 
manner that his motives are, which whilst this thesis makes no statement on Pinto’s integrity, 
other scholars have186. Wallison himself ultimately admits that this line of reasoning is 
‘difficult to prove’187. Whilst it is fine and arguably beneficial to the discipline that theories 
are not discounted just because they are not ‘popular’, the effects of Wallison’s and 
Calomiris’ incorporation of Pinto’s understandings are troubling. Unfortunately, whilst 
Wallison’s dissent in the enquiry was widely criticised and was labelled as such, Calomiris’ 
work continues to garner a following. 
Coming to a unanimous conclusion is particularly difficult. It is difficult because one’s 
understanding of this area comes not just by assessing the facts, but also by how the facts 
relate to one’s wider perception of society. For example, the deregulation detailed in this 
section cannot be disputed; there were a number of legislative actions that took place within a 
particularly concentrated period of time that definitively illustrates a conscious period of 
deregulation. The issue with that however comes when we ask ‘what was the purpose?’ At 
first glance the divide seems straightforward. One argument is that it was to liberate 
constrained markets and increase efficiency by returning to a financial system centred on 
universal banking. We can also add to this that the state made a genuine attempt to increase 
the availability of mortgages to people who usually would not be afforded such an 
opportunity. Both of these endeavours are just and righteous from the perspective of societal 
health. But, the other argument centres on the fact that the financial crisis was the largest and 
most extensive financial collapse on record and irrevocably altered power structures. Perhaps 
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more importantly, it has made the public safety net an expectation rather than an 
extraordinary solution, which alters the rules of our society completely. This argument would 
lead one to believe that the motives of the state and of the market actors who gained the most 
from the pre-crisis system were not genuine. This argument has to lead to the conclusion that 
these entities do not operate in the name of societal balance, which is a stark and chilling 
proclamation. 
This divergence between perspectives is fascinating. Now that we have assessed the role the 
state played (and will inevitably continue to do so) in directing the economy and therefore 
society, it will be useful to briefly assess the relationship between the state and the rating 
agencies. If we are to believe that the state acts genuinely in attempting to promote economic 
efficiency, then what role do the rating agencies play in the state’s plans? Alternatively, if the 
state seeks to disrupt societal balance (for a variety of reasons), then how will the rating 
agencies fit into that agenda? What we will see, which will be a familiar understanding after 
the analyses conducted so far, is that rating agencies are crucial in facilitating the plans of the 
state, whatever they may be. The outsourcing of certain functions to specialist agencies 
allows the state to focus fully on directing the economy, whilst also maintaining a distance so 
that aspects such as attaching authority do not come into the reckoning. Unfortunately for 
those that seek to find definitive answers, these elements fit into both categories of the state 







2.3.2.3 Mechanistic Importance 
 
This section will be very brief for two reasons. Firstly, the importance of the agencies to the 
state in carrying out its mandate, whatever that may be, has already been established 
throughout the thesis. We have seen how the agencies are important in allowing the state to 
form a regulatory framework for a smaller cost than if it were to do it itself, and we have also 
seen how the agencies fit into the relationships between each market actor, which serves to 
make them almost indispensable within currently accepted understandings of the economy 
and how it should function. Secondly, to describe in detail why they are so important would 
take away from the analysis that follows directly after this section. The reasons why agencies 
are considered to be so important are exactly the reasons why there is such a divergence 
between what is desired and what actually occurs. Aspects such as the need to decipher and 
navigate through the purposefully created complexity that defines the modern marketplace is 
just one reason for why the state seemingly depends upon the rating agencies, despite its 
claims of reducing rating dependency in the wake of the crisis. 
It is becoming apparent that there are two extremes that describe the role of the ‘state’: the 
first version consisting of the state aiming to protect the public through making genuine 
attempts to foster responsible economic growth, and the second that is chiefly concerned with 
providing a supportive environment to financial elites so that they can make as much money 
as possible without bearing the cost of that inherently-excessive quest. The former of these 
versions is safe; it is comforting to believe in and most importantly it contains answers. If we 
understand that the state was simply exploited by greedy and immoral market actors, then 
should the state incorporate this knowledge into its regulatory approach we should, 
theoretically, be free from further financial disasters. But, there is very little evidence for this 
being the reality. There is however an abundance of evidence that suggests the state acted 
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predominantly in the interests of market actors who stood to profit immensely from the pre-
crisis system, which brings us to ask why they would do such a thing.  
It is admittedly a digression but arguably it is an important one because understanding the 
motive of the state may help us understand how and why it utilises the rating agencies in the 
manner that it does. It must be declared immediately that there is simply not enough space in 
this thesis to accommodate an appropriate analysis of what is known as ‘Capture Theory’. 
However, some cursory definitions, when combined with a closer look at just one small 
element, may suffice for our requirements. ‘Capture’ in the context of regulation can be 
broadly defined by a regulatory agency or officer acting for the benefit of a party that is 
compensating it in some way, in opposition to its stated mandate (which usually is to protect 
a given entity that is at risk i.e. investors or the general public). A good example of capture 
from the financial crisis can be found in the statement of former Chairperson of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) Sheila Bair, who in an extraordinary exposé of the 
world of banking regulation detailed how the problem with regards to regulators and Citicorp 
(as the primary example) was not just a cosy relationship between them ‘but a problem of 
regulatory capture, in which the (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency) OCC, Office of 
Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the Fed all saw themselves as advocates for the banking 
industry, rather than as regulators of the industry’188. This one example is indicative of 
capture, whereby the captured agency or agencies go against their mandate and actively work 
for the party that has captured it; it is so easily forgotten that they are public servants.  
Capture theories cover a wide range of aspects, and advance a number of methods and 
reasons for how and why agencies (and therefore states in some cases) can become captured 
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by private interests189. One reason that may supplement our analysis is known as the 
‘revolving door’ theory190. The ‘revolving door’, which signifies the moving between 
different strategically-important positions within the field of finance (it can apply to other 
fields of course), increases the potential for success for the lobbying efforts of big business. 
Sriramesh notes that ‘lobbyists and public relations consultants in the U.S. often use personal 
influence to conduct their public relations activities… these former officials rely on the 
contacts they made during their tenure in government service to help their clients’191. This is 
clearly an issue and the fact that the whole lobbying system is not as transparent as it perhaps 
should be compounds the potential for regulatory capture to occur. 
The biggest issue here is one of influence, and it is common knowledge that the leading 
figures in the agencies concerned with financial stability (The Treasury, The Federal Reserve 
etc.) had predominantly moved to the agencies from the leading entities on Wall Street, so 
much so that the government was termed ‘Government Sachs’ by the press for the amount of 
ex-Goldman Sachs employees who were in influential positions in the government when the 
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crisis hit192. If we are to accept this is as the true version of events (and one cannot deny that 
is true, it is just a matter if one believes it has an effect), then the potential effect it may have, 
at the very least, deserves maximum attention. If regulatory leaders are sympathetic, if not 
absolutely supportive to their former employers’ concerns (a lot of them return to the industry 
once their term finishes), and legislative leaders are being systematically lobbied by 
organised and connected parties, then it is rational to suggest that the state functions for 
business predominantly, and not for the public who they represent in a democracy. There will 
be much more on this topic in the next Chapter, but for now there is an important question to 
be asked before we can move on: if the state operates for business, then what role do the 
rating agencies play in assisting the state in its business-friendly endeavour? 
If we look back on what has been established already with regards to the function of the 
rating agencies, and analyse it from the point of view of helping the state to promote and 
protect the interests of big business, then the centrality of the agencies to that cause quickly 
becomes apparent. Credit ratings allow the state to separate investors so that only the truly 
large, influential, and resource-rich investors can partake in schemes that stand to generate 
the most profit for a handful of organisations. Rating Agencies also govern which 
organisations (issuers) will be allowed to partake in such schemes by administering the 
required ratings for entry to a specific marketplace. While this admittedly sounds 
conspiratorial, we have already learned how the rating policies of the top agencies in the lead-
up to the crisis became highly subjective, which alone means this understanding is not 
entirely baseless. 
Again it must be stated that such conclusions will be measured on one’s general and personal 
understandings of the economy and society moreover. Whilst the belief that the state operates 
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for business and against the public may be too adversarial for some, it can at least be stated 
that enough evidence exists to suggest that it may be the case. The existence of the possibility 
alone should cause suspicion and force people to apply their critical faculties when assessing 
the power relations within our market-centric society. What can also be said, perhaps with 
much more authority, is that a clear divergence between what is desired and what is actually 
the case exists throughout the relationships in which the ratings industry plays an important 
part. Irrespective of the view that someone may have on the role of the state, it must be 
advanced universally that it has a considerable duty to protect its citizens; so this is a desired 
quality. Investors can reasonably expect that rating agencies do not actively operate against 
them, as prior to 2010 the state forced them to deal with the rating agencies exclusively; this 
is a desired quality. But, the actual reality is arguably completely different, as this section has 
endeavoured to detail. What we need to know now is why? What are the key reasons that 
underpin and perpetuate this divergence? Finding the answer to these questions will have a 
direct impact on our ability to predict the potential for the reform proposal to be adopted and 




The stated aim of this chapter was to explore what underpins the roles of the issuer, the 
investor, and the state and essentially examine them in relation to the credit rating industry 
and the events of the Financial Crisis (and beyond). The reason why it was important to take 
this approach was because the aftermath of the Financial Crisis has revealed one very 
important truth; the regulations that followed did not curb the successes or the intolerable 
culture of the rating industry. In fact, there is an argument that this culture has been further 
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embedded because of the post-crisis regulations, in that the dynamics surrounding the 
industry have been altered so that it is now even more difficult to apportion blame if and 
when the ratings industry is at the heart of another financial disaster193. If we operate on the 
understanding that the regulations failed to alter the dynamics surrounding the ratings 
industry to any considerable degree, then the question of why this was so is clearly relevant 
to ask. 
In this chapter the foundation was set to answer that very question; in the next chapter we 
shall examine the reasons for this divergence between the desired and the actual, but in order 
to do so this descriptive chapter was required. So, with that mandate in mind the first task 
was to establish the desired, in furtherance of the analysis in Chapter 1, so that we could 
begin to investigate whether this actual vs. desired framework could be a reasoned approach 
to answering the all-important question regarding the effectiveness of the post-crisis 
regulations. 
We began by analysing the relationship between the positions of the issuer, the investor, and 
the state, as one may reasonably expect them to act. The chapter opened with an analysis of 
the issuer, and what became clear was that at the heart of the relationship was the concept of 
‘trust’, in that the issuer was utilising the trust that investors have in rating agencies, and that 
the agencies themselves were trusting the issuers to disclose accurate information that would 
cultivate the trust of the investor (a clearly cyclical arrangement). However, our analysis so 
far unearths a number of issues that should lead one to believe that this concept of ‘trust’ is a 
fallacy when applied to this area. For decades institutional investors have been forced to 
consider the ratings of NRSROs, which negates any argument of ‘reputational capital’ as 
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being an effective regulator194. This also has the effect of reducing the need for rating 
agencies to consider the effect its conduct has upon the investors, which was clearly 
demonstrated with the willingness to accommodate the needs of the paying issuers to the 
detriment of investors. 
In a similar vein we saw how the investor requires the rating agency to be impartial in its 
operations, so that the investor (of all classes) can factor reliable information into their 
investment decisions. To determine this impartiality, the investors require transparency so 
that they can know for themselves whether or not a particular agency is a viable source of 
information. Yet, the actual circumstances are particularly pervasive in this regard. For 
example, the events that led to the SEC issuing a cease-and-desist order against S&P195 show 
that the agencies are more than willing to disseminate false information in order to garner 
business from the paying issuers. Clearly then, even in the post-crisis regulatory phase the 
transparency required by investors cannot be guaranteed. 
Following on from this analysis of the requirements of the investor, we saw how the state, 
from the philosophic perspective of being predominantly concerned with protecting and 
advancing the public interest, requires the rating industry to form part of its arsenal that is 
designed to foster economic security, whilst also lowering the cost for the state. Yet, the 
actual situation shows us that this act of outsourcing cost the state (and therefore the public) 
an incredible amount of money, and arguably altered the dynamics of this market-centric 
society so that the state will continue to foot the bill for future phases of unrepentant greed. 
Even more interestingly however was the analysis of the motivation of the state, and in 
particular the notion that the financial collapse was actually a victory for governmental 
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policies rather than a failure196. The assessment of the concerted efforts of the state to strip 
away the protection that had been in place for over 70 years is an extraordinarily damning 
assessment, although as we saw how one interprets this assessment is extremely divisive. 
Ultimately it is contested here that this divergence between what is desired and what is 
actually the case is real and is pervasive. The number of instances where the ratings industry 
operated against what may be termed as ‘the public interest’, and more tellingly against what 
they themselves argue is their role, is truly staggering. Whether it is brazenly operating 
against investors who control the savings of the vast majority of the developed world, or 
whether it is going against the mandate that was given to it to lessen the possibility of a 
systemic failure, the ratings industry has acted in its own interest throughout. Perhaps what is 
truly desired is that the ratings industry should consider others, in some limited form, it its 
approach to business.  
However, the rating industry has shown no appetite to do this since it received NRSRO status 
in the early 1970s. It actually showed no appetite to do so before then, but the fact that they 
were dependent upon investors (subscribers) for their income prohibited the agencies from 
fully indulging in their self-preservation. Today there is no such prohibition. This notion is 
what this thesis argues has to be incorporated into any future regulatory proposal. Rather than 
hoping or anticipating that the agencies will act in a certain way, we should heed the words of 
Machiavelli197 and examine their actual performance and the motivations that underpinned 
that performance; there is simply no justification for believing that the agencies will act in a 
socially responsible manner. 
Whilst eradicating the actual entirely, in terms of conflicts of interests stemming from 
remuneration structures or the ‘revolving door’ is undoubtedly desirable, it is almost 
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impossible. There are simply too many factors at play that would inhibit such a reality 
coming to fruition. However, rather than seeking to eradicate the actual i.e. the oligopolistic 
structure of the industry, or the issuer-pays remuneration system, it is argued here that we 
acknowledge the actual as much as possible. What is meant by this is that accepting certain 
truths about the ratings industry, i.e. that issuers must pay for the ratings otherwise nobody 
else will because of the ‘free-rider’ problem, will allow us all to focus upon the reality of the 
situation rather than focusing on attaining the desired without any real substance, i.e. calling 
for increased competition for an industry defined by its oligopolistic structure to appease 
widespread condemnation of the agencies’ performance. Whilst some elements of the actual 
cannot be changed, like the fortified position of an industry that is 175 years old or the need 
for third-party analysis in the bond market, there are elements that can be changed if we view 
the process of reform in the right way; it is not unreasonable to constrain the activities of such 
a fundamentally important sector of society, irrespective of their private status. Dictating that 
rating agencies cannot exploit their position by offering non-rating services is perfectly 
rational and represents an element of the actual which can so easily be changed given there is 
an appetite to do so. In the next chapter we shall see how the divergence between the desired 
and the actual came to be, and how it continues. This will be a very important endeavour if 
we are to demonstrate clearly that what is required is a different way of looking at rating 
agency reform; we must understand intently and acknowledge the reasons for this divergence 












Chapter 3 – Why the Agencies Transgress and What 











In the conclusion of Chapter 2 The Divergence Between the Actual and the Desired, it was 
declared that only by acknowledging the actual can we make truly impactful reforms. The 
divergence between the actual and the desired is such that predominantly focusing on the 
desired results only in an increase of that divergence. So, to attempt to understand the 
divergence more, so that we can begin to position a reform proposal as effectively as 
possible, it will now be important to examine what allows the agencies to transgress in the 
way that they do, and also why they do so. To do that this chapter will focus upon three major 
elements to the credit rating industry: its oligopolistic structure; its issuer-pays remuneration 
system (adopted widely within the industry); and finally the reliance on the agencies 
exhibited by regulators.  
These three elements are all crucial components of the divergence. What is also important to 
note is that they operate interdependently; one cannot survive on its own in the long term. 
Yet, these elements are not ‘explanations’ for the divergence; they are in fact ‘components’ 
that allow for the agencies to transgress and therefore create the divergence that was 
established in the previous chapter. The three elements are all predicated upon the existence 
of a self-interested ethos, and as such are all manifestations of that ethos. Although it may 
seem obvious that a private company would have a self-interested ethos, it is the gatekeeping 
position that the agencies exploit which dictates that a wholly self-interested ethos is 
undesirable. This self-interested ethos essentially dictates the conduct of the agencies and the 
actions that they take, so assessing their adoption of the issuer-pays model, or the manoeuvers 
that the agencies make to preserve their oligopolistic industry structure, i.e. buying out new 
competitors, can only be truly understood when one considers their underlying ethos.  
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However, perhaps the most obvious issue here is that it is very difficult indeed to prove an 
entity’s ethos indefinitely, so with that in mind the only option available is to conduct a 
lengthy historical assessment to reveal patterns in the industry’s conduct. Such a research 
project that would present a genealogical review of the actions of the leading agencies from 
its origination to the present day would be beneficial for the field, but for now such an 
assessment is beyond the limitations of this thesis. Nevertheless, the literature concerned with 
the history of the industry reveals an ethos that, up until the late 1960s, was solely concerned 
with surviving via defence, which manifested itself in smear campaigns of those the agencies 
had wronged, and in concerted legal campaigns to absolutely remove any liability1. The 
developments of the late 1960s/early 1970s, as we shall see in this chapter, heralded a new 
ethos; this ethos was to be concerned with survival via attack, in the form of maximisation. 
The agencies, in taking absolute advantage of their position and the environment that they 
operated in, embarked upon a quest to secure as much income as was possible and this quest 
continues to this day.  
This thesis is essentially an examination of that ethos, by way of an examination of one 
particular manifestation of that ethos (ancillary service provision). The thesis’ call for the 
need to reduce the agencies’ capability to absorb punishments, in order to reduce their 
enthusiasm for putting society in danger for their own gain, is based upon the foundation of 
that wealth-maximising and socially-irresponsible ethos being understood; the last chapter 
clearly revealed this ethos in showing the agencies’ disregard for anyone else, and now this 
chapter will show how that ethos manifests itself and allows for the agencies to diverge from 
what they ought to be doing. 
                                                 
1 The legal campaigns adopted by the agencies was discussed earlier, see 2.3.1.1.2.1 Rhinebridge (and Cheyne 
Finance) SIVs (n 93). In addition to this, see Scott Sandage’s excellent account of the appalling treatment of 




To do this the chapter will begin by assessing one of the key components that allow the 
agencies to transgress, and that is the oligopolistic structure of their industry. Oligopolies 
vary by way of the norms that form the parameters, so depending on the product that is being 
sold the members of the oligopoly may choose to compete against each other in a seemingly 
open (but actually constrained) market i.e. Airline companies, or may choose to form a cartel 
or monopolistic structure because their product is finite and is linked to external factors like 
national position i.e. OPEC2. As for the rating industry, the oligopoly consists of three major 
firms as we know, and the market share between Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s affects the 
internal dynamics of the oligopoly further still. The external factors that affect the rating 
oligopoly, the perceived need for their output and the effect it has upon society for example, 
results in a unique situation (although it is rare that two oligopolistic structures are alike).  
The chapter will therefore begin by assessing the oligopolistic structure of the ratings 
industry, which will then be followed by an examination of what keeps the oligopolistic 
structure in place. Even though the ratings industry has been within the confines of an 
oligopolistic structure since 1851, and has experienced times when they were legitimately 
facing extinction3, we shall see that the structure is what is referred to as a ‘natural oligopoly’ 
in that the end-users, investors, would be disadvantaged by increased competition. In light of 
this we shall also see how many alternatives that have been advanced, ranging from the 
                                                 
2 William A McEachern Economics: A Contemporary Introduction (Cengage Learning 2011) 236 ‘At one 
extreme, oligopolists may try to coordinate their behaviour so they act collectively as a single monopolist, 
forming a cartel, such as OPEC. At the other extreme, oligopolists may compete so fiercely that price wars 
erupt, such as those that break out among airlines…’. 
3 Partnoy notes that ‘the rating agencies were struggling when John Moody died in 1958. By the 1960s, the 
rating agencies employed only half-a-dozen analysts each, and generated revenues primarily from the sale of 
published research reports’ see Frank Partnoy ‘The Paradox of Credit Ratings’ in Richard M Levich, Giovanni 
Majnoni, and Carmen Reinhart Ratings, Rating Agencies and the Global Financial System (Kluwer 2002) 70. 
Wilson and Fabozzi note that in relation to Standard & Poor’s ‘Paul Babson gained control and removed Poor’s 
from Bankruptcy. In 1940, it sold its manual subscription list to Moody’s Investors Service. However, still 
having a difficult time, it merged with Standard Statistics in 1941, see Richard S Wilson and Frank J Fabozzi 
Corporate Bonds: Structures & Analysis (Frank J Fabozzi Associates 1996) 211. Abdelal succinctly puts this 
period of hardship down to the economic health of the period: ‘the late 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s were happier to 
both issuers and holders of securities, but for the rating agencies the times were perhaps too good: no one 




complete removal of the agencies4 to a non-profit based supplementation, are rarely practical 
given the actual dynamics of the ratings arena; the ultimate conclusion will be that the 
success or failure of the arena is solely dictated by the investors, which is an important point 
to consider when formulating reform proposals. 
In order to understand this modern ethos better it will be important to assess the reasons for 
the issuer-pays model’s adoption, which in hindsight represented the change in ethos from 
survival via defence to survival via attack. Within the literature there are three hypotheses 
that are commonly advanced to explain why the model was adopted: the impact of the 
collapse of Penn Central in 1970; the threat faced by technological advancements in the late 
1960s; and to a lesser extent the change in conditions facilitated by the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods monetary system in 1971. The first two will be assessed in turn, with passing 
reference to the third, although there will be an intense assessment of the Penn Central 
hypothesis because it is the most commonly advanced hypothesis; the question is however 
whether the hypothesis includes all the information, or whether it produces a rationale that 
distorts the direction of responsibility? 
Finally the Chapter will look at the issue of regulatory reliance. It is consistently proposed in 
the literature that the decision by the SEC in 1975 to incorporate the agencies into its 
regulations was the turning point that allowed the agencies to contribute so heavily to the 
degeneration of the economy almost thirty years later. To assess the validity of this claim the 
Chapter will first seek to examine the concept of the regulatory incorporation of the agencies 
in its entirety; choosing just one era to represent an industry that is 175 years old has the 
potential to be incredibly misleading. The results of this complete analysis reveal an aspect 
                                                 
4 An example of a proposal that calls for the removal of the rating agencies, at least as they exist now, is in 
Emilios Avgouleas Governance of Global Financial Markets: The Law, The Economics, The Politics (CUP 
2012) 394-447. An example of transferring the role of producing financial indicators to market-based measures 
(i.e. credit spreads) can be found in Frank Partnoy ‘How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other 
Gatekeepers’ in Yasuyuki Fuchita and Robert E Litan Financial Gatekeepers: Can They Protect Investors? 
(Brookings Institution Press 2007). 
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that is consistent with the findings from the oligopolistic section; it is the investors that 
dictate the future of the industry – regulators merely react to market dynamics with respects 
to the field of credit ratings. Yet, the act of incorporating the agencies into the regulatory 
framework, without having any real control over the agencies, was a particularly naïve error 
that gave further impetus to the agencies in allowing them to transgress.  
Assessing the ‘ethos’ of the rating agencies is very difficult, primarily because understanding 
it is simple. In essence, the agencies we see today have learned from their ancestors and 
recognise that at any moment the tide could turn against them and their existence could be 
threatened. We have already seen, and will continue to see, how these agencies protected 
themselves by seeking to limit their liability and used the law to protect them from harm. 
However, a genuine threat to their existence in the 1960s meant that those measures would 
not be enough, and to really survive they would have to exploit their position, rather than 
protect it. This chapter demonstrates that the structure of their industry, combined with the 
actions taken within the space of a decade, represents the manifestations of this underlying 
ethos and provided the agencies with the impetus to prosper beyond their wildest dreams, at a 
great cost to society. 
 
3.2 The Oligopolistic Structure of the Ratings Industry 
 
In 1.2 The Industry: Who They Are there were a number of references to the ratings industry 
as being a ‘de facto’ oligopoly, or perhaps even a ‘partner-monopoly’5. Very little was said at 
that point in the thesis because the connotations attached to such structures require more 
analysis than would be appropriate within the ‘primer’ section. It is important to examine 
                                                 
5 See 1.2. The Industry: Who They Are (n 9); (n 10); (n 11). 
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these connotations because if Suarez-Villa is correct in stating that ‘the relations of power 
that oligopolies represent are largely ignored by the public today’6, then providing a clear 
examination of the power structures within Oligopolies, and within the Rating Oligopoly in 
particular, will be very important indeed. In representing just one example of the power of an 
Oligopoly, Suarez-Villa qualifies this statement by confirming that the reason for this public 
ignorance is because the information that is needed to educate people to the potentially 
destructive power of these structures is lost in pro-corporate report after pro-corporate report 
that view corporate interests as ‘beneficial to [almost] everyone’7. 
An Oligopoly, a Greek word meaning ‘few sellers’, describes an industry that has a small 
number of firms but who have incredible power as a result8. Perhaps the defining feature of 
an oligopoly is the interdependence between the members of the oligopoly, something which 
we shall see over and over again in our assessment of the ratings industry as an oligopoly. 
This notion of the members being interdependent makes analysing an oligopoly within 
generalised parameters difficult, mostly because each oligopoly will have different norms that 
influence the actions of its members. For example, the example given earlier9 regarding 
OPEC, the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, as being an almost 
monopolistic oligopoly because of its dynamics differs from the actions taken by Airlines, 
who are subject to different dynamics. OPEC members have their national position to 
consider and also have a product that is finite, whereas the Airlines operate for the benefit of 
their shareholders (for the most part) and offer a service to the public that has no defined end-
date, which arguably results in a competitive nature not seen between the OPEC members 
who concentrate upon maximising the collective return from their position as opposed to 
individual return. 
                                                 
6 Luis Suarez-Villa Corporate Power, Oligopolies, and the Crisis of the State (SUNY Press 2014) 10. 
7 ibid. 
8 McEachern (n 1) 233. 
9 (n 1). 
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However, whilst they are difficult to examine in general terms, there are aspects that (almost) 
all oligopolies share. The issue of competition is an inherent issue within any oligopoly, but 
is an issue that manifests itself in different forms. Every oligopoly contains inefficiencies 
because of competition10, which often stems from the decrease in competitive pressures and 
usually leads to a reduction in quality (owing to the protected nature of each member’s 
position), with the difference between each oligopoly perhaps being the conditions as 
discussed earlier; the competitive pressures at work in the rating oligopoly result in a lax 
approach that reduces quality whilst the openly-competitive nature of the Airline industry, 
albeit amongst a small number of providers (but not as concentrated as the ratings industry), 
results in a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ that incorporates price as well as quality (the price of ratings 
have not decreased as a result of the competitive dynamic within the rating oligopoly). 
The dynamics within an oligopoly vary, but all are technically constrained by anti-
competitive laws that a given jurisdiction has in place (anti-trust laws in the U.S. for 
example). So, to understand these dynamics within an oligopoly further the economic theory 
known as ‘Game Theory’11 can be particularly useful. The seminal work in this field, Theory 
of Games and Economic Behaviour, written by John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern 
in 194712, started a theory that provides for an insight into the dynamics of oligopolistic 
interdependence (it was not until the 1970s that the field of Game Theory began to take 
shape)13. The theory views oligopolistic behaviour as a series of moves amongst rival firms 
within an oligopoly, with every move and countermove being concerned with the search for a 
possible equilibrium; as Stroux describes ‘everything revolves around the search for a 
possible equilibrium or equilibria, i.e. a combination of the strategies that represent the best 
                                                 
10 James A Caporaso and David P Levine Theories of Political Economy (CUP 1992) 96. 
11 For a representative coverage of the literature on ‘game theory’ see James Friedman Oligopoly Theory (CUP 
Archive 1983) Ch. 9; Michael Waterson Economic Theory of the Industry (CUP Archive 1984) Ch. 3; Graham 
Romp Game Theory: Introduction and Applications (OUP 1997) Ch. 4. 
12 John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour (Princeton University 
Press 1947). 
13 Sigrid Stroux US and EC Oligopoly Control (Kluwer Law International 2004) 13. 
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strategy for every competitor, or player, who is presumed to make “rational” decisions in 
order to maximise profits’14. 
Whilst these elements are admittedly generalisations of the dynamics within an oligopoly, 
they are extraordinarily accurate when applied to the ratings industry. Even a cursory analysis 
of the actions of the agencies in the build-up to the Financial Crisis reveals the dynamics at 
play within the rating oligopoly. Speaking in general terms, Sabnavis notes that with regards 
to the rating oligopoly ‘there are the classic elements of game theory here, where each agency 
does not know the stance taken by the other’15. In drawing conclusions from this 
understanding he suggests that the result of this is that the perceived penalty for a firm taking 
a ‘strict’ stance - whether this may mean economically, ethically, or something else - is that 
business will move towards the firm’s competitor who has not taken such a strict stance; the 
obvious result being an incentive to increase the levels of liberality within the particular 
industry. Such liberal undertakings are rarely the precursor to sensible or ethically-based 
economic actions. 
The dynamics within the rating oligopoly can be seen to be the most demonstrable ‘cause’ of 
the divergence between what is desired of the agencies and what they actually deliver. 
However, it is important to pause for a moment to consider the strength of the oligopoly, so 
that the analysis that follows is properly contextualised. The strength of an oligopoly can be 
measured, or at least understood, in a variety of ways. To begin with it is probably best to 
focus on the Big Three’s, and in particular the Big Two’s dominance of the industry. Tennant 
and Tracey note that across the world, between the 1970s and 2000s, only 68 new rating 
agencies were created, with only 4 being in existence before 1970. Additionally, the vast 
majority of these ‘new’ agencies tend to offer specialised services, which naturally prohibits 
                                                 
14 ibid. 
15 Madan Sabnavis Macroeconomics Demystified (Tata McGraw-Hill Education 2008) 104. 
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them from ever posing a threat to the leaders in the field. In adding to some of the figures 
assessed in 1.2 The Industry: Who They Are, Tennant and Tracey state that the Big Three 
capture more than 90% of the value of all issues rated worldwide, and that Moody’s and S&P 
have a combined global market share of 80% (with the Big Three having more than 95% of 
the market)16. While the figures regarding market capitalisation tend to differ ever so slightly 
between analyses, the sentiment is always the same; the Big Three, and the Big Two in 
particular, dominate the rating industry and therefore the industry is ‘characterised by 
incomplete competition and an oligopolistic structure’17. There are a number of other 
indicators to provide support for this understanding of outright dominance of the industry by 
the Big Three18. 
The oligopolistic structure conveys a power that is rarely seen within other industry 
structures. Darbellay makes the point that whilst rating announcements clearly have an 
important impact upon the financial markets, it is the presence of a rating oligopoly that 
makes those announcements particularly powerful, ‘especially if the three leading CRAs – 
even coincidentally – coordinate their rating practices’19. It is worth remembering that 
according to Game Theory, the likelihood is that the oligopolistic structure dictates that the 
rating practices of the leading agencies will be aligned, which is a particularly important issue 
to consider. So, with the potential power that can be wielded by the members of an oligopoly, 
it is worth examining how the agencies actually operate within the oligopoly. In doing so we 
will be able to assess the importance of the structure in relation to our understanding of there 
being a divergence between what is desired of the agencies and what is delivered.  
                                                 
16 David F Tennant and Marlon R Tracey Sovereign Debt and Credit Rating Bias (Palgrave Macmillan 2015) 
53. 
17 ibid. 
18 See Ahmed Naciri Credit Rating Governance: Global Credit Gatekeepers (Routledge 2015) 55-60 for his 
analysis of indicators such as the amount of ratings issued, the amount of analysts employed and the revenue 
trends of each of the major rating agencies. 
19 Aline Darbellay Regulating Credit Rating Agencies (Edward Elgar 2013) 165. 
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Darbellay continues by stating that the Big Three have continuously been accused of abusing 
their market power and that the dominance of the rating market ‘may have detrimental effects 
on the proper functioning of competitive forces in the rating industry’20. Darbellay is correct, 
but it is safe to go further and state that the oligopolistic structure has had a detrimental effect 
upon the proper functioning of competitive forces in the industry, rather than it may; whilst 
the oligopolistic structure is not the sole factor in this regard, as this chapter will ultimately 
demonstrate, it is an important factor. It has this detrimental effect because of certain 
elements that protect and advance the oligopoly, some of which are more obvious than others.  
Perhaps the most prevalent argument regarding the protection of the oligopoly is that the 
oligopoly is a ‘natural oligopoly’. Tennant and Tracey discuss studies that have concluded 
that the rating market is natural oligopoly, based upon the realisation that the nature of the 
market makes it extraordinarily difficult for new agencies to succeed. The scholars focus 
upon the large economies of scale that come with being the leading members of an oligopoly, 
which translate to the ability to hire more staff and be able to invest in better IT systems. It is 
correct, as Tennant and Tracey state, that ‘new entrants have high start-up costs related to 
acquiring the requisite staffing, analytical tools and information technology systems, and few 
resources with which to meet these costs’21. The Big Three employ over 3000 credit analysts 
combined, which represents approximately 90% of the total number of analysts working for 
all of the NRSROs22. Therefore, it is clear to see why an influential issuer would not want to 
purchase the services of a smaller agency, simply due to the lower capacity the agency would 
have to deal with a complex issue. This leads onto the understanding that the concentration of 
resources allows for the Big Three to systematically dismantle any perceived threats through 
a coordinated campaign of acquisitions. The ability to acquire newer agencies is a particularly 
                                                 
20 ibid. 




useful weapon for the established agencies; a weapon that is continually wielded23 (hence the 
prevalence for start-ups to focus upon specialised sectors or local communities rather than a 
widespread coverage of their ratings, which would take them into the firing line of the Big 
Three). 
Another issue that protects the oligopoly sees us revisit the notion of competition. Whilst in 
an industry such as the Airline industry, for example, competition may be expected to lead to 
a decrease in price for the consumer, the ratings industry operates within different 
parameters. The argument of those that claim the ratings industry is a natural oligopoly is that 
for the users of ratings, the investors, increased competition is simply not desired. The 
theoretical purpose of using ratings, from the perspective of the investor at least, is to assist 
with the deciphering of a issuing firm’s financial position whilst keeping costs at a level 
which makes investing in a given firm’s debt economically viable; if an investor had to 
survey a multitude of agencies’ ratings then the use of ratings would become a hindrance 
rather than an aid, which would defeat the purpose. Andenas and Chiu, citing a paper by 
Lawrence J. White, explain that users’ ‘desire for consistency of ratings across investments 
products helps to sustain reliance on the few incumbents in the credit rating market. The 
multiplication of rating providers may decrease comparability and fuel race-to-the-bottom 
tendencies’24. We have seen in 1.4 A Snapshot of the Regulatory Framework25, and will 
continue to see in Chapter 4 Tried and Failed, that the stated purposes of regulatory reforms 
have been to increase competition within the ratings market; with what we know now this is 
clearly a demonstration of the divergence between what is required and what is delivered – 
not considering the actual is a constant and important issue it seems. 
                                                 
23 See Herwig P Langohr and Patricia T Langohr The Rating Agencies and Their Credit Ratings: What They 
Are, How They Work, and Why They Are Relevant (John Wiley & Sons 2010) 386-410 for a representative 
analysis of the Big Three’s acquisition strategies over the last decade (up unto 2010). 
24 Mads Andenas and Iris H Y Chiu The Foundations and Future of Financial Regulation: Governance for 
Responsibility (Routledge 2013) 197. 
25 1.4 A Snapshot of the Regulatory Framework (n 108). 
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This position of the ‘user’, or more precisely the ‘investor’, and their requirements is a 
particularly important aspect to consider when it comes to assessing the justification for the 
oligopolistic structure within the rating industry. Schroeter, in sharing the views of White, 
argues that financial markets are ‘frequented by investors with a limited capacity to 
assimilate and process information… therefore always result[ing] in an investor-driven 
natural oligopoly of rating suppliers, making attempts to increase the number of relevant 
credit rating agencies futile’26. Whilst this assertion does not take into account the position of 
institutional investors, who do have the capability to assimilate and process information, the 
sentiment is indeed correct; the oligopoly is driven by the investors. However, there is an 
incredible situation that appears when we come to look at the qualities that these ‘incapable’ 
investors require. The main barrier to entry, that maintains the oligopoly, is widely accepted 
as being the issue of reputation, as Schroeter continues: ‘The prevailing opinion in the 
literature points to the high barriers of entry that new entrants to the credit rating business 
face, namely the challenge of having to develop and demonstrate a sufficient track record in 
order to acquire credibility with investors, which again is necessary to persuade issuers to buy 
their rating service’. Schroeter goes further by stating that it is precisely the oligopolistic 
structure, when understood in terms of the members each having over 100 years of 
experience, that maintains its existence; ‘new credit rating agencies therefore find themselves 
in a Catch-22 situation because they need a sufficient number of rating contracts in order to 
develop a reputation, which they fail to receive for lack of said reputation’27.  
However, while this understanding is true it is arguably obsolete, because as we shall see in 
much greater detail in 3.4 Regulatory Reliance, the concept of reputational capital was 
obliterated in 1973 with the incorporation of credit ratings into the burgeoning capital 
                                                 
26 Ulrich G Schroeter ‘Credit Ratings and Credit Rating Agencies’ in Gerard Caprio Handbook of Key Global 
Financial Markets, Institutions, and Infrastructure (2013) 387. 
27 ibid 386. 
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markets; the forced usage of ratings produced by an NRSRO, a term which solidified the 
existence of the oligopoly, removed any reputational concerns the Big Three, and in 
particular the Big Two, may have had. In reality however, the NRSRO designation served to 
ratify the position of the Big Two, because the historical dominance of Moody’s and S&P is 
seemingly the most important factor in the eyes of the investor (this is however an overly 
simplistic deduction, as we shall see throughout this section), although there are questions to 
be asked regarding the issue of perceived penalties for issuers for not choosing the Big 
Two28. It is worth noting that before the incorporation of the agencies’ ratings the agencies 
were almost out of business29, which can lead us to conclude that their reputation alone is not 
the reason for their successes.  
The oligopolistic structure, therefore, is based upon this superficial notion of ‘reputation’, 
although in keeping with the analysis of the divergence between the desired and the actual, it 
is clear that any value users (and therefore issuers) place in the reputational capital of the 
agencies is not shared by the agencies; their abhorrent practices that contributed to the 
Financial Crisis are the clearest of indicators that losing any reputational capital is just not a 
concern for the agencies, despite their protests after the fact to the contrary. Perhaps a 
subsequent question that could be asked is why do investors continue to use the ratings of 
these agencies when the reputation that the investors value is simply not a concern for the 
agencies? One answer to this question lies in the notion of there not being a viable 
alternative, or ‘substitute’30. 
To conclude this analysis of the oligopolistic structure as allowing for the divergence it will 
be helpful to assess this notion of there not being an alternative further. We have seen how 
                                                 
28 See 2.3.1.1.2.1 Rhinebridge (and Cheyne Finance) SIVs (n 93) for the discussion regarding potential threats 
for selecting a competitor to the Big Two.  
29 Partnoy (n 2) 72. 
30 Tennant and Tracey (n 16) 53 ‘The elasticity of demand is, however, affected not only by the nature of the 
product/service, but also by the availability of substitutes’. 
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the oligopoly serves to protect itself by acquiring any perceived threats to its existence, whilst 
we have also seen how the dynamics of the requirements of the end-users of the ratings 
dictate that the oligopoly exists. Yet, is it really the case that any attempts to increase the 
number of relevant agencies would be futile? Is the oligopoly irremovable? In the analysis 
that follows we shall see that whilst there are a number of advanced alternatives that are very 
unlikely to affect the position of the oligopoly, there are some that could transform the nature 
of the oligopoly, if the appetite to do so existed (which is another issue that needs to be 
covered). Perhaps the underlying question that needs to be considered here is whether an 
oligopoly as a structure fundamentally dictates the conduct of its members, or whether the 
nature of the oligopoly’s members dictates the conduct of the oligopoly? 
 
3.2.1 Proposed Alternatives to the Rating Oligopoly 
 
The first alternatives that are worth examining, to show the extremes that exist if nothing 
else, are from Frank Partnoy and Emilios Avgouleas. Partnoy suggests that the rating 
agencies’ informational value is so low that replacing their credit ratings as signifiers of 
market performance with market-based measures such as ‘credit spreads’ would be much 
more appropriate and efficient31 (credit spreads are the difference in yield between any type 
of bond and a US treasury of the same maturity [that are considered to carry no risk of 
default]). Partnoy counters the arguments against the use of market-based measures by stating 
that though the measures may be volatile (because of the attachment to the volatility of the 
market), it is infinitely better if the regulators could make transparent choices about this 
volatility rather than leaving it to the agencies that do not consider systemic consequences. 
                                                 
31 Partnoy (n 3). Partnoy also suggests that credit default swaps would be a better method than using ratings. 
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The volatility in rating downgrades, which may be just as subjective as the rating process 
seen before the crisis, is obviously a counterbalance to the criticisms against the use of 
market-based measures. There is however a different criticism which is harder to argue 
against, as we shall see shortly. 
Avgouleas also argues for the removal of the rating agencies. However, his arguments with 
regards to the rating agencies are part of systemic transformation, which separates it from 
Partnoy’s proposals. He argues for a recalibration of accepted governance models and centres 
the new framework on a redeveloped OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) that incorporates research expertise from the Bank of International Settlements 
(BIS)32. The issue however with this ‘big-bang’ approach is that it requires so much political 
appetite, the likes of which have arguably never been seen, that considering it can only be an 
academic exercise. Although Avgouleas and Partnoy should be praised for offering 
alternatives, because as Avgouleas rightly states such exercises being academic should not 
stop people from advancing them33, examining the potential for application is also an 
important exercise. In doing this, it quickly becomes clear that there is little appetite for the 
complete removal of the agencies (for a variety of reasons that will be discussed throughout 
the section). 
In a similar vein to calling for an alternative that effectively seeks to eliminate the rating 
agencies, there are a growing number of proposals that argue for the public provision of 
credit ratings. The argument is based upon the notion that the provision of credit ratings is a 
‘public good’ and as such ‘the public should be responsible for financing the production of 
this information’34. There are clear benefits attached to this approach as some scholars have 
                                                 
32 Avgouleas (n 3) 450. For the proposal itself see 394-447. 
33 ibid 431. 
34 Viktar Fedaseyeu ‘Economics of Information’ in Rhona C Free 21st Century Economics: A Reference 
Handbook (SAGE Publications 2010) 736. 
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claimed: ‘a public rating agency would not just be financially independent from issuers but it 
would be open to a level of public scrutiny that even heavily regulated private companies are 
not submitted to’35. However, there are a multitude of issues with the public agency 
approach.  
If the state provides the funding for this agency, a new conflict of interest appears, as Listokin 
and Taibleson note: ‘if money comes from the public fisc, then all taxpayers must pay for a 
product that directly benefits only a narrow class of investors’36. If the answer is to force 
investors to pay the costs, then deciding which class of investors must meet this obligation is 
just as problematic37. Also, the fact that private institutions usually pump considerably more 
resources into research than the state does is another element that needs to be considered; 
would the research conducted by the public agency be extensive enough to meet the demands 
that are placed upon the current agencies? Also, if the state were to set up a rating agency, it 
would theoretically lose the authority it requires based on the notion that rating agencies have 
their authority based on their independence (it would also do no favours for the US-centric 
allegations aimed at the current industry structure38). 
Therefore it is not reasonable to suggest that the state would sanction enough resources to 
meet the requirements that are on the current agencies, as it is understood that the private 
sector devotes considerably more resources to research in almost every sector39. In addition to 
this, if issuers now court the ratings of two agencies (at least) and investors tend to take into 
account two ratings, then does that mean the state will have to create two separate agencies? 
                                                 
35 Akos Rona-Tas and Stefanie Hiss ‘The Role of Ratings in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: The Art of 
Corporate and the Science of Consumer Rating’ in Michael Lounsbury and Paul M Hirsch Markets on Trial: 
The Economic Sociology of the U.S. Financial Crisis, Part 1 (Emerald Group Publishing 2010) 149. 
36 Yair Listokin and Benjamin Taibleson ‘If You Misrate, Then You Lose: Improving Credit Rating Accuracy 
Through Incentive Compensation’ [2010] 27 Yale Journal on Regulation 96 102.  
37 ibid. 
38 Kenneth Dyson States, Debt, and Power: ‘Saints’ and ‘Sinners’ in European History and Integration (OUP 
2014) 390. 
39 Fedaseyeu (n 34). 
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This would double the cost and make no impact on the differential independence. Lastly, the 
legal problems that would emerge from claims by investors that they lost money after using 
information that was directly produced by the state would make the whole endeavour 
counter-productive. Overall, the proposal is preferable within a perfect environment, but 




There are some proposals however that do not seek to remove the agencies, but challenge 
their dominance. The preface to these approaches is the ‘public utility’ model, whereby the 
state would set up and manage an agency that would produce ratings not to be used by 
investors for usual purposes, but used by investors to check the validity of the rating 
agencies40. The problem with this approach of course is governmental intervention in no way 
guarantees the accuracy of the rating. But, the idea is useful. The idea is useful only if a 
rating agency that could demonstrate a high enough level of independence, and also develop 
a reputation for its accuracy, would take on the role of ‘bench-marker’. At first glance there is 
an issue here in that who would take on such a role when there was no financial reward to be 
gained from it? 
This is where, potentially, non-profit offerings start to make more sense. There are two non-
profit credit rating agency proposals that are worth considering. Firstly there is the ‘Credit 
Rating Initiative’ that was developed by Jin-Chuan Duan as part of the National University of 
                                                 
40 Raquel G Alcubilla and Javier R del Pozo Credit Rating Agencies on the Watch List: Analysis of European 
Regulation (OUP 2012) 249. 
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Singapore’s Risk Management Institute41. The project aims to develop an organic ‘selective-
Wikipedia-style’ database of credit rating assessments on hundreds of thousands of firms, 
covering ‘macroeconomic, financial and default related information’42. By publishing daily 
PDs (Probability of Default), the Initiative is aiming to provide a purely public good. The 
project’s initial cost was $5 million, with the proposed model going forward being to apply 
for grants to meet the operational costs.  
The other version is the International Non-Profit Credit Rating Agency (INCRA), developed 
by the Bertelsmann Foundation. INCRA aims to provide sovereign ratings that incorporate 
not just economic and short-term socio-political factors, but also incorporate long-term socio-
political factors43. The agency proposes to develop transparent and accountable governance 
structures within the agency that it hopes will stimulate funding. However, the issue of 
funding is again an issue, with the agency predicting that $400 million would be required to 
begin and maintain operations. The Foundation’s target for funding is the G20, which it 
argues should fund INCRA to reduce costs that will occur later through CRA failures. 
The two endeavours unfortunately share a common problem; it is proving difficult to 
generate funding because of what they are offering. They are both offering an addendum to 
the current credit rating system, in that it gives investors the opportunity to compare against 
an established rating agencies’ output. However, there is a massive issue here; this facility 
already exists, arguably, with the smaller NRSROs who operate on an investor-pays basis 
(mostly just Egan-Jones in this respect, although smaller agencies are often used for this 
purpose irrespective of their remuneration model). Their ratings are considered independent 
from any issuer influence, and are commonly used by the larger investors to gain perspective 
                                                 
41 Jin-Chuan Duan and Elisabeth Van Laere ‘A public good approach to credit rating – from concept to reality’ 
[2012] 36 Journal of Banking & Finance 3240. 
42 ibid 3243. 




and check conformity on the Big Three’s ratings on the more obvious credit ratings. The level 
of independence, and therefore perceived accuracy, is arguably less than the smaller NRSROs 
should the two endeavours obtain the public funding they are hoping for. I have argued 
elsewhere that the two entities should perhaps combine so as to cover all aspects of the 
provision of credit ratings, and that they should also seek funding from private philanthropic 
sources, in order to increase their all-important perceived independence. There is also a role 
that seems perfectly suited for the agencies, where they to combine, within current SEC 
regulations, which resembles closely the public utility model discussed earlier44. 
The conclusion that must be drawn from this analysis of alternatives to the current system is 
that they are not particularly viable in their current forms. More research needs to be 
conducted into how these alternatives may be amended to fit the current system, rather than 
overhaul it. The reason for this is not because overhauling the system as we know it is 
incorrect, but it is particularly impracticable given the dynamics that exist currently; one can 
imagine that The Big Three would spend everything they had lobbying against their removal. 
The dynamics of the rating oligopoly are perhaps unique. We have seen that the structure is 
determined by the requirements of the end-users, the investors, which fundamentally 
prescribe the actions of every participant within the ratings market. It has been noted that 
issuers, who actually pay for the ratings, are only concerned with the agency that enjoys the 
most market reliance45; if this is the case then reducing the influence of the Big Two will be 
particularly difficult, but not impossible. While large impactful reforms may be interesting to 
consider, it is arguable that they can never be realised. What can be realised however are 
incremental reform proposals that incorporate the actual dynamics of the industry, rather than 
what is desired. 
                                                 
44 Daniel Cash ‘The International Non-Profit Credit Rating Agency: The Viability of a Response’ [2016] 37 The 
Company Lawyer 6. 
45 Darbellay (n 19) 169. 
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Now that we have established how the oligopolistic structure of the rating industry allows for 
its transgressions, we can now move on to examine the other aspects which coalesce to result 
in the extraordinary confidence that the agencies have whilst they are transgressing. The 
oligopolistic structure protects the agencies because its ‘naturalness’ means that new 
competitive pressures are not forthcoming, which in itself is a major reason for the actions of 
the agencies. The question of whether it is the oligopolistic structure that dictates the actions 
of its components, or whether it is the components’ sentiments that dictate the nature of the 
oligopoly is an interesting one, and will be answered in the conclusion to this chapter. What 
is clear now though is that the nature of the rating oligopoly is at once both protective and 
advancing, and certainly needs to be considered when one advances a reform proposal.  
 
3.3 The Issuer-Pays Remuneration Model 
 
The issuer-pays remuneration model was first adopted in 1969, and operates on a simple 
basis: credit ratings are initiated by issuers, rather than investors, who approach the agency 
and order a creditworthiness assessment; the payment for this service can range from $1,500 
to $2,500,000, depending upon the size and issue of the given security46. Schroeter suggests 
that agencies operating under this model determined 99% of the total outstanding credit 
ratings in the United States47, which demonstrates the importance of assessing this model and 
revealing its advantages and disadvantages. The vast majority of the literature, including this 
thesis, focuses upon the negative aspects of this model. However, there are arguments for the 
model that have to be included before we continue. Probably the most obvious and rational 
one is that without it the agencies simply could not meet the demand that they are faced with. 
                                                 




Alcubilla and del Pozo note that ‘new markets required more specialisation, more qualified 
and higher paid analysts, lawyers and compliance officers, the opening of offices in regional 
areas, and so on. And the increased costs associated with the production of ratings of quality 
could not be funded just by subscribers’48; the reason why this cost cannot be met by 
subscribers is because technological advancement created the ability for subscribers to share 
the rating information with non-subscribers (this will be discussed more in 3.3.1.2 The Impact 
of Technological Advancement). 
In addition to this practical ‘advantage’, there is a theoretical advantage created by the issuer-
pays model, in that the agency must liaise with the issuer (their client) and this ‘provides the 
rating analysts with a better understanding of the issuer’s financial situation and business 
prospects’49; this affirms what was discussed earlier with regards to ‘Signalling Theory’50. In 
what is arguably the only other argument for the model, rating agencies themselves 
vehemently argue that the perceived ills of the issuer-pays model would also be witnessed in 
the subscriber-pays model. Their argument is based upon the notion that the paying party 
naturally wants the situation to be geared towards their advancement over the opposing party; 
the suggestion being that ‘investors would prefer lower ratings (since they will then receive 
higher yields), as would the short sellers of any other security of the issuing company’51. 
These points are representative of the arguments for the adoption and continuation of the 
issuer-pays model, but, as we shall see throughout this section, there are so many other 
factors that these simplistic understandings do not consider. 
So, to thoroughly assess the concept of issuer-pays and how it relates to our analysis of the 
divergence, the section will split into two clearly defined sub-sections. Firstly, we shall assess 
                                                 
48 Alcubilla and del Pozo (n 40) 248.  
49 Schroeter (n 26) 383. 
50 See 2.2.1 The Desired Situation for Issuers. 
51 Matthew Richardson and Lawrence J White ‘The Rating Agencies: Is Regulation the Answer?’ in Viral V 
Acharya and Matthew Richardson Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System (John Wiley & 
Sons 2009) 107. 
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the commonly accepted hypotheses for the reasons why the issuer-pays model was adopted in 
the first place; doing so will add to our assessment of why the agencies transgress in the way 
that they do and also, interestingly, reveal how common misconceptions contribute to the 
divergence. After this we shall then assess some of the negative effects of the issuer-pays 
model, in opposition to the claims advanced by the agencies, to determine how it contributed 
to the creation of the divergence, and also how it is a vitally important tool to the agencies in 
widening the divergence. 
 
3.3.1 Hypotheses for the Adoption of the Issuer-Pays Model 
 
A definitive explanation for the adoption of the issuer-pays model would reveal the mentality 
of the industry at that time, which would go a long way to confirming the existence of an 
underlying approach taken by the industry (as will be advanced in the last section to this 
chapter). However, ‘the reasons for this change have never been established definitively’52. 
So, in light of this fact, what follows is an assessment of the two commonly accepted reasons 
for this change in policy: as a response to the collapse of Penn Central; and as a response to 
technological advances witnessed in the late 1960s 
 
3.3.1.1 The Collapse of Penn Central Hypothesis 
 
That the rating agencies altered their remuneration models as a reaction to the changing 
market dynamics after the collapse of Penn Central in 1970 is by far and away the most 
                                                 
52 Lawrence J White ‘Financial Regulation and the Current Crisis: A Guide for Antitrust’ in American Bar 
Association Competition as Public Policy (American Bar Association 2010) 90 (footnote 90). 
166 
 
common hypothesis. The hypothesis intimates that the increased nervousness felt by investors 
after the collapse altered the market dynamics in that investors no longer trusted in 
‘household names’, with the result being that they required some third-party verification to 
calm their nerves when investing53. Yet, this version of events paints a picture of a passive 
industry being given the opportunity to play a central role just by pure chance; nothing that 
has been discussed so far in this thesis should lead one to accept that the ratings industry has 
developed by chance alone. The important question to ask will be ‘does this hypothesis hold 
up under scrutiny?’ 
The proponents of this hypothesis are wide and varied: Partnoy states that ‘when Penn 
Central defaulted in 1970 on $82 million of commercial paper, investors began demanding 
more sophisticated levels of research’54. Geisst tells us that a ‘potential revenue source 
presented itself following the default of the Penn Central Railroad in 1970… to assure 
nervous investors, issuers of commercial paper sought out and paid for objective ratings of 
their commercial paper issues’55. These statements are representative of a number of sources 
that subscribe to the same view56. 
The clarity with which these proponents make the statement is such that it suggests that no 
other alternative explanation exists. For example, Hudson, Colley and Largan are emphatic in 
their proclamation that ‘at that time, investors relied on name recognition as the principal 
criterion for issuer selection’57. If this was the case that would mean that the industry was 
                                                 
53 Larry Allen The Encyclopedia of Money (ABC-CLIO 2009) 94. 
54 Partnoy (n 2) 72. 
55 Charles R Geisst Encyclopedia of American Business History (Facts on File 2006) 112. 
56 Just some of the many works that are representative of this view include Enrica Detragiache ‘Rational 
Liquidity Crises in the Sovereign Debt Market: In Search of Theory’ [1996] 43 International Monetary Fund: 
Staff Papers 3 565; Daniel Immergluck Foreclosed: High-Risk Lending, Deregulation, and the Undermining of 
America’s Mortgage Market (Cornell University Press 2011) 111; Benjamin Taupin ‘Perpetuating the 
Regulatory Order in the Credit Rating Industry’ in Isabelle Hault and Chrystelle Richard Finance: The Discreet 
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53) 94. 
57 Robert Hudson, Alan Colley, and Mark Largan The Capital Markets and Financial Management in Banking 
(Routledge 2013) 175. 
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almost non-existent, or at least extremely ineffectual, which is an understanding that tallies 
with previous statements made by other proponents58 regarding the health of the rating 
industry prior to 1970. However, there is a reason why the words ‘industry’ and ‘rating’ 
where emphasised in the preceding sentence; there is an incredibly poor oversight made by 
many when they differentiate between the pathways of the reporting agencies, like Dun & 
Bradstreet, and the rating agencies like Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. The credit reporting 
industry was not in poor health like the rating agencies, and the ownership structures between 
the two industries reveal that to differentiate between them during this crucial period in the 
1960s and 1970s is an important oversight. Although it will form the central component of 
the last section of this chapter, it is worth noting here that up until 2000 Moody’s was owned 
by Dun & Bradstreet, having purchased the company in 1962 upon John Moody’s death59; 
with Moody’s being the first rating agency to initiate the issuer-pays model on an extensive 
scale in 197060 it is clearly an important oversight to overlook the position of the parent 
company at that time. 
So, in what represents a wildly different take on the conditions in the economy before the 
collapse of Penn Central, the SEC in its Staff Report on the collapse of Penn Central 
confirmed that the ‘National Credit Office’ (NCO) was ‘the only national rating service of 
commercial paper’61, which when combined with the importance of the commercial paper 
market to the American economy in the late 1960s (and early 1970s) demonstrates the 
importance and centrality of Dun & Bradstreet’s National Credit Office62. The NCO was a 
                                                 
58 Partnoy (n 2). 
59 Geisst (n 55) 111. 
60 Moody’s began using the issuer-pays model in 1970 after Standard & Poor’s had begun using the model in its 
Municipal Bond rating service in 1969, see Naciri (n 18) 16. 
61 Securities and Exchange Commission The Financial Collapse of the Penn Central Company: Staff Report of 
the SEC to the Special Subcommittee on Investigations (GPO 1972) 10. 
62 Markham notes that ‘Corporations in America were borrowing large amounts of money in May of 1970 
through the commercial paper market. Outstanding commercial paper rose from $17.5 billion to $38 billion 
between April of 1968 and April of 1970’, see Jerry W Markham A Financial History of the United States: 
From Enron-Era Scandals to the Great Recession (Routledge 2015) 5. 
168 
 
part of Dun & Bradstreet in the same manner that Moody’s Investment Services was, and was 
acquired through a merger with Arthur D. Whiteside in 193163. The SEC continued by noting 
that ‘customers relied heavily on the NCO prime rating as an independent opinion of the 
creditworthiness of commercial paper issuers’64, which clearly flies in the face of the claims 
of those mentioned earlier with regards to investors simply ‘trusting’ in issuers’ abilities to 
pay back their debts (which is arguably a ludicrous suggestion given the 170 years of 
experience exhibited by the rating/reporting industry). 
In presenting the NCO we simultaneously debunk two common misconceptions: firstly that 
investors simply relied upon the reputation of issuers when determining creditworthiness; and 
secondly that ‘the late 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s were happier to both issuers and holders of 
securities, but for the rating agencies the times were perhaps too good: no one seemed to 
default’65. The first misconception is debunked by the SEC’s Staff Report. The second 
misconception can be set straight by understanding that the ‘prime rating’ awarded by the 
NCO was the equivalent of today’s AAA rating from the rating agencies. Fight confirms that 
the NCO had more than 600 commercial paper ratings outstanding at the time of Penn 
Central’s collapse, and that all of them were ‘prime’, which not only should strike a chord 
with respect to our understanding of the events of 2007/08, but also reveals that the 
availability of ‘prime’ ratings, that investors ‘relied’ upon, ultimately meant that the malaise 
experienced by rating agencies was solely due to the liberality of their reporting partners, as 
Fight affirms: ‘Who would want to run the risk of a lower credit rating when the National 
Credit Office was certain to award a Prime rating?’66.  
                                                 
63 Whiteside would bring the National Credit Office with him when he joined Dun & Bradstreet, two years 
before his company would eventually merge with D&B, see ‘Your Credit Good? Dun & Bradstreet Knows’ 
[1947] Kiplinger’s Magazine September edition 28. 
64 Securities and Exchange Commission (n 61). 
65 Abdelal (n 2) 167. 
66 Andrew Fight Understanding International Bank Risk (John Wiley & Sons 2004) 48. 
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So, the hypothesis that rating agencies began charging issuers for ratings because the collapse 
of Penn Central made investors nervous about investing can be dismissed, because as we 
have seen it was not the case that some implicit trust was shattered by the shock collapse of a 
major national company. However, that is not the end of the story. In understanding further 
the collapse of Penn Central, and the involvement of the NCO in that collapse, we shall see 
two things: firstly that rather than it being the case that some implicit trust was broken, it was 
actually the case that investors were betrayed by the NCO; and secondly that the comparisons 
with the recent financial crisis are very similar indeed. Again, the words of Machiavelli are 
appropriate here, as is the commonly misattributed line from Mark Twain: ‘History never 
repeats itself but it rhymes’67. 
To understand the collapse of Penn Central we must first understand the commercial paper 
market and what it represented in the late 1960s/early 1970s. Commercial paper usually takes 
the form of ‘short-term unsecured promissory notes’, which at the time provided a very 
attractive alternative to bank financing for short-term borrowing owing to it being a 
particularly inexpensive mode of financing, which was easy to use and viewed by investors 
‘as almost entirely without risk’68. As we now know this belief was not due to an implicit 
belief in the creditworthiness of commercial paper issues, but the widespread coverage of the 
NCO’s prime ratings. 
It is because of this widespread belief in the safety of commercial paper that the collapse of 
Penn Central caused such a shock to the economy. Penn Central was a subsidiary of a larger 
holding company, The Penn Central Transportation Company, which was the largest 
                                                 
67 The usage here was initially based upon Richard Sylla’s usage of the quote from Mark Twain in Richard Sylla 
‘An Historical Primer on the Business of Credit Ratings’ in Richard M Levich, Giovanni Majnoni and Carmen 
Reinhart Ratings, Rating Agencies, and the Global Financial System (Kluwer 2002) 34. However, further 
research confirms that the quote has been mistakenly attributed to Twain, and in fact stems from John R 
Colombo Neo Poems (Sono Nis Press 1970) in which a poem contains the line ‘“History never repeats itself but 
it rhymes”, said Mark Twain’. 
68 J W Hicks ‘Commercial Paper: An Exempted Security Under Section 3 (a)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933’ 
[1976] 24 UCLA Law Review 227. 
170 
 
nonfinancial company in the United States; at one point the Company held over $200 million 
in commercial paper69 (the US Government would go onto transform the remnants of Penn 
Central into Amtrak in 1971). Yet, despite its size and dominance of the market place, the 
Company was heavily criticised for a number of things including its structure, its operations 
and widespread mismanagement70, which adds further weight to the claim made here that 
rather than relying on the reputation of these large companies (which was not exactly 
pristine), the investors relied upon a third party to verify the creditworthiness of these large 
companies. 
The company would go on to file for bankruptcy on June the 21st 1970, after running into 
financial difficulties. The company had in essence over-leveraged itself: it struggled to 
integrate an extensive transportation network that stretched from St. Louis to Boston to 
Canada; it was being constrained by governmental regulation (owing to their providing a 
‘public good’); it was running money-losing passenger trains; and was suffering from 
endemic mismanagement71. At the time of bankruptcy it defaulted on $80 million (or $82 
million dependent upon the source72) worth of commercial paper, making it the largest 
bankruptcy in U.S. history at that point. 
So, in the investigations that followed this enormous collapse, a number of telling aspects 
were revealed that implicated the NCO, but also revealed a familiar pattern within the 
economy that is particularly disheartening. Firstly, the SEC noted that as opposed to the usual 
practice where commercial paper is concerned, Penn Central was using it as if it were long-
term financing, which alludes to Penn Central over-leveraging itself (the report also reveals 
                                                 
69 Markham (n 62) 5. 
70 For a sample of the general discussion and criticism of Penn Central see Joseph R Daughen and Peter Binzen 
The Wreck of the Penn Central (Beard Books 1999); Michael Bezilla and Jack Rudnicki Rails to Penn State: 
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71 Bezilla and Rudnicki (n 70) 247. 
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multiple financial arrangements like $100 million debentures that were an attempt to keep 
afloat). In addition to the multiple instances of insider trading amongst executives, the firm 
was also operating against its investors for the benefit of investment banks, Goldman Sachs 
in particular, by way of providing Goldman Sachs with advanced warning of financial 
troubles in the firm whilst concealing all negative information to the investing public; during 
this whole period, the NCO never once removed its prime rating. Goldman Sachs would act 
upon this information and would go on to purposefully but covertly reduce its holding in the 
company whilst maintaining the appearance of holding a significant stake; the result being 
that investors were fraudulently soothed by the presence of Goldman Sachs – at the time of 
bankruptcy Goldman Sachs held none of the commercial paper issued by the railroad 
company73.  
Although legal action was brought against Goldman Sachs (and the NCO as a part of that 
action), the individual nature of that particular case resulted in the court finding that the 
plaintiff was not in a position to have relied upon the NCO’s prime ratings (the plaintiff was 
not a subscriber to the NCO but had received the information regarding the prime rating, 
allegedly, from a Goldman Sachs employee)74. So, even though the reporting agency was 
complicit in the largest bankruptcy in US history (which we know with hindsight would not 
be the last time), there were very few consequences for their actions.  
Before we conclude this section it will be worthwhile understanding the NCO a little more. 
The NCO, which had been rating commercial paper since 1920 and was in effect the only 
national rater in that market, was never registered with the SEC as an investment advisor; it 
was only after the collapse of Penn Central that Dun & Bradstreet transferred the NCO to 
Moody’s Investors Service which at that point was a registered investment advisor. The SEC 
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stated in their report that the NCO grew concomitantly with the commercial paper market in 
the late 1960s, and that ‘most of the data contained in the NCO releases [was] a mere reprint 
of Penn Central press releases or excerpts from annual reports’; the similarities to the modern 
rating agencies are incredible and suggest that differentiating between the path taken by the 
reporting agencies and rating agencies is a potentially serious oversight. Furthermore, dealers 
were utilising NCO ratings as a marketing tool because many customers ‘were required by 
statute or resolutions of their boards of directors or trustees, to purchase only that commercial 
paper which was rated prime by NCO’75. It also alludes to an understanding that the structure 
of the market, whether it is monopolistic or oligopolistic, is irrelevant when there is an 
underlying will to capitalise upon one’s position irrespective of the damage that may be 
caused. 
This incredible likeness and evidence of complicity perhaps reveals one important aspect that 
we must not ignore. The need to be thorough and critical when passing comment is of the 
utmost importance. Irrespective of intention, the story of the rating agencies simply being 
mandated by the investing public to provide ratings, based upon the lack of a third-party 
beforehand, is not only erroneous but misleading and has the potential to warp any analyses 
that are based upon that notion; that version of events is the intellectual foundation that is 
used by the industry and its proponents to justify its position as one of necessity. We shall 
now see in the remainder of this chapter that rather than the industry fulfilling a societal need, 
they purposefully create the environment around them through opportunistic and on occasion 
callous behaviour; this is the actual that must be considered. 
 
 
                                                 




3.3.1.2 The Impact of Technological Advancement 
 
So, if it was not the case that the rating agencies adopted the issuer-pays model because of an 
overwhelming desire from investors to have a third-party verify a firm’s creditworthiness, 
what were the reasons for its adoption? The answer to that question lies in the understanding 
that technological advancement in the late 1960s essentially forced the agencies into a corner, 
forcing them to act. Whilst it is the case that the fall of the Bretton Woods monetary system 
facilitated the explosion of the capital markets76, which in turn empowered the agencies given 
the centrality of their service to the requirements of the burgeoning capital markets77, the fall 
of the system represented the opportunity to take advantage of their position, not to 
implement the issuer-pays model, because quite simply the agencies had already incorporated 
the model (to differing levels initially) a few years before the collapse of Bretton Woods. 
Simply put, technological advancements were a real threat to the agencies because the 
agencies’ ability to charge investors (or any consumer) for the service of published credit 
ratings was obliterated because of the ‘free rider’ problem. A simplified explanation of the 
‘free-riding’ concept would be when an entity cannot capture the benefits of producing a 
product because that product can be duplicated or shared easily, which results in the 
undersupply of that product (if those conditions that prompted free-riding persist). Though 
this concept is part of a larger theoretical discipline known as Public Choice theory (as part of 
                                                 
76 For a representative analysis of the Bretton Woods monetary system see Michael D Bordo and Barry 
Eichengreen A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Reform 
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the study of Regulation), which in itself can be an important theoretical framework with 
which one can examine the ratings industry78, for now this simplified description will suffice. 
It will suffice because the impact of this concept upon the agencies in the 1960s and 1970s is 
straightforward, as just one analysis that is representative of the literature states:  
‘Starting at this time, the major rating agencies began to charge issuers for ratings 
assessments. One reason was the diminishing viability of investor subscriptions as a 
source of financing ratings. Technological changes in the dissemination of 
information, including the spreading use of photocopying, had made it increasingly 
difficult to restrict the beneficial use of ratings assessments only to paying 
subscribers. Since ratings information quickly became available to most market 
participants, the free-rider problem intensified and the value of subscribing to a rating 
service was diminished’79. 
This succinct understanding is universally accepted across the literature80. The threat itself 
came from the new product released by the Xerox Corporation, the Xerox 914, which was 
advertised on Television in 1959 and subsequently became a vital part of Xerox’s revenues 
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(thus highlighting its popularity)81. The popularity of the model therefore dictated that the 
agencies simply could not garner any financial recompense from subscribers, which was in 
addition to the paucity of subscribers anyway because of the preference for believing in the 
‘prime’ assessments of the NCO. What was becoming apparent to the ratings industry is that 
without an event that would change the dynamics of the economy they would most likely go 
out of business. 
That this threat was clearly understood by the agencies is not surprising, but it is at this point 
that we must apply what we know about the agencies and how they operate to an analysis of 
that particular era. In the 1960s the agencies were being dominated by the NCO, primarily 
because the NCO was the only national assessor within the Commercial Paper market, which 
was the driver for economic activity. Furthermore, they were faced with a real threat of 
extinction because whatever revenue they could garner from subscribers would likely be lost 
because of free-riders utilising the technology that was available in the 1960s. So, the official 
story goes from this chain of events to the issuer-pays model being adopted in 1970; it is 
clear to see that there is a part missing. The fall of the Bretton Woods monetary system in the 
late 1960s had the effect of escalating the capital markets which in turn created the need for 
third-party verification (even after the failings of the NCO). However, this narrative means 
that the potential to change the remuneration model, based upon the issuer needing to signify 
to the now global markets their creditworthiness (a new market which had different 
requirements than the Commercial Paper market), happened just by chance. It is this 
understanding of events that leads to a possible line of future research; what was the level of 
direct involvement by the agencies in bringing about the fall of Bretton Woods? It is 
documented that large and influential companies lobbied heavily to promote a freer market 
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during the 1960s82, which cumulated in the demise of Bretton Woods. What is not known 
however is the differentiation within this concerted lobbying campaign, which in an era of 
limited publicly-available information would be particularly difficult to source, admittedly. 
What can be said is that given our analysis of the rating industry so far, it is just too 
coincidental that the capital markets, which naturally rely upon the presence of a third-party 
to verify creditworthiness, would open up just at the time the industry was facing extinction; 
it may be a stretch to suggest that the rating agencies played a significant role in destroying 
an international monetary system, but to rule out any involvement in light of what we know 
would surely be imprudent. 
 
3.3.2 The Effects of the Issuer-Pays Remuneration Model 
 
Schroeter’s analysis of the advantages and disadvantages that are inherent within the issuer-
pays model is a good place to start this section. In describing the advantages, Schroeter 
advances the notion that the increased exposure to issuers, as opposed to under the 
subscriber-pays model, results in a more open relationship that has the theoretical potential to 
increase the amount of information within the system as a whole i.e. ratings analysts will 
have more information which should therefore result in a more accurate rating; this was 
discussed earlier with regards to the concept of Signalling Theory83. In describing the 
disadvantages, Schroeter states that the primary disadvantage is the obvious conflict that 
arises out of the arrangement: ‘since it is in every issuer’s economic interest to receive as 
high a rating as possible, there is an incentive for the credit rating agency not to displease the 
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paying issuers, lest he may take his future rating business elsewhere’84. Yet, as Schroeter 
understands, the situation regarding competitive pressures differs between the corporate bond 
and structured product markets (investors, and therefore issuers, usually only require one 
rating for a structured product, which increases the competitive pressure within the oligopoly, 
as opposed to the corporate bond market where two ratings are usually mandated). Not giving 
a favourable structured product rating will result in lost business, which may result in further 
lost business because that issuer, who may well also have corporate bond ratings outstanding, 
may choose to use the third member of the oligopoly, Fitch Ratings, to discipline the 
offending agency85 (this does not take into account the revenues that may be withdrawn from 
the ancillary service business as well, but that discussion is best saved for Chapter 5). 
So, the issuer-pays model transformed the ethos of the rating agencies so that their fortunes 
are inextricably linked to the will of the issuers. This tying of the agencies’ ethos to the will 
of the issuer is demonstrated when we consider that an investor needs to have the rating 
constantly reviewed so that the information is accurate and up-to-date. However, because the 
agency is only concerned with the will of its client, who as an issuer will only be concerned 
with the initial rating (so that the debt can be traded), the lack of incentive created by the 
issuer-pays model to review ratings has the potential of being an extremely important 
consequence of this particular conflict of interest. This also relates to the nature of the 
oligopoly when, as Dombalagian states, ‘the highly concentrated nature of the credit-rating 
industry may reduce the incentive for established credit-rating agencies to compete on the 
basis of better methodologies or diligence’86. As we saw in the methodological race-to-the-
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bottom witnessed before and after the recent Financial Crisis87, the incentive to be diligent is 
arguably non-existent. 
This transformation in ethos manifested itself almost immediately after the issuer-pays model 
was incorporated. As Moody’s was the first to incorporate the model on an extensive basis, 
researchers have endeavoured to gauge their ratings against that of Standard & Poor’s who 
incorporated the model in the same manner almost four years later. If, as the agencies 
suggest, the issuer-pays model does not affect the operations of the agencies, then the 
expected result of such studies would be that there would be very little noticeable difference 
between Moody’s’ ratings from 1970 onwards compared to Standard & Poor’s’ from the 
same period (given their similarities in a wide range of areas i.e. market capitalisation, 
resources, and rating models etc.). Jiang, Stanford, and Xie conducted this research under the 
title of ‘Does it matter who pays for bond ratings?’ and the results are spectacularly revealing. 
Using a sample of 797 corporate bonds issued between 1971 and 1978 that were rated by 
both Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, the scholars find that between 1971 and June 1974, 
when Moody’s charged issuers for bond ratings and Standard & Poor’s charged investors, 
Moody’s ratings were, on average, ‘higher than S&P’s ratings for the same bond’. During the 
period in which both Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s both charged issuers for the bond 
ratings – July 1974 through to 1978 – the researchers find that ‘Moody’s ratings are no longer 
higher than those of S&P’. The scholars finish by determining that the change in the 
difference between the two agencies’ ratings derives ‘from an increase in S&P’s ratings 
around 1974, rather than from any change in Moody’s ratings’. The natural conclusion to this 
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empirical research is that ‘this finding supports the view that the issuer-pay model leads to 
higher bond ratings’88. 
This incredible empirical research provides evidence to assertions of the same nature within 
the literature, like the OECD who state in a report that ‘the ratings inflation was attributable 
not to the valuation models used by the agencies, but rather to systematic upward adjustments 
in ratings in efforts to retain or capture business, a direct consequence of the issuer-pays 
business model’89. Although Jiang et al’s research was based on a small sample of the 
agencies’ history, it was the only available time-period in which there was a divergence 
between the two leaders of the oligopoly; the result being that any claims that suggest that the 
issuer-pays model is not a conflict of interest, or can be managed, can be dismissed. 
Finally, one issue that stems from this understanding that the issuer-pays model inherently 
results in rating inflation is the systemic effect that the system will inevitably produce. Bar-
Isaac and Shapiro state that several economic fundamentals suggest that ‘ratings quality is 
lower in booms and improves in recessions’. This systemic understanding displays for us the 
realisation that agencies are in effect the facilitators of economic expansion in that they 
primarily serve to create bubbles; their output is weaker during a time when the public 
interest needs it to be stronger, and then their output is stronger when there is less need for 
their product at all (owing to reduced investment after a burst bubble), which also has the 
effect of prolonging the damage that their weak output contributed to in the first place. The 
reason why this dynamic exists is rather simple; ‘The CRA can earn more in a boom, and so 
may be tempted to capitalise on the opportunity to earn the higher revenues available’90. It is 
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safe to say that at this point in the thesis we can discount the word ‘may’ from Bar-Isaac and 
Shapiro’s statement. 
We have seen that the adoption of the issuer-pays model irreversibly altered the dynamics 
within the industry so that their operations were now set up to serve the needs of their clients, 
the issuers, rather than the needs of their former clients, the investors. There is ample 
evidence that suggests the model has created rating inflation across the board, and resulted in 
a lack of diligence based upon the agencies’ acceptance of the requirements of the issuers 
rather than investors. This seemingly reckless desire to garner as much revenue as possible (it 
is actually rather calculated) then has the effect of causing systemic issues like bubbles, 
which ultimately affect the general public through the reduction of societal provisions in 
order to meet the costs incurred by the bursting of the financial bubble (‘austerity’ measures 
for example). 
Now we shall look at the last commonly-understood facilitator of the divergence which is the 
concept of regulatory reliance. In the 1970s the Securities and Exchange Commission 
purposefully integrated the agencies into the regulatory framework, which sought to give 
authority to the practices that were already in place within the economy (as we saw earlier 
large investors were already dependent upon the NCO ratings prior to the 1970s91). With 
competitive pressures resulting in the eradication of ratings quality, particularly in light of the 
incorporation of the issuer-pays model which promised huge returns for doing so92, the SEC 
created the NRSRO position which essentially ring-fenced the ratings industry from any new 
competitors from that point forward. What effect would this ratification have upon the 
divergence? The answer to this question lies in the understanding that whatever effect it had 
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could not be reversed; a fact which is proven by the continued growth of the industry even 
after the references to rating agencies were removed from every governmental regulation as 
mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. 
 
3.4 Regulatory Reliance 
 
The third and final commonly advanced facilitator of the divergence is that a campaign by the 
SEC in the 1970s to incorporate the ratings of the agencies into a number of regulations was a 
prime cause of the agencies’ shortcomings thirty years later. The period of incorporation, 
which saw the agencies being granted recognised status, is often cited as being the most 
important aspect in the development of the ratings industry, as Barth et al claim: ‘How did 
these agencies become so pivotal? Until the 1970s credit-rating agencies were comparatively 
insignificant institutions that sold their assessments of credit risk to subscribers… the answer 
lies with the Guardians of Finance, especially the SEC, which created a climate in which it is 
virtually impossible for a firm to issue a security without first purchasing a rating’93. 
Yet, as our analysis so far has revealed, to attribute the rapid growth of the industry to just 
one element is misleading; is it really true that the SEC were the ones who created the fertile 
environment for the ratings industry? Alternatively, the appropriate way forward is to 
consider a number of aspects as part of a ‘causal web’, so incorporating an understanding of 
the oligopolistic structure of the industry or the industry’s relationship with investors after the 
widespread release of photocopying machines all must be taken into account, amongst other 
aspects of course. Therefore, this section has a number of aims that fall in line with the rest of 
the chapter. Firstly, it will assess whether the commonly held understandings as represented 
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in the literature are appropriate, because as we saw in the last section regarding the widely-
held but misinforming adoption of the Penn Central hypothesis, a widely-held narrative is not 
automatically the correct narrative; so, the section will begin by assessing whether regulatory 
reliance began in the 1970s or whether that specific period of incorporation was effective 
only because of the other elements we have already assessed i.e. the burgeoning capital 
markets or the new relationship between the agencies and their new clients, the issuers. 
This assessment will be helpful because many analyses seem to direct absolute blame 
towards the SEC94, but understanding whether this is deserved will be important because the 
consequence of these claims is that blame is simultaneously diverted away from the agencies, 
which is particularly distasteful given their actions. To conclude, the section will assess the 
effects of this period of incorporation, with the result being the confirmation that the 
incorporation of the ratings of the agencies, and therefore the agencies themselves, when 
combined with their structure and remuneration model essentially cemented their position 
within the economy that we see today. Furthermore, not only was their position cemented, 
but their conduct displayed ever since was arguably inevitable owing to the ratification by the 
SEC (in combination with the other factors); in effect, the agencies had risen from facing 
extinction to being cemented within the regulations that governed access to the burgeoning 
capital markets, all whilst having a new remuneration model that allowed them to capture 
more revenues than ever before, in a period spanning just over 5 years. This incredible 
reversal of fortunes was the breeding ground for the divergence we witness today. 
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3.4.1 Regulatory Reliance: The Blame Game 
 
We saw earlier in 1.4 A Snapshot of the Regulatory Framework that in 1975 the SEC 
promulgated the ‘haircut’ rule that also had the effect of assigning the status of NRSRO onto 
the Big Three (the Big Three were the only recipients initially, although two more would 
follow in the seven years that followed the rule promulgation95). However, in the same 
section we also saw that in the 1930s the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency officially 
recognised and incorporated the agencies into their regulations as well. So, in line with this it 
will be important to understand the concept of regulatory incorporation with regards to the 
ratings industry in its entirety, because assessing such an important construct in a limited 
manner has the potential of producing distorted and therefore misleading information. The 
seemingly predominant condemnation of the SEC for its actions in the 1970s is potentially 
dangerous in that it directs blame and attention away from other important aspects, like the 
nature of the industry. 
Flandreau and Sławatyniec attempt to dispel the myth that before the 1970s the ratings 
industry was of limited importance96. This myth is a prime example of the effect that 
misguided information can have, because the reality is that the agencies were extremely 
important, in the context of that era, and were relied upon heavily by a number of parties, 
which ultimately goes against the narrative of the SEC incorporating the agencies 
unexpectedly and the damage caused after this therefore being the fault of regulators. It 
seems as if though assessments of the industry’s importance stems from their involvement 
with the globalised capital markets, but when we understand that between 1900 and 1940 the 
US Judiciary overwhelmingly relied upon the rating agencies in commercially-concerned 
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cases because ‘both banks who originated the products and those who distributed them were, 
already in the 1920s, highly dependent on the decisions of rating agencies for they benefited 
from the ratings being generous (as they would be able to sell more products without facing 
liability risks)97, then the relevance of understanding someone’s meaning behind the term 
‘importance’ is all too apparent. So, in opposition to the claims that that revolutions occurred 
in the usage of ratings in the 1930s98 or the 1970s99, it is actually the case that they were 
relied upon by financial institutions and investors long before those eras. 
As a result of this understanding it is clear that a switch in emphasis needs to occur, based 
upon the actual version of events. Whilst the common assertion is that the regulatory 
incorporation of the 1970s created an ‘artificial demand’100, and that essentially the industry 
was forced upon the marketplace, it is actually the case that the market relied upon the 
agencies’ outputs long before an institution representing the state sought to ratify their output. 
If we are to assess this further, then one point that ought to be raised is that rating agencies 
existed, and prospered, long before the SEC was even formulated. What is important to 
remember is that ultimately the agencies did provide an information service that allowed 
investors to make informed choices, and that these services made the process of investing 
economically viable at a time in US history when the expansion of the territories had the 
potential of increasing costs for investors. 
This sentiment is confirmed by Flandreau and Sławatyniec’s research when they find that the 
courts refused to technically endorse the rating agencies, but rather confirmed their 
acceptance of the understanding that the ratings had become a conventionally accepted 
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benchmark in the banking and securities trading professions101. It is on this basis that it is 
contested here that the focus that centres on the SEC when it comes to apportioning blame is 
not entirely justified, because just like the SEC in 1975 and the Judiciary before the 1930s, it 
is actually the fact that the market was dictating the acceptance of the agencies, not the 
regulatory bodies (the regulatory bodies can be seen to be retroactive in this light). In 
evaluating Partnoy’s well-known but contentious principle of the SEC granting ‘regulatory 
licences’102, Flandreau and Sławatyniec are correct in noting that the Judiciary’s 
understanding of the agencies’ systemic importance, which was merely transferred to 
regulatory bodies (the OCC in 1931 and the SEC in 1975) represents a ‘legal licence’ rather 
than a ‘regulatory licence’.  
What this does then is shift our attention to the market. It has been stated that ‘regulatory use 
occurred because rating agencies already were providing a well-known and valuable product 
to market participants’103, which of course is true when we consider that in 1931 when the 
OCC incorporated technical elements of the agencies’ products into their regulations, they 
did not have to supplement this with any explanation; the market was well aware of the 
agencies’ products because they had been using them for over 50 years (and in some cases 
even longer). This calls into question then the wisdom in championing the removal of 
references to the agencies within regulations in the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, because as 
Darbellay and Partnoy note ‘behavioural reliance on ratings has been deeply anchored in the 
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financial markets’104. The scholars go on to ask whether behavioural reliance is the key factor 
driving the Big Three’s market share, and the answer has to be a resounding ‘yes’. 
Ultimately this understanding of the actual version of events can help us to prepare reform 
proposals that are more appropriate. If it is the case that the market dictates that the Big Three 
remain in power, then what use is removing references within the regulations, because the 
investors will continue to use the agencies regardless. The actual effect, which we shall see in 
the next chapter, is that now the state has removed itself from the equation, superficially, 
investors have no recourse to complain that they were forced to use the agencies. What is 
important for our analysis is that the correct account of the history of the ratings industry is 
consistently advanced, because the account that focuses on the 1970s as the real turning point 
neglects over 130 years of actions that can reveal to us the true characteristics of the target for 
reforms. 
 
3.4.2 The Effects of SEC Incorporation 
 
It is important here to reaffirm that we must understand the following ‘effects’ of regulatory 
reliance in conjunction with the effects of the oligopolistic structure and the issuer-pays 
remuneration model, because they all form part of a 6 year campaign that has come to define 
the modern rating industry. This is perhaps emphasised best when we assess the effect that 
regulatory incorporation had upon competition within the industry. It has been noted that the 
incorporation in 1975 essentially made competition within the industry ‘almost 
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impossible’105, but as we now know the oligopolistic structure and the requirements of those 
in the corporate bond market are the actual reason why competition is ‘almost impossible’; at 
most the SEC rules served to officially ratify what was occurring already. Fight suggests that 
assigning NRSRO status actually allowed the US Government the opportunity to insert itself 
in this area that is dominated by the market and protect its own hegemonic interests: ‘…the 
defining criteria (of NRSRO status) have never been articulated by the SEC (advantageous if 
the goal is to block the road to foreign rating agencies!)’106. 
The NRSRO status altered the dynamics within the industry, because now rather than 
operating under the façade of being constrained by competitive and reputational pressures, 
they were purely bound by regulatory pressures, as Freidman suggests: ‘their financial 
success did not depend on the ability of these techniques to produce accurate ratings. Instead, 
their profitability depended on government protection. If the rating agencies used inaccurate 
rating procedures, they would not suffer for it financially – let alone would they go out of 
business’107. From 1975 onwards the only real concern for a NRSRO was not losing that 
NRSRO status, and that was it. Again, however, an understanding of the wider picture is 
beneficial because the reason why this regulatory factor contributed to the degeneration of the 
industry’s output is because of the presence of a global market that depended on rating 
agencies (this was not the case in the 1930s when disintermediation was not as prevalent), 
and also because the agencies had incorporated a remuneration model that altered the nature 
of the output whilst also allowing them to record incredible profits based on the operational 
requirements of issuers as opposed to subscribers. 
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With the regulatory pressure being the only true pressure that serves to constrain the 
agencies, it has been argued that the result is that agencies’ outputs tend to be homogenised 
so that no one agency steps away from the crowd108; this makes sense because before the 
Financial Crisis the SEC would never had removed all of the NRSRO designations as a 
punishment (Congress did with the Dodd-Frank Act but that is another matter). This 
homogenisation has a systemic effect in that the uniformity in opinion increases the degree 
and spread of procyclicality, because a downgrade for a firm is more likely to result in 
multiple downgrades which would devastate their position, and if the agencies all respond to 
an event in exactly the same manner i.e. the response to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, 
then the spread of downgrades and losses is almost instantaneous109. 
Part of the reason for this uniformity, other than not wanting to draw undue attention onto a 
given agency, is because the agencies began to construct their ratings so that they achieved a 
regulatory purpose rather than represented the underlying creditworthiness of the given 
entity; this is particularly relevant to the structured finance market110. For example, the CDOs 
and SIVs that came to define the pre-Crisis era were all designed so that they had just enough 
attributes to be rated as AAA, but not enough that they reduced the profits available for the 
entities that created them; as a result, when the first products began to default it quickly 
became apparent that all of the products that had the same rating were of a similar nature, 
which is the reason why we saw mass downgrades in 2007 and 2008. This notion of being 
able to construct an offering so that it just passed the threshold for what was regulatory 
required was a direct result of the incorporation in the 1970s (although subsequent additions 
to the SEC rules affected SIVs and CDOs). 
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These effects of the regulatory incorporation, the procyclicality, the official termination of 
competitive and reputational pressures, and the transformation of emphasis upon meeting 
regulation standards rather than quality standards are indeed incredible. However, one can 
only gauge how incredible they are by understanding that before the CRA Duopoly Relief 
Act of 2005, the CRA Reform Act of 2006, and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 the SEC 
received very little information from the agencies. Miller notes that the SEC often received 
their information on the operations of the agencies through business publications or from 
competing rating agencies: ‘For example, the (SEC) learned about McGraw-Hill Inc.’s 
(S&P’s parent company) acquisition of J.J. Kenny Co., a bankers’ broker, from a Wall Street 
Journal article’111. This incredible understanding, when paired with the fact that there is no 
formal training, educational qualification, or professional qualification required to become a 
rating analyst112 arguably leads to the conclusion that up until 2006 the ratings industry was, 
in essence, unregulated which is an incredible conclusion to reach. 
The regulation of the credit rating industry is a particularly complex area to assess, and 
admittedly many aspects have been deferred to the next chapter where we shall assess in 
greater detail the regulatory response to the crisis (which incorporates an analysis of the 
regulatory failings that the Dodd-Frank Act attempts to remedy). What is abundantly clear 
from this analysis however is that the regulatory incorporation that took place in the 1970s 
was an important factor in the development of the industry we see today, but it was not the 
decisive factor; it is simply not appropriate to consider just one of the ‘causes’ of the failings 
of the industry alone.  
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Before the thesis can progress it was important to give as much detail as possible on this 
concept of there being a divergence between what is desired of the agencies and what they 
actually deliver. Though there are many instances that illustrate that the idealised position of 
the parties that surround the agencies - the state, investors, and issuers - is nothing more than 
a fallacy, the fact still remains that reforms have been consistently founded upon the 
realisation of the requirements of these idealised positions. We shall see in the next Chapter 
that the once-in-a-generation opportunity to enact meaningful change that the Dodd-Frank 
Act represented was squandered because it focused on the desired rather than the actual. The 
next Chapter is framed within that understanding, so in order for that analysis to be effective 
we first had to understand the reasons for the divergence and how they contribute to the 
perpetuation of it. 
The Chapter began by assessing the oligopolistic structure of the ratings industry. It was 
established that a large majority of the perceived ills of the ratings arena stemmed from this 
oligopolistic structure; the agencies all follow one another with regards to rating 
methodologies, and perhaps most importantly their professional conduct, because an 
oligopolistic structure encourages a propensity to follow one another. When we consider the 
extraordinary dominance that S&P and Moody’s have over the rest of the industry, it is clear 
to see that they plan to operate solely within the confines of the oligopolistic structure; to 
deviate and act responsibly, which would likely raise costs and reduce earnings, would see 
them lose substantial ground to their oligopolistic partners. 
In discussing the lack of alternatives that exist to the current model, it became clear that the 
reason for this was not due to a lack of effort, but a lack of appetite for competition. The 
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notion of the rating oligopoly being a ‘natural oligopoly’ stems from the understanding that 
investors determine the future of the industry, and that increased competition would in turn 
raise their costs and reduce the economic viability of investing; it is this understanding that 
sits at the heart of the problems that define the ratings industry today, because the agencies 
fully understand this and proceed upon the acknowledgement that they cannot be removed 
from their position because investors will not tolerate it. Though this understanding is related 
to other elements, like the state’s acceptance of this understanding (the state could not allow 
for a reduction in systemic investment), it is the agencies’ acknowledgement that determines 
their appalling conduct – it is not inevitable that gatekeepers in this position have to act in 
such a manner. 
This manner was illustrated when we assessed the adoption of the issuer-pays remuneration 
model. As opposed to the almost passive intimations that the Penn Central hypothesis 
produces, we saw that the adoption of the issuer-pays model was prompted by a credible 
threat to their existence through the process of ‘free-riding’, and was ultimately facilitated by 
the expansion of the globalised capital markets that grew as a result of the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods monetary system. The international and dispersed nature of the capital 
markets meant that the agencies were required in order to make participation for investors 
economically viable. The influx of issuers to this burgeoning marketplace, combined with the 
fall of the commercial paper market (and therefore the NCO) provided the agencies with the 
perfect opportunity to incorporate the lucrative issuer-pays model; which they did 
emphatically. 
The effect of the adoption of the model was instantaneous; Moody’s, the first agency to 
incorporate it in an extensive manner, immediately began to cater to the issuers, now their 
main source of income, by way of inflating their ratings. We saw how this inflation was 
confirmed by studies that compared Moody’s ratings to that of S&P, who for four years 
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maintained the subscriber-pays model. S&P’s eventual incorporation of the model heralded 
an era defined by a race-to-the-bottom with regards to quality, and most importantly ethics. 
This incredible situation was only made possible by the oligopolistic structure, but its success 
depended upon interweaving this new model into the fabric of the economy; the SEC duly 
followed suit in 1975. 
The SEC, in incorporating the agencies into its regulations in 1975, certainly cemented the 
new maximising ethos of the ratings industry, and arguably cemented it irrevocably. In our 
assessment we saw how rather than do it maliciously, the Commission enacted the rules to 
implement themselves into the process that was already considered to be the standard in the 
economy; by determining the requirements of investors, the conduct of market participants, 
and the composition of the ratings industry, the Commission had attempted to implement 
some order in an environment in which it had no real authority – the lack of resources 
ultimately meant that it could not serve to protect investors on its own. However, whilst this 
attempt, when viewed in this light, seems perfectly rational, the actual version of events 
paints a rather different picture. In reality the Commission had incorporated an agency 
without knowing much about it; there was no information coming from the agencies with 
regards to their operations, and it appears that there was very little consideration given to the 
plight of the agencies. In the space of five years (six including S&P’s foray into issuer-paid 
municipal ratings) the rating industry had gone from avoiding extinction to incorporating a 
model that gave them the real opportunity to make more money than was ever thought 
possible; for the Commission to focus upon their own needs and ignore the effects that their 
incorporation of the agencies would have was particularly short-sighted and proved to be an 
extremely damaging decision. The agencies, now free from competitive and reputational 
pressures, and armed with a guaranteed and exceptionally large flow of revenue, decided to 
take full advantage of their position which would eventually cost the global society trillions 
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of dollars and place large parts of the world in an extremely difficult financial position for 
years to come. 
It is on this understanding that the reform proposal that will be established in Chapter 6 
operates; the ability of the rating agencies to take advantage of their position must be 
constrained. Whilst it is very difficult to foresee a chain of events that would result in their 
actual position being fundamentally altered, it is far more reasonable to suggest that by 
constraining their ability to take advantage of that position, by way of excessive profits from 
activities that are not important for the actual act of rating i.e. ancillary services, the financial 
penalties that are seemingly the only threat may have more of an impact then they do now. 
We shall now see in the next Chapter that this focus on the actual version of events was 
simply not considered in the wake of the Financial Crisis. In order to provide weight to the 
reform proposal in Chapters 5 and 6 we will have to understand where the current regulatory 
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So far we have been introduced to the ratings industry, discovered that it operates in a 
different manner to how it is expected to, and also why this is the case and how it was made 
possible. We have already seen on a number of occasions that the agencies continue to act in 
this opposing manner, even after the Financial Crisis, so now it will be important to assess the 
legislative and regulatory responses to their actions. However, that the agencies’ conduct 
continues is a damning indictment of the effectiveness of this response. The reason for this is 
that the legislative bodies have focused upon what they desire the agencies to be, rather than 
focussing upon their actual capabilities as demonstrated by their actions over a long period of 
time; this lays at the heart of the recent legislative ineffectiveness. In examining this 
ineffectiveness, we shall see that what is required are incremental reforms that concentrate 
upon the agencies’ actual philosophies and subsequent capabilities, which is precisely what 
follows in Chapter 6 A Reform Proposal. 
It should be obvious that the United States was not the only country to enact major reforms in 
the wake of the crisis. With regards to the ratings industry, the EU enacted particularly 
extensive pieces of legislation after the collapse, with the first piece being the first to be 
established anywhere in the wake of the crisis1. However, for our analysis it will be important 
to remain focused on the United States for a number of reasons. Perhaps the most important 
reason is that the agencies were created, and continue to be headquartered, in the United 
States. Whilst the financial crisis spread around the globe (mostly in the West but there was 
naturally knock-on effects for the Rest of the World), it originated in the US with US-based 
                                                 
1 Niamh Moloney EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation (OUP 2014). For the actual Acts see 
Regulation (EU) No 1060/2009 [2009] OJ L302/1; Regulation (EU) No 513/2011 [2011] OJ L145/30; 
Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 [2013] OJ L146/1. There was also a significant Directive which contributed to 
the direction of CRA related regulation in the EU, Directive 2013/14/EU [2013] OJ L145/1. 
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institutions selling products that were primarily based upon US housing mortgages; this 
resulted in the US being seen as having to take the lead with regards to regulation. Also, the 
nature of the EU means that different factors are important in comparison with the US, which 
may alter their focus when regulating the ratings industry. One clear example of this would 
be the rating agencies’ involvement in the sovereign debt crisis that still has the EU in a state 
of flux2. 
So, we will start by assessing the relevant sections of the US’s legislative response (The 
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010). It will then be important to detail some of the issues that have 
arisen from the Dodd-Frank Act, particularly with regards to the administering of its rules 
and guidance, which is a real issue with this piece of legislation. The Chapter will then use 
these analyses to make a judgement on the effect the Dodd-Frank Act has had in relation to 
the desired v. actual framework. The consequences of this will be important for the 
projection of potential validity for the reforms proposed by this thesis later on. 
 
4.2 The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 – What Were its Aims? 
 
As we have heard throughout the thesis, the US responded to the financial crisis by enacting 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. In its preamble 
the Act states that its aim is to ‘promote the financial stability of the United States by 
improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end “too big to fail”, to 
protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive 
financial services practices, and for other purposes’3. For our analysis the most important 
                                                 
2 For more on the EU Sovereign Debt crisis and the agencies role in it see Lucia Quaglia The European Union 
and Global Financial Regulation (OUP 2014). 
3 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 124 Stat. 1376. 
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section of the Act is Title IX ‘Investor Protections and Improvements to the Regulation of 
Securities’ - Subtitle C ‘Improvements to the Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies’. This 
expansive section aims to readdress certain elements, and ultimately build upon both the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 with 
respect to rating agencies.  
It has been noted by various onlookers that the Act has nine particular areas that it covers 
with respect to the ratings industry. It aims to legislate in the areas of: SEC oversight; 
governance and compliance; conflict of interest management; accountability for ratings 
procedures; transparency of ratings procedures and methodologies; the use of ratings within 
statutes and regulations; SEC-provided penalties; Securities Act registration, and finally the 
Private right of action4. Before we continue it is appropriate to note that from this cursory 
review the Act appears to be challenging the constructs that make up the actual in order to 
bring about the desired as much as possible; however, does this understanding hold up under 
closer inspection? 
Congress was of the opinion that the SEC required more power in this area than it had been 
granted in the CRA Duopoly Relief Act of 2005 and the CRA Reform Act of 2006. Whilst it 
is to be expected that Congress appointed the SEC as the State’s representative in such 
matters, given its position within the regulatory framework since its inception in 1934, it is 
apparent that a lot of the Act leaves making the rules and enforcing those rules to the SEC; 
the Act simply dictates on a number of occasions that the SEC takes action. This will be 
discussed in the next section as this element of the Act raises a number of concerns, although 
                                                 
4 Claire A Hill ‘Limits of Dodd-Frank’s Rating Agency Reform’ [2011] 15 Chapman Law Review 1; Jeffrey 
Haas Corporate Finance (West Academic 2014). 
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for now it appropriate just to note that the SEC is placed at the forefront of ratings industry 
reform by the Dodd-Frank Act5. 
All of the elements of the Act are important, although some are crucial to the deciding of the 
course for the industry and the effects that that may have. With regards to the actual, there 
are a number of the stated aims of the Act that aim to change or restrict the actual, in theory. 
Perhaps the most noteworthy attempt comes in the form of Congress attempting to remove 
the systemic reliance upon the agencies by removing the references to them within statutory 
and regulatory documents. Again, in deferring the particular details to the respective 
agencies, the Act instructs those governmental agencies that have historically used the ratings 
as a standard measure of creditworthiness to ‘remove any reference to or requirement of 
reliance on credit ratings and to substitute in such regulations such standard of credit-
worthiness as each respective agency shall determine as appropriate for such regulations’6. 
Macey has noted that, in theory, this act of removing statutory reliance forces investors 
(particularly institutional investment managers) to analyse investments by taking into account 
a variety of information and not to lean upon the agencies, which leads to the reduction of 
systemic risk by ‘decreasing the tendency of mutual funds to have investments that are highly 
correlated with (i.e. the same as) the investments of other mutual funds’7. It is worth noting to 
avoid any confusion that the Act merely states that ratings cannot be the only declared source 
of investment guidance used by investment managers. The effect of this is negligible as we 
shall see, as we already know that the larger investors incorporate ratings into their analysis 
rather than relying upon it; what it does change however is the dynamics of the agency 
                                                 
5 Aline Darbellay and Frank Partnoy ‘Credit rating agencies and regulatory reform’ in Claire A Hill, James L 
Krusemark, Brett H McDonnell, and Solly Robbins Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2012) 280.  
6 The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 (n 3) § 939A (b). 
7 Jonathan R Macey ‘The Nature and Futility of “Regulation by Assimilation”’ in Greg Urban Corporations and 
Citizenship (University of Pennsylvania Press 2014) 217. 
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problems we have discussed in that shareholders cannot use the ratings as the only 
benchmark in which to constrain the decisions of managers. 
Another aim of this particular order is to reduce the availability of the state-induced crutch 
for investors, but also to force the agencies to compete ‘on the basis of the quality of their 
ratings as the artificial demand for their services created by regulation subsides’8. This 
concept raises all of sorts of problems as it brings into the equation the notion of 
‘competition’, which due to the dynamics of the industry is very difficult to realistically 
induce as we know. Macey also suggests that this move will lead to the ironic situation of the 
agencies’ quality improving just as their relevancy decreases9, although this notion is 
particularly representative of an attempt to move the situation into the realm of the desired 
whilst not taking into account the actual; as we shall see the agencies have lost none of their 
‘relevancy’. 
The other crucial part of Subtitle C was Congress going against vast amounts of judicial 
precedent and established practice by making the agencies liable for their ratings. Congress 
deemed the agencies’ operations to be commercial in nature and that they were to be held to 
the same professional levels of accountability as registered public accounting firms or 
securities analysts under the securities laws10. The Act states that in order to make a claim for 
damages emanating from a credit rating the plaintiff must be able to prove that the credit 
rating agency ‘knowingly or recklessly failed… to conduct a reasonable investigation of the 
rated security with respect to the factual elements… (and/or) to obtain reasonable verification 
of such factual elements’11. It is for exactly this reason that CalPERS settled with Fitch for 
important and incriminatory documents rather than money; the documents allowed CalPERS 
                                                 
8 ibid. 
9 ibid. 
10 The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 (n 3) §933 (a)(m)(1). 
11 ibid (B). 
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to prove the ‘state of mind’ of Standard & Poor’s (it is assumed that it will be able to do so 
for Moody’s as well)12. 
These are indeed the key elements, although it will be useful to briefly go through the other 
elements as they will be assessed when we look at the potential issues with the Act. There are 
a number of references to the internal organisation of the agencies and the responsibilities 
which must be met. For example, half of the Board at an NRSRO must now be independent 
(at least half, and a minimum of 2). The agencies must now also publish their methodologies 
that have been used in formulating a rating, and that methodology must be used across the 
entire class of ratings, or the rating agency must publish the reasons for not doing so. The 
agencies are also prohibited from using universal rating symbols to avoid the confusion over 
the structured finance ratings as discussed earlier13, whilst they are also forced to prove they 
have considered more information to produce their ratings other than that provided by the 
issuer. Also, they are now obliged to inform Law Enforcement authorities when they become 
aware of the issuing company acting (or to have acted) in a manner that is deemed illegal for 
whatever reason; this has the real effect of altering their role within the framework because as 
we saw the agencies are adamant that they are not in the business of detecting fraud14. 
As was stated earlier the SEC have been given more powers and with it much more 
responsibility. They must check that the agencies are keeping to prearranged conditions 
designed to separate sales and marketing influences from the credit rating process, in addition 
to checking the increased amount of declared documentation from the agencies that has been 
mandated by the Act. In terms of their capability to enforce the rules of the Act, the SEC has 
now been given the power to suspend or revoke an NRSRO’s licence or suspend it from a 
certain area of ratings (which it has done with relation to S&P and Egan-Jones as we have 
                                                 
12 2.2.1.1.2.3 The Case of CalPERS.  
13 1.4 A Snapshot of the Regulatory Framework (n 127). 
14 1.3 The Industry: What It Does (n 60). 
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already seen). The SEC was also instructed to create an ‘Office of Credit Ratings’ that was to 
be at the epicentre of its relations with the agencies. 
On paper these steps are admittedly a positive step in countering the distasteful practices of 
the agencies and the issuers who they were in cahoots with (the Dodd-Frank Act covers 
almost every aspect of the pre-crisis system). It appears that the Act has managed to focus on 
the actual more than the state ever has, at least since the New Deal era, to achieve the 
desired. However, if this was the case there would be very little criticism, as the desired is 
seemingly widely coveted. Yet, it has been claimed that the reforms are directed at the 
symptoms rather than the causes which has had the effect of altering the façade rather than the 
structure15. If the Act was successful in its mission, then the oligopoly would have been 
dismantled, the rate of profit and revenue would have decreased, and the financial sector 
would have been weaned off of its ‘addiction to ratings’16; this has simply not been the case. 
To understand why, it is important that we turn our attention to the many criticisms of that 
Act and the way in which its legislative rulings have been administered. 
 
4.3 A Reality Check 
 
The stated aims of the Act are very honourable indeed; they certainly appear to generate the 
required safeguards that would have prevented the financial crisis had they been in place. 
However, it should be very clear at this point in the thesis that the ratings industry represents 
a unique realm within which there are a number of dynamics that are constantly swinging the 
balance of power in favour of the agencies. The benefit of hindsight tells us that the agencies 
                                                 
15 Darbellay and Partnoy (n 5) 286.  
16 Marc Flandreau and Joanna K Sławatyniec ‘Understanding Rating Addiction: US Courts and the Origins of 
Rating Agencies’ Regulatory Licence (1900-1940)’ [2013] 20 Financial History Review 3. 
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have become more powerful, have maintained their status as an oligopoly (or duopoly), and 
have increased both their revenues and profits, all whilst seemingly adhering to the new rules 
put in place that are designed to do the very opposite. This naturally leads one to suspect that 
these rules that have been designed to do the very opposite have in actual fact been 
incorrectly designed, otherwise the post-crisis successes of the agencies would not have been 
witnessed, theoretically.  
The Dodd-Frank Act has been widely criticised from a number of different perspectives17, 
which is to be expected when such extensive reforms are enacted; the New Deal reforms 
were also criticised in the wake of their enactment18. However, for our analysis it is important 
to look at two particular aspects. Firstly, we need to establish what the effects of the rules 
have been in reality, and secondly, we need to understand the complexities involved in 
transferring those rules from the pages of the statute to the everyday running of the financial 
sector. If the intended effects are different to the effects of the actual, then there are two 
potential explanations for this; either the legislators have mistakenly interpreted the actual 
dynamics of the ratings industry and all that comes with that, or the legislators have 
mistakenly interpreted the dynamics of the regulatory framework that governs the ratings 
industry. 
To begin with the issues surrounding the interpretation of the industry itself, one 
commentator has noted that in aiming to remove the reliance upon NRSROs and making 
them more accountable, the Dodd-Frank Act has actually served to empower The Big Three 
and disadvantage its ‘competitors’. Pierce argues that the requirements relating to 
                                                 
17 The criticisms of the Act come from literally every affected aspect of the financial system, whether it is rating 
agencies, banks, insurers, or a number of other financial sectors. For just some resources that are representative 
of the sentiment aimed at the failings of the Act see Christian Evans ‘The Dodd-Frank Wall Street and 
Consumer Protection Act: A Missed Opportunity to Rein in Too-Big-To-Fail Banks’ [2011] 13 Duquense 
Business Law Journal; Hill (n 4); Edward J Kane ‘Missing Elements in US Financial Reform: A Kübler-Ross 
Interpretation of the Inadequacy of the Dodd-Frank Act’ [2012] 36 Journal of Banking & Finance. 
18 Burton W Folsom New Deal or Raw Deal?: How FDR’s Economic Legacy Has Damaged America (Simon 
and Schuster 2009) 219. 
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organisational structures and internal governance are disproportionately burdensome for the 
smaller agencies19. Pierce does acknowledge however that the SEC has been granted powers 
by the Dodd-Frank Act to exempt smaller agencies in the name of reducing the burden that 
comes with adhering to the Act, although he does have reservations about whether the SEC 
will use these powers. Since 2013 when Pierce’s work was published, the SEC has granted 
exemptions to four NRSROs when it concerned being excluded from the marketplace as a 
result of adhering to the new requirements20, although one agency did relinquish its NRSRO 
status in the wake of the Dodd-Frank Act being implemented21. 
Whilst the concept of disproportionality seems to have been negated by the Act with regards 
to the potential burdens in adhering to the Act for the smaller agencies, what it has not 
countered is the disproportionate effect the opening of liability may have on the smaller 
agencies. Pierce makes the valid argument that the larger NRSROs (The Big Three) have 
specialised legal departments devoted to repelling legal actions, whereas the smaller agencies 
are less able to defend themselves22; it is certainly true that the Big Three have much more 
experience of repelling legal action against their conduct. Also, the larger agencies have the 
capacity to absorb any fines levied against them, mostly because of their vast size and 
compartmentalised sources of revenue (this is yet another of the major issues with Ancillary 
Service Provision). 
                                                 
19 Hester Pierce ‘A Title-by-Title Look at Dodd-Frank: Title IX – Securities and Exchange Commission’ in 
Hester Pierce and James Broughel Dodd-Frank: What It Does and Why It’s Flawed (Mercatus Center at George 
Mason University 2013) 102. 
20 The SEC granted temporary exemption to MorningStar, LACE Financial Corporation, and Kroll Bond Rating 
Services. MorningStar applied for an exemption as their planned switch to the issuer-pays system would have 
seen them violate certain aspects of the Act. Kroll applied in order to be able to expand their operations into 
CMBS markets. LACE applied because they had ratings outstanding on a client who provided more than the 
permitted 10% of total revenue (which is clearly more of a concern to smaller agencies than the Big Three). The 
SEC also granted exemption to Japan Credit Rating Agency, although this was to ensure that they complied with 
regulatory requirements regarding board structure in the US and well as Japan, see the following for the 
respective SEC Releases: Securities and Exchange Commission Release Nos. 34-71219; 34-71220; 34-57301; 
34-75747. 
21 Rating and Investment Information, Inc. (R&I) withdrew on October 13th 2011, stating that the withdrawal 
was ‘based on its own business judgment’ see Rating and Investment Information, Inc. ‘R&I to withdraw from 
NRSRO registration with USSEC’ [2011] R&I News Release. 
22 Pierce (n 19) 103.  
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If we look more closely at what the Act is asking the agencies to do, then Hill’s perception 
that ‘Dodd-Frank does not ask rating agencies to guarantee results, only processes’23 is 
particularly astute. This adds weight to the notion that the legislators have failed to learn 
from, what we now understand because of the analysis in Chapter 2, the actual conduct and 
processes of the credit rating agencies, because as Hill argues ‘the essential conflict, that the 
issuer is the client, remains, no matter what formal separations of duties and outside 
monitoring is mandated24’. If we accept this understanding then Hill’s argument that the Act 
will serve to perfect concealment rather than quality is logical, given that the core of the 
agencies’ business is to cater for their clients, which as we know are the issuers of the 
securities they rate. It is fathomable to suggest that the agencies will now invest heavily in 
working out how to navigate their way through the restrictions imposed by the Act so that 
they can enable the issuers to take profitable securities to the marketplace; or perhaps they, 
and the issuers will bide their time before the collective amnesia takes hold again and 
deregulation becomes acceptable. 
In the same vein as Hill, Pagliari argues that the Act has only sought to intervene in the 
façade and has avoided altering the actual. Pagliari has a particular concern regarding 
allowing the agencies to dictate their methods and only having to declare their practices in the 
name of transparency. Although the sentiment of this thesis is slightly different, it is similar 
to Pagliari in that it is this trust in the agencies to perform in the correct manner which is at 
the heart of the divergence. For Pagliari, the real issue lies in the regulators’ reluctance to 
intervene in determining the models to be used by the agencies despite their obvious 
shortcomings25. He suggests that reason for not doing so is that regulators, and the state in 
                                                 
23 Hill (n 4) 145. 
24 ibid 146. 
25 Stefano Pagliari ‘Who Governs Finance? The Shifting Public-Private Divide in the Regulation of Derivatives, 
Rating Agencies and Hedge Funds’ [2012] 18 European Law Journal 1 56. See also Nicholas Ryder The 
Financial Crisis and White Collar Crime: The Perfect Storm? (Edward Elgar Publishing 2014) 65.  
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general, are reluctant to be seen as validating the operation of the agencies, as this would be 
seen to be ‘creating moral hazard and exacerbating over-reliance on ratings’26. This is 
obviously a valid concern and a positive stance to take, although whilst they may not 
intervene for these reasons, is it actually the case that the Act has managed to avoid such 
negative consequences? 
In reality the Act has created a wonderfully confusing dynamic that is not helpful to society 
whatsoever. The Act removes all reliance on the agencies for a number of reasons, but some 
are more obvious than others. Yes it removes the ability of investors to rely on the ratings and 
claim that they were forced to use them when times turn bad, because when investors make 
this argument they are essentially making the argument against the state, for creating the 
environment in which the agencies were formally forced upon the market, although as we 
know the market was using the ratings anyway. However, Pierce argues that giving the SEC 
the ability to suspend or revoke registration sends the message that the ratings industry and its 
outputs have a ‘government imprimatur’27. This is obviously in direct contradiction to the 
stated aims of the Act.  
This process is an important one and has been reviewed by two scholars who label it the 
‘Emperor’s Equivocation’28. Scalet and Kelly claim that the ability to ‘pass the buck’ was 
institutionalised in the system that preceded the crisis, in that the state forced investors 
towards the agencies who expressly denied responsibility for their actions29. However, this 
notion of the institutionalisation of the ability to ‘pass the buck’ has arguably been reinforced 
by the Dodd-Frank Act, in that the state now have removed themselves, on the face of it at 
least, from the ratings process, whilst the agencies can argue that investors are not forced to 
                                                 
26 ibid. 
27 Pierce (n 19) 103. 
28 Steven Scalet and Thomas F Kelly ‘The Ethics of Credit Rating Agencies: What Happened and the Way 
Forward’ [2012] 111 Journal of Business Ethics. 
29 ibid 488. 
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rely upon their ratings. The issue with the state removing itself from the ratings industry 
problem is that this does not take into account that the state has been systematically 
embedding the agencies into the fibres of the economy for over 35 years before the Dodd-
Frank Act was enacted30 (and even more so when we consider the early stages of the credit 
reporting and credit rating industries31). This alludes to the existence of a regulatory ‘sleight 
of hand’ which is just one worrying aspect; these criticisms reviewed in this section all point 
to the notion of the state only chipping away at the façade of the actual in the name of 
chasing the desired, when in reality they have strengthened the actual and distorted the 
reality of the ratings realm even further. Before we conclude however it is important to ask 
how this has been done. Every Act must be enforced, so whether the intentions of the 
legislators are honourable or not is irrelevant if there are issues with the administering of their 
decisions, and as we shall now see there a number of concerns regarding the vehicle for the 
Dodd-Frank Act’s rules; the SEC. 
It would be misleading to suggest that the legislative process ends with the signing of an Act 
of Congress into Law. Arguably, this represents just half of the whole process because, as the 
post-Act dynamics develop, affected parties will seek to minimise the effect that the 
democratically created legislation will have upon their organisation. Kane suggests that 
‘during and after the extended post-Act rulemaking process, decision makers will be 
opportunistically lobbied to scale back consumer benefits and to sustain opportunities for 
extracting safety-net subsidies’32. Macey agrees, stating that ‘the rating agencies have begun 
a guerrilla campaign of behind-the-scenes lobbying to weaken the Commission’s efforts to 
                                                 
30 Manns agrees with this sentiment in that the escalation of the reliance on the agencies by governmental bodies 
has ‘survived the abolition of these requirements’, see Jeffrey Manns ‘The Sovereign Rating Regulatory 
Dilemma’ in Nigel Finch Emerging Markets and Sovereign Risk (Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 132. 
31 Flandreau and Sławatyniec (n 16). 
32 Edward J Kane ‘The Expanding Financial Safety Net: The Dodd-Frank Act as an Exercise in Denial and 
Cover-Up’ in Susan M Wachter and Marvin M Smith The American Mortgage System: Crisis and Reform 
(University of Pennsylvania Press 2011) 274. 
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carry out other parts of Dodd-Frank’33. Concerned onlookers have endeavoured to chart the 
amount and extent of lobbying within the United States and have found that the Financial 
Sector lobbies more than any other sector, and that rating agencies are key members of that 
movement34. This is the first stage of the post-Act response that was to be expected. 
However, the important question is whether this pressure from the financial sector paid 
dividends? Some evidence regarding the SEC’s administering of the Dodd-Frank’s 
instructions paints a particularly damning picture. 
Macey asks the question ‘is the SEC simply “Captured” or is it suffering from “Stockholm 
Syndrome” too?’35 He asks this question mainly because of one act of the SEC which 
resulted in the dilution of the Dodd-Frank Act’s aims almost immediately. Barnett describes 
how on July 21st, 2010, President Obama signed the Act into law; the very same day S&P, 
Moody’s, and Fitch all asked that their ratings not be used in any new bond sales36, in direct 
response to the increased exposure in liability. To digress for one moment, this chain of 
events is indicative of the state not focusing upon the actual, because this act by the agencies 
was their obvious ‘joker in the pack’ and they did not hesitate to use it. This understanding 
can be important for us later because it is becoming apparent that when making (or 
attempting to make) changes to the ratings industry, one must attempt to anticipate the 
reactionary moves the agencies will make and attempt to counter them first; this is admittedly  
not a simple task. 
                                                 
33 Jonathan R Macey The Death of Corporate Reputation: How Integrity Has Been Destroyed on Wall Street 
(FT Press 2013) 232. See also Michael Lounsbury and Paul M Hirsch Markets on Trial: The Economic 
Sociology of the U.S. Financial Crisis: Part A (Emerald Group Publishing 2010) 91 for more on the financial 
sector’s lobbying efforts after the Dodd-Frank Act. 
34 The highest spending lobbying client in the US between 1998 and 2015 has been the US Chamber of 
Commerce at $1.16 billion, two-thirds more than the closest client the American Medical Association. For more 
on the lobbying statistics, see the Centre for Responsive Politics. 
35 Macey (n 33). 
36 Harold C Barnett ‘Risk and Mortgage-Backed Securities in a Time of Transition’ in H K Baker and Greg 
Filbeck Investment Risk Management (OUP 2015) 418. 
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To continue, this removal of their ratings had the effect of bringing the entire market for 
Asset-Backed securities to a standstill. In response, the SEC established another of their 
infamous ‘no-action letters’37 in which issuers were informed that the SEC would not bring 
enforcement actions against them if they did not disclose ratings in the prospectuses. The 
result of this was that the expert-liability that the Dodd-Frank Act had sought to establish for 
the agencies was immediately obliterated because the ratings were no longer attached overtly 
to the securities on offer (although the ratings were available from a number of other sources 
of course). This act of removing this feature that had been championed by the Act was 
consolidated when the SEC ‘subsequently extended this non-enforcement stance 
indefinitely’38. 
The issue here is that the legislators behind the Dodd-Frank Act made a crucial mistake when 
formulating the Act. They left a number of important issues too vague, and allowed for a lot 
of autonomy on the part of the SEC. When we understand that the SEC has been chastised for 
its part in the pre-crisis era39, it is a very questionable strategy indeed entrusting that same 
organisation with the administering of such a crucial Act (what the alternative is however is 
hard to say). It has been noted that the Act prescribes that the SEC had to adopt a number of 
rules to govern various aspects of the rating agencies’ operations without detailing how the 
SEC was to obtain the necessary expertise to carry out this mandate effectively40, and that 
ultimately ‘the Act provides regulators with significant room for interpretation and 
implementation’41. Subjectivity in this domain is a particularly dangerous concept. 
                                                 
37 See 1.4 A Snapshot of the Regulatory Framework (n 105) for the use of this method in creating the reliance 
upon agencies in 1975. 
38 Barnett (n 36).  
39 Thomas J Schoenbaum The Age of Austerity: The Global Financial Crisis and the Return to Economic 
Growth (Edward Elgar Publishing 2012) 166; Mehmet Odekon Booms and Busts: An Encyclopedia of Economic 
History from the First Stock Market Crash of 1792 to the Current Global Crisis (Routledge 2015) 734. 
40 Jerry W Markham A Financial History of the United States: From Enron-Era Scandals to the Great 
Recession (Routledge 2015) 729. 
41 Darbellay and Partnoy (n 5) 286. 
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It is dangerous because as Macey suggests, the SEC is particularly vulnerable to being 
‘captured’. Earlier we spoke of the ‘revolving door’ theory42 and this is particularly relevant 
when talking about the relationship between the SEC and the Rating Agencies. Firstly, the 
Dodd-Frank Act has (probably unwittingly) increased the potential for this to occur with the 
forced establishment of the Office of Credit Ratings. If we accept Macey’s perception that 
‘the major credit rating agencies are a significant source of support and employment for SEC 
alumni’43, then forcing a dedicated number of SEC staffers to be the focal point for SEC-
CRA relations is obviously not ideal. The SEC’s nonchalant attitude towards to the Office of 
Credit Ratings in the wake of the Dodd-Frank Act (the Office remained unstaffed for 12 
months44) also paints a worrying picture of its approach to fulfilling its mandate. 
Before this section concludes it will be useful to analyse just one example of the SEC’s 
favourable approach to the Big Three, an example which also throws further light on events 
first described in Chapter 2. In section 2.3 we heard how Egan-Jones Rating Company had 
been punished by the SEC for making misrepresentations in its application to become a 
NRSRO45. However, with what has been alleged against the SEC, with regards to its 
potentially favourable approach to the Big Three, this event needs to be reassessed. Macey is 
a strong critic of the SEC and he pulls no punches in admonishing the SEC in this instance. 
He tells us that the story between Egan-Jones and the SEC began in 2008, when under 
pressure from Congress to increase competition within the ratings industry the SEC 
‘grudgingly’ allowed Egan-Jones to receive the NRSRO designation. However, in 2012 the 
SEC announced that it was suing Egan-Jones and would be attempting to remove its NRSRO 
status. Macey argues that in suing this relatively small agency (it had at the time just 20 
employees) the SEC demonstrated its ‘pure maliciousness’ towards the competitor to the Big 
                                                 
42 See 2.3.2.3 Mechanistic Importance (n 170). 
43 Macey (n 33). 
44 Darbellay and Partnoy (n 5) 280. 
45 2.3 The Actual Situation (n 42). 
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Three46. It is worth noting at this juncture that Egan-Jones is the only NRSRO that does not 
use the issuer-pays compensation model and is forthright in its promoting the understanding 
that it is more accurate and timely in administering its ratings than any other agency as a 
result. This is an important factor as we shall now see. 
Macey continues by alleging that Egan-Jones’ problems began in July 2011 when the 
company had downgraded the US’ sovereign debt rating by one notch; the SEC contacted the 
agency immediately to ask for explanation for its decision. 3 months later the SEC notified 
the firm that it was the target of an investigation, and in April 2012 legal proceedings began 
against the agency and its co-founder Sean Egan. However, the content of this legal action is 
where the true nature of the SEC begins to appear. The action was not concerned with its 
ratings, methodologies or professional conduct (as they should have been with the Big 
Three), but it was concerned with a technical element of the firm’s NRSRO registration. The 
main question surrounded the issue of whether the agency met the SEC requirement that the 
ratings be ‘disseminated publicly’, which as we know now is a laughable idea because the 
Big Three put their full and easy-to-use ratings and ratings decisions behind pay-walls47. The 
obvious issue here is that Egan-Jones cannot publicly disseminate their ratings because not 
doing so is how they make money; it is inherent within the subscriber-pays model that people 
must pay to view the ratings. In essence then Egan-Jones was punished predominantly 
because it had not incorporated the conflict-of-interest-inducing system of issuer-pays, which 
is an extraordinary understanding. For daring to do so, Egan-Jones was banned for 18 months 
from rating any Asset-backed securities. 
 
                                                 
46 Macey (n 33) 232-5. 
47 See 3.3.1.2 The Impact of Technological Advancement (n 78) for Langohr and Langohr’s assessment of the 





As the presence of a divergence between the desired and the actual was established earlier in 
the thesis, this Chapter endeavoured to identify the regulatory response to the financial crisis 
for the purpose of placing that response within the desired vs. actual framework. Before this 
analysis started it was always clear where the regulatory response would fall with regards to 
this framework simply by analysing the trajectory of the ratings industry post-crisis. That the 
Big Three have resumed their pre-crisis rates of growth both in terms of revenue and profit, 
that their position as an oligopoly has been strengthened, and also that the major threats to 
their existence that were advanced post-crisis have been circumvented (liability concerns), all 
contribute to the realisation that the regulatory response did not take aim at the actual state of 
affairs. In essence the legislators sought to move the industry towards the desired by aiming 
at the middle ground, which inevitably has resulted in failure and the widening of the 
divergence. In addition to this, we now see that the state has managed to exonerate itself from 
any future blame even though the system that it was responsible for creating has not changed; 
this is a worrying development within the financial sector. 
One of the main sentiments of this thesis is that effective regulation must seek to focus on the 
actual first in order to accurately describe what the desired can be and then whether that 
situation can be achieved. The regulatory response to the crisis has not done this; what it has 
done is place the onus (and future blame) on investors, whilst also absolving issuers. It has 
paid lip service to holding the agencies accountable for their actions, as the administering of 
the legislative rules have gone on to confirm (almost immediately after the Act was enacted). 
We saw how the SEC is playing a particularly central role in determining the trajectory of the 
ratings industry, which goes against its mandate to protect investors. The increased exposure 
of the agencies for liability was a welcome start, but as we saw the SEC’s no-action letters 
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put a stop to that development, which is particularly worrying because it is entirely 
reasonable that the agencies will be much more careful in the future with regards to leaving 
trails; the requirement to prove the ‘state of mind’ of the agency will prove to be very 
difficult, as not every investor will be able to do what CalPERS did and turn one agency 
against another. 
Admittedly this chapter leaves a sour taste. It is contested here that the once-in-a-generation 
opportunity to enact socially-impactful reforms has been scuppered by the presence of 
captured administrators, which results in the understanding that proposing any sort of socially 
beneficial reforms and have them come to fruition is a difficult concept in itself. However, 
whilst accepting defeat in this endeavour may be rational, it is important to advance proposals 
that may educate people to the reality of the situation, however unlikely it may be to see it 
realised. In proposing that the rating agencies be forced to choose between Ratings Provision 
and Ancillary Service Provision, the thesis aims to both present a socially beneficial solution 
to the exploitative nature of the ratings industry and its ability to absorb any punishment 
whilst also developing the narrative that this reality exists; this is perhaps the key point to 
reform proposals regarding such seemingly immoveable objects. This thesis has, so far, 
established that narrative; what is important now is that the reform proposal is introduced. 
However, in order to do so we will need to know much more about the division that is the 

























‘Ancillary Services’ is a term used loosely to describe services that credit rating agencies 
offer in addition to their rating services. While the actual definition of what these services are 
has not been definitively established1, Moody’s has defined their offering as including 
services such as: ‘Cashflow Models; Credit Models; Pool, Loan, and Performance Data; and 
Valuation & Advisory Services’2. Yet, whilst the definition of what ancillary services 
actually consist of may be undecided, what is very clear is that the revenue from ancillary 
service provision represents a significant portion of the agencies’ overall revenue, whilst it is 
also recognised that the provision of additional services within such a systemically important 
sector is very controversial3. It is this controversial, yet substantial, growth of a business that 
is not important to the development of accurate credit ratings that is at the heart of this 
chapter’s analysis. 
There has been a movement since the Crisis to reduce the influence of ancillary service 
provision upon the rating process, but it is important to cover the nuanced details of this 
movement before we continue.  Essentially, no NRSRO is prohibited from providing 
‘ancillary services’, which is more accurately represented by Moody’s when they affirm that 
‘Moody’s Investor Services (MIS) does not currently offer Ancillary Services but may do so 
in the future’4. What they are prohibited from offering is pre-rating advice to an issuer, as 
detailed by the SEC: ‘Paragraph (c)(5) of Rule 17g-5 prohibits an NRSRO from issuing or 
maintaining a credit rating with respect to an obligor or security where the NRSRO or person 
associated with the NRSRO made recommendations to the obligor or the issuer, underwriter, 
                                                 
1 Raquel G Alcubilla and Javier R del Pozo Credit Rating Agencies on the Watch List: Analysis of European 
Regulation (OUP 2012) 145. 
2 Moody’s Analytics How Do You Transform Risk into High Performance? An Overview of Moody’s Analytics 
(2015). 
3 Aline Darbellay Regulating Credit Rating Agencies (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2013) 122. 
4 Moody’s Policy for Ancillary and Other Permissible Services: Compliance (Moody’s 2013) (emphasis added). 
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or sponsor of the security about the corporate or legal structure, assets, liabilities, or 
activities of the obligor or issuer of the security’5. The aim of this regulation was to stop the 
process detailed earlier where agencies were involved in the construction of SIVs6, in what 
was just one example, which is commonly referred to as the agencies ‘rating their own work’. 
Whilst Moody’s do not offer ‘Ancillary Services’, they do offer more than 17 services that it 
describes as ‘other permissible activities’7. So, whilst pre-rating services are prohibited, the 
provision of ancillary services moreover contributes greatly to the Big Three (and the Big 
Two in particular). 
So, in light of these factors it will be important to state some important aspects that this 
analysis will be built upon. Firstly, the term ‘Ancillary Services’ is used here to mean any 
service offered by a CRA which is not expressly attached to their service of credit rating 
provision, and is not available to issuers before a credit rating of a particular security has 
been disseminated, should that entity require an issuance to be rated (as that practice has now 
been prohibited). The second aspect that needs to be established is that there will be a 
noticeable favouring in analysing Moody’s Analytics over S&P Capital IQ; this is solely 
because the data for Moody’s Analytics is readily available with Moody’s being a publicly 
traded company, as opposed to S&P being part of the McGraw-Hill company (the same 
applies to Fitch Ratings).  
In terms of the aims of this chapter, the analysis will begin with an examination of the 
vehicles that deliver ancillary services, namely Moody’s Analytics and S&P Capital IQ. 
                                                 
5 Securities and Exchange Commission Final Rule Analysis – Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 
34-72936; File No. S7-18-11 (2014) footnote 70 (emphasis added). This sentiment is also the one adopted by 
European regulatory authorities, see Alcubilla and del Pozo (n 1) 147. 
6 See 2.3.1.1 Collusion and the analyses of the SIVs that the CRAs were a part of.  
7 Moody’s makes clear that it does not offer consultancy or advisory services to rated entities (in addition to 
‘Ancillary Services’), but does offer only ‘Credit Rating Services and “Other Permissible Services”’, which 
include, but is not limited to: Bond Fund Ratings; Common Representative Quality Assessments; Equity Fund 
Assessments; Indicative Ratings; and Rating Assessment Services. See Moody’s Rating Symbols and 
Definitions (Moody’s 2016) for further details of their offerings.  
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Rather than examining what the ancillary services actually are and how they are utilised by 
the market, which is an issue that will be raised in 7.1 Avenues for Future Research, it will be 
more appropriate here to assess these subsidiary components and their contribution to the 
parent company’s financial position overall. One of the key contentions of this thesis is that 
the agencies understood intently the environment that surrounded them in the early 2000s 
and, therefore, took the conscious decision to take advantage of their unique position that was 
protected by the State and was central to the burgeoning securitised issuance market. To test 
this hypothesis the Chapter will make use of figures that chart the rise of securitised product 
issuances, the acquisition trends of the Big Two, and the growth of Moody’s Analytics in 
comparison to the economic fluctuations that took place in the 2000s (because financial 
performance figures are available throughout the period for Moody’s Analytics); what we 
will see is that the Big Two (S&P predominantly, although the duopolistic nature of the 
industry means the other company will surely follow suit, which Moody’s did) took notice of 
the demise of the consultancy operations of the leading Public Accounting Firms in the wake 
of the Enron and WorldCom affairs and sought to merge the same exploitative ideal with 
their particularly unique position – whilst Arthur Andersen would fail and PwC, Deloitte, and 
others would have to divest their consultancy operations, the Credit Rating Agencies would 
cause more havoc than was witnessed during the Enron scandal whilst instituting an ancillary 
business that has become widely accepted by regulators as just being part of the service. 
In order to make this central point the chapter will then progress onto an assessment of the 
varying levels of criticism aimed at the agencies with regards to the provision of ancillary 
services. We shall see that the majority of criticism is concerned with the effect that the 
provision has, or at least potentially has, upon certain relationships (issuers being pressured 
into paying for additional services to preserve a rating for example), which is argued here 
misses the larger and more impactful point of serving to increase the divergence established 
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earlier by way of protecting the agencies. However, the criticisms are far from incorrect, and 
in adjoining them with analyses that are concerned with the concept of ‘economic rent’, we 
shall see that ancillary service provision is as responsible for the agencies’ capacity to act in 
such a reckless manner than any other recognised aspect (the issuer-pays remuneration model 
for example); the establishment of non-vital business divisions, that are the manifestation of 
the agencies’ acknowledgement of their protected and influential position, has resulted in a 
revenue stream that is excessively increasing their capacity to absorb the only deterrent that 
authorities deem appropriate i.e. financial penalties. 
What becomes apparent is that once again the focus has not been on the actual environment 
because, as we shall see, many of the conflicts of interests inherent within the provision of 
ancillary services still remain after the regulatory fertile post-Crisis era, and the fact that they 
have not been addressed has only served to strengthen them further. It will be on this basis 
that the thesis will progress onto Chapter 6 A Reform Proposal and establish a reform 
proposal that can definitively end those particular conflicts once and for all. 
There are not many, if any, direct calls for the prohibition of ancillary services like this thesis 
is suggesting8, and in fact some, rather incredibly, suggest that ancillary services are a 
                                                 
8 With regards to the prohibition of ancillary service provision by rating agencies, there are very few proposals. 
In addition to any fleeting musings that appear within analyses, perhaps the only distinct call in the literature 
comes from a General Counsel in his testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives (which demonstrates the 
scarcity of this viewpoint in the literature), see Testimony of Gregory W. Smith, General Counsel, Colorado 
Public Employees’ Retirement Association in U.S. House of Representatives: Committee on Financial Services 
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises: 
Approaches to Improving Credit Rating Agency Regulation (GPO 2009) 22. 
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‘nonissue’9. In assessing this range of opinion the Chapter will help us to understand one 
important point: in focusing on the effect of ancillary service provision upon the relationship 
between the agency and the issuer, the larger understanding of the impact of the agency upon 
the economy, and therefore society, is unfortunately missed. By joining the criticisms of the 
ancillary service provision with the economic theory of ‘economic rent’ and the concept of 
there being a divergence between the actual and the desired, the resulting analysis has the 
capacity to induce a wider understanding of the real effect of ancillary service provision upon 
the role of the rating agencies, which will be very important indeed. 
 
5.2 S&P Capital IQ and Moody’s Analytics: Vehicles of Profit 
 
The story of the rating agencies’ provision of ancillary services can be directly related to the 
growth experienced by the securities markets, and particularly the growth of asset-backed 
securities. We shall see that the agencies consciously built (and acquired) an arsenal of 
analytical tools that would see them become the central hub for parties who were partaking in 
the securitisation process, because not only were the structured finance ratings of the agencies 
                                                 
9 Nicole Neuman asserts that ‘unlike the auditing industry, the credit rating industry does not need formal 
governmental regulation to solve the problems it faces… credit rating agencies have actually maintained their 
independence. The client-pays model does not tempt credit rating agencies to inflate ratings… furthermore, 
ancillary services are a nonissue because they contribute an insignificant fraction of the credit rating agencies’ 
total revenue. Finally, credit rating agencies have firewalls and self-regulations in place to prevent any conflicts 
of interests from negatively impacting the integrity of their rating processes’. The SEC, in utilising Neuman’s 
research as a counterbalance to criticisms of ancillary service provision, explain that for these conclusions the 
author ‘relies upon the (SEC) 2003 Report’. There are some very important issues here: firstly, Neuman’s is the 
only research to downplay the effects of the issuer-pays system and the provision of ancillary services, which 
then serves to single out the research; secondly, Neuman does not refer to the 2003 report when making these 
statements in the article, which suggests that it was not based upon the report at all. Even if Neuman used the 
2003 report, to make such statements based on data that is over 7 years old is extremely misleading. We know 
from our own analysis that the issuer-pays system does result in ratings inflation, and that when the article was 
published ancillary service revenue for Moody’s accounted for a quarter of their entire revenue. For Neuman’s 
article see Nicole B Neuman ‘A Sarbanes-Oxley for Credit Rating Agencies? A Comparison of the Roles 
Auditors’ and Credit Rating Agencies’ Conflicts of Interests Played in Recent Financial Crises’ [2010] 12 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law. For the SEC Report that cites Neuman’s work see 
Securities and Exchange Commission Report to Congress: Credit Rating Agency Independence Study (2013) 45. 
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required to decipher information that was not readily publically available (unlike corporate 
bond issuances), the acquisition of companies that already existed to support parties in the 
securitisation process irrevocably entwined the agencies to parties within the process. 
The growth of the asset-backed securities market reveals to us the concerted and deliberate 
nature of the agencies’ decisions. The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 
(SIFMA) has published figures that detail the growth of the sector in the US and the results 
make for a very interesting read when one considers the actions of the agencies, as we shall 
do in this chapter. In 1985 when the SIFMA’s analysis begins, the total issuance of ABS, 
which for their analysis includes Automobile, Credit Cards, Equipment, Housing-related, 
Student Loans and Other securities, was just $1.2 billion. When Student Loans securities 
were first registered in 1993 the total issuance stood at $51 billion. Most interestingly for our 
analysis, when ‘Housing-related’ securities were first registered in 2003, the total issuance 
stood at $228 billion, with the housing-related securities making up just $55 million of that 
total. The next year that contribution rose to $270 million of $222 billion which demonstrates 
the relative explosion of the RMBS market that is so crucial to our analysis. Between 2003 
and 2007 when the Financial Crisis took hold the issuance of housing-related securities had 
surpassed $900 million, with the total ABS issuance for the same period coming in at just 
under $1 trillion. Whilst the housing-related securities segment made up just 9 or 10% of the 
total ABS issuance, the rapid growth of that particular market had an effect on other markets 
too, with the general increase in fervour in the marketplace producing significant increases 
within the markets for automobile and student loan securities also10. 
These figures from SIFMA serve to demonstrate the rapid growth of the RMBS market that 
came to dominate the headlines surrounding the Financial Crisis. The figures will provide us 
                                                 
10 The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Authority Statistics: US ABS Issuance and Outstanding (1985 
to 2016) (SIFMA 2016). 
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with a statistical basis that will be required as a foundation for the following analyses 
concerning the evolution of the rating agencies’ ancillary service offerings. It is worth noting 
before we continue that the aim of the agencies’ creation of these divisions was not to just 
capitalise upon a market that would last for 4 years, but was also to cement itself within the 
securitisation process, because as we know from earlier the housing-related market went on 
to develop at an unprecedented pace just a year or two after the height of the Crisis11 (a fact 
which is confirmed by SIFMA when it shows that housing-related ABS issuances rose to 
$2.6 billion after a two-year hiatus during the Crisis12). The agencies’ cementation of their 
position in advance of such an incredible rate of growth in this particular market, not 
including the other sectors within which the agencies have a role to play once the securities 
have been bundled together, is the focus of the following analysis. 
 
5.2.1 S&P Capital IQ 
 
As was stated earlier in the introduction to this Chapter, any analysis of S&P’s ancillary 
service division, S&P Capital IQ, will be naturally limited because of the private structure of 
S&P’s parent company McGraw-Hill. Whilst the company do reveal the performance figures 
for its ancillary division on occasion, it is not consistent (and in some instances simply not 
available), which makes building a complete picture almost impossible without the assistance 
of McGraw-Hill directly. The most detail that is available on S&P and its divisions is 
contained within McGraw-Hill’s yearly financial reports (Form 10-K) to the SEC. Whilst 
McGraw-Hill conceal the performance figures of S&P and its divisions before 2011 (the 
figures are all combined in ‘segments’ rather than individual companies and divisions), we 
                                                 
11 See 2.3.1.1.2.2 The SEC’s ‘Cease and Desist’ Order against S&P (n 99). 
12 The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Authority (n 10). 
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can see the acquisitions that took place and chart them against the evolution of the structured 
finance market and the financial performance of Moody’s during the same period because, 
even though S&P is a larger agency, the presence of the duopoly dictates that the 
performance between the two has always been comparable. 
In the next subsection we shall see that within Moody’s Corporation lies two entities: 
Moody’s Investors Services and Moody’s Analytics, with the result being that one can easily 
chart the financial performance of the ancillary service division and then compare that to the 
performance of the Investors service which is Moody’s traditional base. However, the 2016 
Form 10-K of McGraw-Hill reveals the issue with assessing the divisions within S&P. 
McGraw-Hill differentiates itself into two divisions: McGraw-Hill Financial and McGraw-
Hill Education. Within McGraw-Hill Financial there are a number of businesses including: 
S&P Ratings Services; S&P Capital IQ, which is adjoined to SNL which was acquired in 
2015; S&P Dow Jones Indices; Platts; and J.D. Power. Platts, a company that provides 
information on price assessments for energy, petrochemicals, metals and agriculture markets 
is joined together by McGraw-Hill with J.D. Power, a company that provides marketing 
research, under the banner of ‘Commodities and Commercial’ (often abbreviated to ‘C&C’). 
The issue with assessing the impact of S&P Capital IQ upon the rating agency is that S&P 
Capital IQ’s figures have only been reported in isolation by McGraw-Hill from 2011 to 2013. 
Although we will look at the acquisitions made by McGraw-Hill in much more detail shortly, 
it is worth noting here that McGraw-Hill acquired Capital IQ in 2004, but it was not until 
2010 that the company was merged with S&P to become S&P Capital IQ, and it would be 
another year until the company moved from being a standalone subsidiary to a McGraw-Hill 
financial company (with it being safe to assume that this was in response to the enactment of 
The Dodd-Frank Act). So, before 2011 the financial performance of the ancillary divisions of 
S&P are simply not reported by McGraw-Hill, which is in addition to the lack of information 
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on S&P itself; McGraw-Hill provides financial information for the ‘financial services’ 
segment which includes S&P Dow Jones Indices as well as S&P Ratings Services, which is a 
very important market actor in its own right.   
It is important to be as clear as possible when discussing these financial statements, as the 
complexity regarding the terminologies that are adopted have the potential to cause confusion 
and misinformation. Simply put, McGraw-Hill, before the end of 2011, only reported the 
results of the company overall together with what it called its ‘segments’: Education; 
Financial Services; and finally Information and Media. Even though the performance data for 
Standard & Poor’s for the 3 years prior to the 2011 financial statement was included in the 
2011 submission, the point still stands that until that year the financial position of the rating 
agency was not definitively clear. What exactly happened in 2011 to initiate such a change in 
reporting standards is difficult to prove. What can be proven is that the firm underwent a 
significant phase of restructuring at that time as it went about selling a substantial portion of 
its Education arm, with the claim being that the firm wanted to move further towards 
Financial Services because of the reduction in opportunities in Education owing to the 
digitalisation of textbooks, amongst other things13. This is indeed plausible, although the 
incredible backlash against the lack of transparency demonstrated before the crisis may have 
been the most pressing reason for increased disclosure in this area.  
This chapter’s aim was to introduce the ancillary service divisions adopted by the Big Two in 
much more detail, and in doing so demonstrate the effect that they had upon the business of 
providing credit ratings in such a unique situation as the pre-Crisis environment surely was. 
The hypothesis is that the agencies consciously developed such non-essential strands to their 
business in preparation for taking advantage of the hubris of the securitisation era, and also in 
taking advantage of their central position in the modern economy. We shall see shortly that 
                                                 
13 Richard Summerfield ‘McGraw-Hill sells education unit’ [2013] Financier Worldwide. 
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Moody’s Analytics was developed to flourish in the years prior to 2007/8, and that as a result 
of the position of the agency Moody’s Analytics rose initially with the upsurge in securitised 
issuances in 2004, but crucially kept rising when securitised issuances crashed in 2007 and 
has continued unabated ever since; this would confirm the hypothesis that the agencies 
created the divisions to exploit the hubris of the pre-Crisis era knowing that the centralised 
position of the agencies would enable the divisions to become irremovable once the 
inevitable crash took place. It is regrettable that the figures for S&P Capital IQ are not 
available for the 15 years or so required to further confirm such a hypothesis; all that is 
available is the aftermath which confirms that, as of 2013 when McGraw-Hill last made S&P 
Capital IQ’s performance data available in isolation, the division was recording revenues 
consistently in excess of $1 billion annually14. 
So, whilst we may not be able to demonstrate the financial impact that the provision of 
ancillary services had upon Standard & Poor’s as it navigated its way through the 
extraordinarily lucrative pre-Crisis era, we can see how a number of acquisitions present the 
picture of a company preparing to take full advantage of its position. S&P’s relationship with 
ancillary services began in the wreckage of the Enron affair when they acquired the 
consultancy arm of PriceWaterhouseCoopers, who had been essentially forced by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act to divest from the consultancy business after its appalling conduct, like 
many of the other top Public Accounting Firms. Interestingly, but admittedly a victim of 
hindsight, Ellen Haley who in 2003 was the Vice President of Development and Research at 
McGraw-Hill states in the Form 10-K submission that ‘It’s been said that the genius of 
capitalism is to pacify greed into benign self-interest. In the boom years, greed often went 
unchecked. Too many took advantage of a financial system that is based on trust and 
                                                 
14 McGraw-Hill Financial, Inc. Form 10-K (SEC 2014) 81. 
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integrity. But now we’re seeing changes…’15. Unfortunately for society, rather than the 
change being that ‘auditors are now doing a better job’ as Haley went on to suggest, the 
actual change was that the rating industry was evolving a practice that decimated the 
accounting industry and the marketplace. 
The pressure created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act had resulted in a mass-selling of highly 
focussed advisory services16. The timing of S&P’s purchase of the consulting arm of PwC in 
2001 could not have been better because in 2003/4 two important aspects emerged. Firstly, 
structured finance issuances began what turned out to be an unprecedented rise (as 
demonstrated by SIFMA earlier and Moody’s’ financial disclosures that will be assessed 
next) and secondly, on April 28th 2003, ten large investment banks settled with the SEC (and 
others) regarding conflicts of interest relating to equity research, with one important 
component of the settlement being that the firms spend $432.5 million over a five-year period 
to provide a minimum of three sources of independent equity research to their clients; 
Standard & Poor’s almost jubilantly stated in their 2003 annual report: ‘as a leading provider 
of independent equity research, Standard & Poor’s believes that it is uniquely positioned to 
capitalise on this opportunity’17. This turn of events also allowed the agency to peddle their 
newly-acquired ancillary services to the investment banks that, through their own fraudulent 
behaviour, were now being funnelled through the credit-rating machine. 
Building on this fortuitous turn of events, the agency then began a rapid phase of growth in 
relation to the securitisation process that was growing at an unprecedented rate. The lack of 
publicly available information in the process meant that the rating industry was central to 
both issuers and investors, and S&P made sure that they would have the tools to facilitate the 
                                                 
15 McGraw-Hill Education, Inc. Form 10-K (SEC 2003). 
16 Kathryn Cearns ‘Auditors and International Financial Reporting’ in Carien van Mourik and Peter Walton The 
Routledge Companion to Accounting, Reporting and Regulation (Routledge 2013) 386. 
17 McGraw-Hill Education, Inc. (n 15). 
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business of its most important clients, the issuers. In 2004 when the rate of securitised 
issuances rose significantly, S&P purchased Capital IQ, a firm that specialised in offering 
‘high-impact information solutions to the global investment and financial services 
communities’18. S&P boasted that the newly acquired company allowed S&P to ‘empower 
clients with workflow solutions and idea-generation tools’, which was important because 
there was a noted increase in the issuance of U.S. CDOs which S&P stated were due to ‘an 
improving economy, strong consumer spending, increasing investor confidence and the 
quality of the underlying transaction collateral in CDOs’. 
We now know that this was not true at all. However, the aftermath of the Crisis has revealed 
the urgency in which the rating agencies sought to provide its clients with the ratings that 
were necessary to keep the process going; we saw earlier how the agencies adopted the 
Gaussian Copula formula in order to facilitate the ever-increasing amount of structured 
products that were being peddled. To compliment this approach the agency began adding a 
number of elements that would assist with this aim and encourage supplemental business 
through the ancillary division, so in 2005 the company acquired Vista Research, Inc. and 
CRISIL Limited, which increased the agency’s capacity to deliver equity research on a global 
scale. They also introduced what is referred to as ‘S&P Compustat’, which was an improved 
database of financial, statistical and market data19. Superficially, these moves all paint a 
picture of efficiency which would have contributed to a greater understanding of risk within 
the marketplace, which in essence is the fundamental concern of a rating agency. But, 
through all of our analysis that has been conducted so far we know that this was not the case. 
S&P did not have a good understanding of the underlying collateral in CDOs and other 
securitised products, and they certainly did not seek to pass on this increased knowledge to 
investors who were devastated by the unprecedented amount of mass-downgrades in 2008. 
                                                 
18 McGraw-Hill Education, Inc. Form 10-K (SEC 2005). 
19 McGraw-Hill Education, Inc. Form 10-K (SEC 2006). 
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What can be seen then is not a company that is seeking to provide for its clients and end-users 
but a company that is purposefully positioning itself within the financial information market 
based upon its ‘reputation’ garnered through its rating business, which is also a highly 
contestable notion in itself, in order to extract the maximum amount of money from the 
system. 
S&P would go onto acquire a number of other companies to consolidate its position that it 
had created for itself20. What is clear to see when assessing the company and its decisions is 
that the Financial Crisis did not represent the end of any strategy but alternatively was only 
the beginning. The foresightedness is evident when we consider that in adjoining the research 
elements with the rating brand, at a time when all securitised products had to be rated by an 
NRSRO, the agencies had developed a consulting arm that would dwarf that of the accounting 
industry some years before. Furthermore, it was a business that would be developed in a way 
that those in power would consider the provision of ancillary services to be beneficial to the 
marketplace even when provided by such an integral sector of the financial system. In 
essence, Standard & Poor’s created, in just 7 years, a division that would record annual 
revenues that was almost the equivalent of the unprecedented record fine given to it by the 
US Justice Department; the effect of that punishment is therefore negligible at best. 
 
5.2.2 Moody’s Analytics 
 
Whilst assessing S&P Capital IQ’s performance and effect upon the fortunes of the rating 
agency was difficult given the nature of McGraw-Hill’s disclosure practices, we will have no 
such issue with the assessment of Moody’s ancillary service division Moody’s Analytics. 
                                                 




Moody’s Corporation, a public company, includes within its annual statements detailed 
performance information. As a result this section will examine the many acquisitions 
undertaken by Moody’s, but crucially we can then attach this examination to an assessment 
of the financial performance of Moody’s Analytics. What is revealed is that during the same 
upsurge in securitised issuances around 2004, as was detailed in the previous section, 
Moody’s began an incredibly concerted operation to build an ancillary service division that 
would take advantage of the environment and the parent company’s place within it. The 
result of this concerted effort was that today Moody’s Analytics generates only a few hundred 
million dollars less than the revenue received from the rating of corporate bonds, which has 
always been the cornerstone of Moody’s operations since the company was founded. This 
incredible fact lends credence to the contention of this thesis that the ancillary service 
division, and the issues that ensue, must be addressed because its impact is highly significant 
upon the fortunes of the rating agency. 
Unlike S&P which had started in the ancillary field by acquiring the consulting division of 
PwC, Moody’s took a different path. Initially, while S&P was profiting from the Sarbanes-
Oxley rules, Moody’s was being transformed into public company by Warren Buffett in 2000 
as was discussed earlier; this may be a good reason why the company did not partake in the 
purchasing of accountancy-related consulting divisions in the wake of the Enron scandal. 
However, it did enter the ancillary marketplace with the acquisition of KMV in 2002, which 
was already a leader in the provision of qualitative credit analysis for lenders, investors, and 
corporations21. This acquisition was to be the cornerstone of Moody’s Ancillary operations, 
and would be the brand with which Moody’s ancillary services would be recognised until the 
                                                 
21 Moody’s Analytics History of KMV (2016). This was not the first acquisition by Moody’s in this field, but it 




adoption of Moody’s Analytics in 2007 (the division was known as Moody’s KMV prior to 
Moody’s Analytics). 
The significance of these acquisitions is only realised when one considers the environment 
before the Crisis in 2007/08. The rapid growth of the structured-finance market, which as 
discussed earlier was based upon (predominantly) non-public information, led to a duality 
which the rating agencies capitalised upon. After the acquisition of KMV, Moody’s acquired 
Economy.com in 2005 and Wall St. Analytics in 2006; these companies would all be merged 
into Moody’s Analytics in 2007. To explain this point regarding duality it is important to note 
the actual services being offered by these companies, which will then demonstrate why 
Moody’s was acquiring them. KMV was the pioneer in creating commercially available 
credit loss predicting models, like the ‘Loss Given Default’ (LGD) model and the ‘Expected 
Default Frequency’ (EDF) model. Once connected to Moody’s, KMV created the Moody’s 
KMV RiskCalc and LossCalc models which became significant tools for banks and other 
market actors when trading in the structured finance markets. So, rating agencies made these 
models  available to issuers and investors, in addition to the role in which any structured 
product had to have been rated by a leading NRSRO in order to be considered worthy of 
investment in the capital markets.  
This incredible consideration, that the agencies’ were effectively creating an additional 
business for something they were already doing but just packaging it to be used before the 
rating phase, is further demonstrated by understanding the purpose of Wall St. Analytics. In 
hindsight the acquisition of Wall St. Analytics in 2006 represents a clear conflict of interest 
when we consider that Wall St. Analytics was ‘a leading provider of specialised software and 
data tools for the structuring, analysis, management, and servicing of structured debt 
instruments’. Furthermore, ‘the addition of Wall St. Analytics enhanced Moody’s Analytics’ 
current Collateralised Debt Obligations product suite and immediately added mortgage-
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backed securities and asset-backed securities analytic software capabilities’22. It is clear from 
this description that Moody’s sought to provide the consultancy for the preparation and 
maintenance of structured products that it would most likely have to rate (given that The Big 
Two were the overwhelming choice) in order for the products to enter the capital markets. 
So, Moody’s had positioned itself so that it was the gatekeeper to the capital markets (with 
the assistance of the SEC), so that it provided the information needed to efficiently structure 
and service structured products, and so that it provided the information regarding the risk 
involved with the process; with this all-inclusive approach being tied to the mercenary nature, 
as demonstrated throughout this thesis, it is little wonder that the financial system was on the 
verge of collapsing on the backs of these agencies. Moody’s would go onto acquire six more 
companies in this quest to cover all the bases regarding the securitisation process23 and a 
cursory analysis of the financial rewards for doing so reveal that, for the agency, it was very 
much worth it.  
 
                                                 
22 Moody’s Analytics History of Wall Street Analytics (2016). 
23 After creating Moody’s Analytics as a ‘separate’ entity it would acquire Fermat and ENB consulting in 2008; 
CSI Global Education, Inc. in 2010; Copal Partners and Barrie & Hibbert Limited in 2011; and finally Lewtan 





A simple collation of the figures declared in Moody’s annual statements reveals the actual 
impact of the adoption of ancillary services at the turn of the century. Table 1 shows us that 
in just 15 years the Corporation has gone from recording revenues of $796 million in 2001 to 
$3.4 billion in 2015, which is an incredible achievement given the turbulent events of that 
short space of time. For our analysis of the ancillary services that the agency began to provide 
from 2002 onwards, we can clearly see that the revenues from ancillary services experienced 
a sharp rise in line with the sharp rise in structured product issuance around 2004, but more 






































































Table 1 - Collected Financial Data from 
Moody's Corporation Annual Statements 
2001-2015
Revenue from the Rating of
Corporate and Financial
Institution Bonds ($ Millions)
Total Revenue ($ Millions)








during the Crisis in 2007 and 2008. In fact, there was a point in 2009 when ancillary services 
were generating more revenue for the corporation than any other revenue stream, which is 
extraordinary in itself. In 2013/14 the revenue from the ancillary service division surpassed 
the $1 billion mark for the first time, confirming its increasing importance to the health of the 
company.  
These aspects of the financial figures are clear. What is also clear is that the data presented 
above would seem to confirm the hypothesis, established earlier, that the agencies (it is safe 
to assume that S&P Capital IQ has a similar trajectory) established these divisions in the 
knowledge that the position of the industry within the financial sector would mean that when 
the structured product boom (inevitably) collapsed, the division that was created to assist the 
boom would continue on. The real question is why would it continue on when the market for 
structured finance issuances collapsed and has yet to recover to pre-Crisis rates? The data 
above suggests that the market for corporate bond issuances recovered after one or two years, 
and we know from our earlier assessments that there is less need for the services that the 
ancillary service divisions offer, i.e. structured product risk indicators and assessments of 






One explanation is that the agencies focussed more on the analytical side of corporate bond 
finance to fall in line with the dramatic drop in structured finance product issuance. However, 
we have already seen that this is not necessarily the case, because the agencies have 
continued acquiring components that enhance the structured-finance packages that they offer. 
Put simply, there is very little that the agencies can offer prospective clients when it comes to 
corporate bond issuances; the reason why the ancillary service divisions flourished with the 
expansion of the structured finance market and not before is because there is no real need for 
in-depth assessments of corporate bonds, owing to the publicly-available nature of the 
underlying information and the data that is contained within the ratings provided by the rating 
agencies (in addition to the specialised in-house analytical capabilities of sophisticated 
investors).  
Table 2 reveals that the structured finance market did indeed drop significantly between 2006 








































































Table 2 - Collected Data from Moody's 
Corporation Annual Statements - % of 
Revenue from the Rating of Structured 
Finance Products





gone from strength to strength despite this obvious issue regarding its necessity leads to a 
very important inference. It is important for the development of this aspect of the discipline 
that we understand exactly what it is that clients find beneficial when subscribing to these 
services; more will be said on this point in the concluding chapter, because whether through 
qualitative or quantitative research there is a need to understand further the rationale of the 
division’s clientele. The real reason why this is an important endeavour is because without 
any data regarding the benefits of usage of the ancillary services the only inference that can 
be made is that clients purchase the services to gain favour or protect their position, which is 
a conflict which is particularly venomous. 
We shall see in the next section that many onlookers have realised this facet that is hard to 
explain and have come to the same inference as established above. In assessing these 
analyses it will be important to adjoin them to the bigger picture of the ancillary services 
contributing to the protection of the agencies against the only punishment that is deemed 
appropriate. The data above reveals that in just 15 years the agencies have managed to record 
annual revenues from ancillary services that in 2015 alone would have been enough to cover 
the record financial punishment given to Standard & Poor’s by the US Justice Department; 
the incredibly high profit margins mean that the creation of the ancillary services has 
completely nullified the threat of the authorities and protected the agencies’ bottom line 
which is the profits from its rating services – the modern agencies have finally developed an 
approach that more-or-less guarantees their survival, which since their inception in 1841 has 
been a constant issue owing to the nature of the business (i.e. deformation and economic loss 




5.3 The Inherent Issues with Ancillary Service Provision – The View from the 
Literature 
 
Though the practice of providing ancillary services continues unabated, there is a wide 
acceptance of the conflicts that come with the provision within the literature. In this section 
we shall assess some of the more obvious conflicts that are discussed within the literature 
before looking closely at the concept of ‘economic rent’; this will be important because 
although the concept is a general economic concept that may or may not apply to each 
individual industry, we shall see that the general principle of a company extracting more 
resources than its input dictates is very much attributable to the ratings industry. The 
appalling performance of the industry over the past 15 years (and arguably longer still) 
simply does not tally with the incredible rate of growth and profitability we witnessed earlier 
with the declarations from the annual statements – the growth of a billion-dollar sub-division 
like Moody’s Analytics (and S&P Capital IQ), based upon the unique position of the ratings 
industry, is a classic example of economic rent. This section will ultimately show that whilst 
the issues surrounding ancillary service provision are known, the bigger picture regarding the 
industry and its position within society is overlooked; the aim is to show that the ancillary 
services are not just an attempt to garner some extra revenue, but in fact represent a conscious 
decision to both embed the agencies further into the modern economy and protect against 
financial penalties that aim to stifle the fraudulent and criminal actions that have made the 
agencies multi-billion dollar institutions – removing this capacity has the potential to avert or 




5.3.1 The Issue of Pressure 
 
The most obvious conflict that comes with ancillary service provision is based upon the 
notion of ‘pressure’. With respect to the rating industry this can take one of two forms: either 
the agency exerts pressure upon its rating clients to purchase additional services, with the lure 
of potentially receiving or maintaining a higher rating; or alternatively the rating client could 
threaten to stop purchasing the additional services (which we know are incredibly lucrative 
for the agencies) unless a high, or at least required rating is given. We shall begin by 
assessing the first of these two forms which is referred to as ‘tying’. 
‘Tying’ is simply when an agency would ‘force’ a rated company to purchase other 
services24, although there are other examples of agency-dictated pressure that also represent 
the manifestation of conflicts. For example, it has been noted that agencies have requested 
payment for unsolicited ratings25, have issued lower-than-warranted ratings to punish a firm 
for purchasing rating services from a competitor26, and have also reduced or refused to rate a 
pool of assets (in a CDO for example) unless a substantial proportion of the pool’s individual 
securities were also rated by the same agency27, which is a process referred to as ‘notching’. 
The common word within the literature with regards to ‘tying’ is the word ‘fear’, as Rousseau 
states: ‘issuers may feel the need to subscribe to such services simply “out of fear that their 
failure to do so could adversely impact their credit rating (or, conversely, with the expectation 
                                                 
24 Herwig P Langohr and Patricia T Langohr The Rating Agencies and Their Credit Ratings: What They Are, 
How They Work, and Why They are Relevant (John Wiley & Sons 2010) 423. 
25 Mark J Flannery ‘Supervising Bank Safety and Soundness: Some Open Issues’ [2007] 92 Economic Review 1 
& 2 88. 
26 See 2.3.1.1.2.1 Rhinebridge (and Cheyne Finance) SIVs (n 93) for information on the case of Hannover Re 
where Moody’s downgraded the company in an unsolicited rating because the firm had chosen a competitor. 
27 Flannery (n 25). 
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that purchasing these services could help their credit ratings)”’28. The SEC and other 
authorities were aware of this practice and sought to prohibit it in the CRA Reform Act of 
200629 after hearing testimonies from witnesses confirming their suffering at the hands of the 
agencies30. We shall cover the regulatory response to these conflicts in greater detail in 6.2 
The Imperfections in the Current Framework Governing Ancillary Service Provision, but for 
now it is enough to state the SEC’s position on such offences: 
Rule 17g-6 prohibits, among other things, an NRSRO from: (1) conditioning or 
threatening to condition the issuance of a credit rating on the purchase by an obligor 
or issuer, or an affiliate of the obligor, of any other services or products, including 
pre-credit rating assessments products, of the NRSRO or any person associated with 
the NRSRO; (2) issuing, or offering or threatening to issue, a credit rating that is not 
determined in accordance with the NRSRO’s established procedures and 
methodologies for determining credit ratings, based on whether the rated person, or an 
affiliate of the rate person, purchases or will purchase the credit rating or any other 
service or product of the NRSRO…31. 
How one can ‘prohibit’ such behaviour when any pressure is usually implied is puzzling to 
say the least. In the case of the reinsurance firm Hannover Re, Moody’s could not be held 
accountable because it defended its right to issue a rating that was not consistent with other 
rating agencies; in essence the clear lack of appetite to prosecute agencies for the breach of 
                                                 
28 Stéphane Rousseau ‘Enhancing the Accountability of  Accountability of Credit Rating Agencies: The Case for 
a Disclosure-Based Approach’ [2005] 51 McGill Law Journal 629; see also Deniz Coskun ‘Supervision of 
Credit Rating Agencies: The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in Finance Decisions’ [2009] 5 Journal of 
International Banking Law & Regulation 258; Lynn Bai ‘On Regulating Conflicts of Interest in the Credit 
Rating Industry’ [2010] 13 New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 261 for the same 
sentiment. 
29 The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 Pub. L. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327.; Jerry W Markham A 
Financial History of the United States: From Enron-Era Scandals to the Great Recession (Routledge 2015) 725. 
30 Committee on Financial Services Credit Rating Duopoly Relief Act of 2006: Report 109-546 (GPO 2006) 13. 
31 Securities and Exchange Commission Final Rule Analysis – Securities and Exchange Commission Release 
No. 34-72936; File No. S7-18-11 (2014) [n 70]. 
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regulations means that these pressures, whether perceived or real, cannot be prohibited by 
regulation alone. 
The second form that the conflict regarding the provision of ancillary services may take is 
when clients may put pressure on the rating agency to award a certain rating in response to 
continued business from the client. There have been a number of references to this aspect in 
the literature32, with Macey and Bai both helpfully linking the issue of additional services in 
the rating industry to the issue of additional services within the Public Accounting industry 
which came to a head with the Enron scandal33. The lead-up to the Enron and WorldCom 
scandals provides a perfect example of the dangers of financial gatekeepers engaging with 
additional service provision and encouraged an abundance of scholarly work on the subject as 
a result34; for this reason, the stance taken in the aftermath by legislators, through the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act predominantly, will be covered in much more detail in the next chapter 
because it serves as some form of inspiration for the proposal that will be advanced. It is 
worth noting before we continue that the same issue arises when looking at other industries’ 
usage of additional services; the pressures exerted, either way, are rarely pronounced but 
subtly built into the relationships which makes regulating the additional services an almost 
impossible endeavour. 
 
                                                 
32 Alcubilla and del Pozo (n 1) 145; Carol A Frost ‘Credit Rating Agencies in Capital Markets: A Review of 
Research Evidence on Selected Criticisms of the Agencies’ [2007] 22 Journal of Accounting, Auditing & 
Finance 480.  
33 Bai (n 28) 261; Jonathan R Macey ‘The Politicisation of American Corporate Governance’ [2006] 1 Virginia 
Law & Business Review 1 18. 
34 Just a few scholarly works that are representative of the vast amount of research conducted in this area 
regarding accounting firms’ provision of additional services are Cearns (n 16); Mike Brewster Unaccountable: 
How the Accounting Profession Forfeited a Public Trust (John Wiley & Sons 2003); Dennis Caplan, Diane 
Janvrin, James Kurtenbach ‘Internal Audit Outsourcing: An Analysis of Self-Regulation by the Accounting 
Profession’ [2007] 19 Research in Accounting Regulation; Don E Garner, David L McKee, Yosra A McKee 
Accounting and the Global Economy after Sarbanes-Oxley (Routledge 2014).  
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5.3.2 Economic Rent Theory 
 
Whilst there has been plenty of research concerning the immediate issues with rating 
agencies (and accounting firms before them) providing additional services, there is much less 
research which is concerned with placing the effects of that provision within a larger picture. 
It is undoubtedly true that there are a number of conflicts that arise from the provision of 
ancillary services, but this thesis aims to advance a proposal that sees the provision absolutely 
prohibited, so any discussion regarding the pressures within the working relationships that 
surround the rating industry are superficial at best when one is concerned with the dissolution 
of the service. It was noted earlier, and will be noted throughout the rest of the thesis, that the 
biggest issue with regards to the provision of ancillary services is that it has created an 
excessive revenue stream that is single-handedly protecting the agencies from feeling the 
effects of the only punishment that the authorities seem willing to prescribe i.e. financial 
penalties. We saw earlier how in just 15 years Moody’s Analytics has breached the $1 billion 
mark in terms of revenue, which is absolutely extraordinary when the actual need for the 
service is unclear. It is this notion of excess that leads us into assessing the theory of 
‘economic rent’, as Hirshleifer et al explain: ‘Economists give the term economic rent a 
special meaning. It must be distinguished from the usual concept of rent as the hire-price for 
annual use of an acre of land, a building, or a machine. Instead, economic rent is defined as 
the excess return to any input’35. 
The theory of economic rent is arguably directly applicable to the ratings industry. However, 
it would be beneficial to examine the theory itself first before continuing because this notion 
of excessive return on the agencies’ output is of real importance to the communication of this 
                                                 
35 Jack Hirshleifer, Amihai Glazer, David Hirshleifer Price Theory and Applications: Decisions, Markets, and 
Information (CUP 2005) 402. 
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thesis. Congleton provides a very helpful analysis of the theory when he discusses the 
evolution of the theory itself. He begins by stating that the term ‘rent seeking’ was initially 
coined by Anne Krueger in 197436, in which she argued that the competition for the ‘rents’ 
associated with import and export monopolies caused a good deal of competition for 
positions within a given industry that consumed vital resources – talent, time, training etc. – 
which she ultimately saw as a waste of resources depending upon the value of the rent 
accrued i.e. the competition drove down the value of the rent37. However, unbeknownst to 
Krueger, Gordon Tullock had published a seminal paper almost a decade earlier which was 
also concerned with the quest for attaining unearned rents and the inefficiencies that came 
with that endeavour38. Congleton concludes that the early literature established the concept of 
‘rent-seeking’ as ‘the wasting of resources in the pursuit of “unearned” profits or wages, 
which were often obtained through public policies that were widely acknowledged by 
economists to be counterproductive’39. 
This rent-seeking behaviour, which is clearly attributable to the rating agencies’ adoption of 
ancillary services in the build-up to the Financial Crisis, and the value that it seeks to achieve 
is dependent upon one aspect; Competition. Simply put, ‘economic rent is smaller the greater 
the range of alternatives considered’40, which is what Krueger and Tullock were referring to 
as being the most important factor in determining the value of the rent and therefore the 
efficiency of dedicating resources to its attainment. The common assertion in this regard is 
that industry participants would engage in concerted campaigns against policy makers to 
ensure that competition is kept to a level where the value of the rent outweighs the cost of 
                                                 
36 Anne O Krueger ‘The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society’ [1974] 64 The American Economic 
Review 3. 
37 Roger D Congleton ‘The Nature of Rent Seeking’ in Roger D Congleton and Arye L Hillman Companion to 
the Political Economy of Rent Seeking (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 3. 
38 Gordon Tullock ‘The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft’ [1967] 5 Western Economic Journal 
3. 
39 Congleton (n 37). 
40 Hirshleifer (n 35) 404. 
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competing, and also of procuring the favour of the policy makers41. In thinking of the ratings 
industry it is clear to see that this aspect is inherently accounted for because, as we know 
already, the ratings industry is arguably a ‘natural oligopoly’ which means that the 
competitive costs in attaining rents are minimal (in addition to the assistance of the SEC with 
its NRSRO designation process in the mid-1970s). 
This particular field is extremely well researched. However, when we apply the concept to 
the ratings industry and its adoption of ancillary services the outcome is particularly sinister. 
There have been a number of references to the output of the agencies constituting what is 
known as a ‘public good’, which is an economic term rather than one which denotes the 
moral nature of the ratings industry. The concept is based upon the notion that there are 
certain areas or aspects of society that need to be provided for the benefit of the public, and 
often there is little financial benefit to be garnered through doing so42. There are instances 
whereby the good needs to be produced, but the cost would be too high for the state to 
provide the good, so where possible the private sector would be enlisted to provide the good 
instead. Yet, with little financial benefit to be had from doing so the State will usually allow 
for the full or partial exclusion of access, which would lead to the creation of enough profit to 
make the provision of that good worthwhile for the private sector. In order to simplify this 
concept we can look at the example of the ratings industry and what is known as a ‘Public-
Private Partnership’43. The growth of the capital markets, combined with the issues that stem 
from the State providing financial information for investors, means that the State is in no 
position to provide credit ratings for the marketplace. However, even though ratings are 
important to the functioning of the capital markets (when delivered accurately), the ‘free-
riding’ that occurred in the late 1960s with the commercialised usage of photocopying 
                                                 
41 Congleton (n 37) 4. 
42 Further details were discussed earlier, see 3.3.1.2 The Impact of Technological Advancement. 
43 Helmut Willke and Gerhard Willke Political Governance of Capitalism: A Reassessment Beyond the Global 
Crisis (Edward Elgar Publishing 2012) 8. 
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machines meant that the agencies could not ‘capture’ the financial benefit for providing the 
good. The answer to this conundrum is seen in the SEC’s acceptance of the adoption of the 
issuer-pays model, which simultaneously allows for the ‘public good’ to be delivered whilst 
allowing for the agencies to capture the benefits of provision. 
On the surface this seems to work well. However, the self-interested nature of the two parties, 
the issuers and the agencies, means that conflicts are inherent within that structure as we have 
seen throughout this thesis. Furthermore, whilst this situation may be bad enough, the 
agencies’ adoption of ancillary services in the lead-up to the largest crash since the Great 
Depression constitutes what is known as a ‘quid pro quo’44, which means an advantage 
granted in return for something, which is also attributable to the concepts of economic rent 
and rent-seeking. It is entirely reasonable to suggest that the adoption of ancillary services in 
the rating industry, just two or three years after the largest accounting failure in history was 
directly related to the provision of additional services by accounting firms, is a prime 
example of a quid-pro-quo; the excess is an unspoken stipulation of the agencies’ provision of 
a ‘public good’. 
Earlier it was said that assessing the role of the State and the agencies’ adoption of ancillary 
services would result in a sinister evaluation. This is not because of the public-private-
partnership theory that was advanced above, but because of an understanding advanced by 
Kofi Dompere, which is relatable to the rating industry situation, although it admittedly 
paints a particularly bleak picture when it comes to the possibility of advancing the public 
interest in this sphere. Dompere begins by positioning the issue of economic rent and rent-
seeking as a process that requires ‘the members of the principal (the State) to actively work to 
include in the social goal-objective set, the goals and objectives that create rent-seeking 
                                                 
44 The theory can be traced back to Knut Wicksell and his work on the relationship between a government and 
its citizens, see Knut Wicksell Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen nebst Darstellung ung Kritik des 
Steuerwesens Schwedens (Jena 1896). 
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environments for social groups where specific rents may be exploited and harvested by 
specific groups. In this way, the members of the decision-making core (the agent) or the 
elected officials become nothing but economic puppets to non-politically elected 
salespersons’45. Although this is admittedly a very controversial take on the situation within 
society today, this should not reduce our willingness to evaluate it and incorporate it into our 
understanding of the ratings industry if it is indeed fitting. 
Dompere continues: 
The game is played with the constitution as the umpire. The whole process involves: 
1) the establishment of the social decision-making core (the elected officials or the 
members of the agent), 2) the selling and buying of influence in order to affect the 
direction of votes to create the social-objective set, national interests and social vision, 
that define a rent-seeking environment favourable to specific interest groups, and 3) 
the exploitation of the environment for private gains through non-wealth-creating 
transfers through resource allocation for output production and income-wealth 
production. Number one is called influence tampering; number two is called rent-
creation; and number three is called rent protection and harvesting46. 
In using this template to evaluate the ratings industry situation it becomes difficult to disagree 
with Dompere; we have seen instances throughout this thesis of the ‘revolving door’ theory 
(influence tampering), concerted lobbying campaigns (rent-creation), and the establishment 
of revenue streams that are excessive (harvesting). Furthermore, we have seen how the Dodd-
Frank Act, amongst a host of other legislative and regulatory moves have served to empower 
the agencies rather than discipline them. Dompere again encapsulates this phenomenon: ‘The 
                                                 
45 Kofi K Dompere Fuzziness, Democracy, Control and Collective Decision-choice System: A Theory on 




political structure offers opportunity for rent creation and the legal structure offers 
opportunities to protect rent, while the economic structure with the four aggregate markets 
offers opportunities to harvest rent’47. 
Yes this version of events paints a dismal picture, but the evidence points towards it being the 
case. It is noted within the literature that the agencies are generating rental returns 
irrespective of their performance48, that regulations are directly allowing rent-seeking 
activities to take place49, and that the NRSRO designation in the mid-1970s was a clear 
indication of this process taking place50. The entirety of the second chapter of this thesis was 
dedicated to the principle of focusing on the actual rather than being led by the quest for 
having the desired realised and that principle is directly attributable here; the reality is 
particularly downbeat with regards to the potential for change, but to overlook the reality 
whilst attempting to make any sort of inroad is simply not the way to approach the task of 




The aim of this chapter was to gain a better understanding of the ancillary services that the 
Big Two offer, whilst also assessing the issues that come with this provision. In addition to 
this, the chapter aimed to move the discussions regarding ancillary service provision in the 
literature forward by adjoining the concept of economic rent, primarily in order to 
                                                 
47 ibid.  
48 Jonathan R Macey ‘The Nature and Futility of “Regulation by Assimilation”’ in Greg Urban Corporations 
and Citizenship (University of Pennsylvania Press 2014) 212. 
49 D T Llewellyn ‘Banking in the 21st Century: The Transformation of an Industry’ in Tom Valentine and Guy 
Ford Readings in Financial Institution Management: Modern Techniques for a Global Industry (Allen & Unwin 
1999) 40. 
50 L J Rodriguez ‘The Credit Rating Agencies: From Cartel Busters to Cartel Builders’ in William A Niskanen 
After Enron: Lessons for Public Policy (Rowman & Littlefield 2007) 227. 
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demonstrate the claim here that the ancillary services are single-handedly nullifying the 
effects of financially-based punishments. 
We began by assessing S&P’s ancillary offering S&P Capital IQ. Gaining a precise 
understanding of its impact upon the rating agency was difficult because S&P’s parent 
company, McGraw-Hill Financial, is not consistent with its terminologies or with its 
categorisations within its annual financial statements. Whilst gaining a complete picture of 
the financial performance was not possible, we saw that the aftermath of 15 years’ worth of 
conscious and purposeful development was that the division now records annual revenues of 
over $1 billion consistently. This lack of information regarding S&P Capital IQ was 
somewhat offset by the nature of the ratings industry, because although S&P hold a slightly 
larger market-share than Moody’s, their financial performance is generally comparable and 
has been for some time. Moody’s ancillary service offering, Moody’s Analytics provided us 
with a perfect opportunity to assess the incredible rates of growth within this particular 
business and subsequently the financial effect that growth has upon the rating agency. We 
saw through analysing Moody’s’ annual statements that the division’s growth was not solely 
tied to the development of the structured finance market, which raises concerns as to the 
reason for its growth. 
In this regard we assessed some of the claims within the literature to try to understand why 
the ancillary divisions would show consistent growth despite the collapse of the structured 
finance market, damning blows to the reputation of the agencies, and a lack of a definitive 
reason for the necessity of the services. A number of scholars intimated that the notion of 
‘pressure’ is prevalent within the ratings industry, in that agencies may apply implied 
pressure upon clients to purchase additional services, or clients may apply implied pressure 
upon agencies to rate favourably in return for continued business. We saw that whilst 
regulations exist to prohibit such behaviour, the implied nature of this pressure means that 
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one simply cannot regulate against it. Also, one may be forgiven for concluding that the 
purchasing of additional services may be as some sort of ‘reward’ or ‘tax’ for the agencies’ 
facilitation of what was in essence fraudulent securities trading in the lead-up to the crisis. 
One issue that consistently arises when researching the credit rating industry is the issue of 
moving into controversial realms. The short suggestion above concerning ancillary service 
subscription as constituting a reward for facilitation may indeed be viewed as controversial or 
fanciful, but the nature of the ratings industry dictates such actions; the way in which 
conservative thought views the industry simply does not tally to the output of the agencies 
and the scandals that consistently emerge concerning their conduct. This was demonstrated at 
the end of the chapter when the work of Kofi Dompere was assessed in relation to the theory 
of economic rent and rent-seeking. Dompere’s account is extraordinarily divisive, yet when it 
is applied to the actual reality of the ratings industry it seems to fit very well. Dompere’s take 
accounts for the lack of appetite from the authorities to make impactful changes, whilst it also 
accounts for the self-interested and mercenary nature of the rating agencies themselves. 
Ultimately there are larger points raised by this chapter which serve as the culmination of the 
analyses that have gone before it and a foundation for all that follows. The notion of there 
being a divergence between the actual and desired is clearly demonstrated when looking at 
the response to the agencies’ adoption of additional services. In the modern era, one that is 
centred upon the economy and the capital markets, the rating agencies are arguably as 
important as Public Accountants. Yet, whilst the accountancy industry was vilified for its use 
of additional services in the lead-up to the Enron scandal, the rating agencies have received 
comparatively very little coverage for its adoption of what, in essence, are the very same 
divisions. The impact of the Enron scandal upon society is simply not comparable to the 
Financial Crisis, yet the mounds of research concerning additional services is predominantly 
concerned with the accounting industry, even some 15 years after the fall of Enron. 
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This demonstration of the common view being to ignore or downplay the actual version of 
events has contributed to a stark reality. Firstly, as has been stated on a number of occasions, 
the provision of ancillary services has given the agencies an excessive revenue stream that 
directly nullifies the effects of ‘record’ and ‘unprecedented’ disciplinary measures like the 
$1.375 billion fine given to S&P in 2015. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the 
continued presence of this revenue stream not only protects the agencies from discipline, but 
it also provides the initiative to become involved in other structured-finance based scandals, 
because the authorities have demonstrated quite clearly that they are not prepared to 
discipline the agencies in any meaningful manner; recent developments within the structured-
finance market for automobile sales in the US represent this very danger51. 
Ultimately the provision of ancillary services presents conflicts and outcomes that are not 
acceptable when assessed through the lens of trying to increase public protection. Whilst the 
issuer-pays model is justifiable in terms of allowing for the provision of a ‘public good’, the 
provision of additional services that do not have a bearing upon the accuracy of credit ratings 
is quite simply not acceptable when assessed through the same lens. It is for this reason that 
the next chapter endeavours to position and explain a reform proposal that would bring an 
immediate end to these conflicts and warped outputs, because the public is in real danger of 
being subjected to another rating industry-facilitated financial malfunction that would make 




                                                 
51 Journalists point towards a raft of defaults within the Automobile finance market as potential evidence for lax 
underwriting standards in the face of high ratings, see Serena Ng ‘Subprime Flashback: Early Defaults Are a 





















In the last chapter we sought to gain a more detailed understanding of the ancillary service 
divisions of Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, an analysis which resulted in the clear 
demonstration of divisions that do not contribute to the accuracy of credit ratings yet 
contribute almost as much to the financial health of the agencies as the primary function of 
the credit rating agencies. We saw, in no uncertain terms, that the agencies had consciously 
taken advantage of their centralised position within the burgeoning structured-finance market 
to create divisions that served almost as a levy for their participation in a system that brought 
the world to a standstill in 2008. In addition to the views within the literature concerning 
ancillary service provision, that advance the notion that ancillary service provision creates 
pressures within the working relationships that govern the ratings field i.e., agencies 
threatening clients with lower ratings or clients threatening the withdrawal of their business 
in response to unfavourable ratings, the last chapter attached the economic study of ‘rent’ and 
‘rent-seeking’ behaviour to the views within the literature to form a much deeper and 
impactful understanding; we ultimately saw that the provision of ancillary services represents 
the ‘rent’ or undue reward for the agencies that was incorporated in anticipation of the 
industry’s involvement with the often-fraudulent securitisation process that came to define 
the 2000s.  
This conscious development of a rent-harvesting division has had other effects however. The 
most dangerous effect of the incorporation and incredible success of the ancillary service 
divisions has been that the discipline selected by authorities has in effect been entirely 
nullified. We saw earlier in the thesis that the $1.375 billion fine given to S&P for its conduct 
during and after the Financial Crisis was heralded as an unprecedented victory for investors 
and the public, although in the last chapter we saw evidence from the financial statements of 
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the Big Two that the ancillary service divisions have been recording revenues in excess of $1 
billion for a number of years; this offsetting, based upon a division that could technically be 
removed and not impact upon the accuracy of ratings at all, is the core issue for this thesis. 
So, in light of this understanding, this thesis will now draw to a close by establishing a reform 
proposal that has the potential to end that offsetting capability once and for all. The proposal, 
which in essence calls for the complete prohibition of any additional services that may be 
offered by the credit rating agencies, has been constructed so that technically it could be 
accepted and put into practice. However, while there are no technical impediments to the 
theorised adoption of this proposal, there are a number of impediments that must be 
addressed when we consider the actual world in which we live. Therefore, this chapter will 
endeavour to assess all of these issues and ultimately ascertain the potential for such 
impactful reforms succeeding in this field. 
To begin with the chapter will assess the current regulations that govern the provision of 
ancillary services by the rating agencies. While this thesis’ mandate of providing an impactful 
reform proposal obviously dictates that there is a belief that current measures are not 
appropriate, it will still be important to describe the current framework so that we can see 
where the flaws are; doing this will then lead to the understanding of what is required to 
initiate the publicly-concerned reforms that this thesis calls for. Also, we have the benefit of 
hindsight to assist our analysis, which will allow us to see that the agent who was given the 
power to discipline the agencies, the SEC, has taken an extraordinarily lenient approach to 
their task, which simply enhances the argument that only complete prohibition can work 
rather than a constrained version of the provision that would be regulated by the SEC. 
Once the imperfections in the current framework have been established, the natural 
progression will be to then establish the proposed remedy to the issues that are inherent 
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within the provision of additional services by socially-vital financial gatekeepers. However, 
with such a divisive proposal there is usually a desire to establish some element of precedent 
or ‘inspiration’, so the next section of the chapter will establish two separate instances 
whereby the additional services provided by socially-important financial gatekeepers have 
been prohibited for the apparent protection of the system, and therefore the public. However, 
there are issues with each instance that mean that to use the word ‘inspiration’ to describe 
them could be problematic, so it is perhaps better to understand them as historical 
benchmarks. We shall see that the forced separation in 1933 of ‘Universal’ banks, banks 
which housed both investment and commercial divisions, has been understood in hindsight to 
have been politically motivated, which many have used as an impetus for an attack upon the 
notion of public intervention. In 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act initiated the forced divesture 
of the Chartered Public Accounting firms’ consultancy service divisions in response to the 
systemic conflicts that allowed for the colossal collapses of Enron and WorldCom, although 
the issue with this instance is that the prohibition was not indefinite and additional service 
provision has resumed in less than a decade. 
Using these instances as a basis for advancing the proposal that the agencies’ provision of 
ancillary services should be completely and irreversibly prohibited, the chapter will then go 
on to establish and detail each component of the reform proposal. This section will be as clear 
as is possible in order to communicate the measures proposed, and their effects, as effectively 
as possible. Once the proposal has been established the chapter will then go through the 
hypothesised benefits to the proposal, if it were to be enacted, before discussing the potential 
impediments to it being accepted and incorporated. Whilst it is important to be positive when 
suggesting such socially-important changes to the system, the list of potential impediments is 
extensive and contains elements which would mean a societal shift is needed if any 
meaningful change is to be forthcoming. However, it is precisely moments like these where 
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the commitment to assessing the actual becomes vital when it is all too easy to be dismayed 
and retreat to the relative comfort of focussing upon the desired; the actual must be addressed 
and communicated if we are to stand any chance of aligning the output of the rating industry 
with the pursuit of the public’s protection.  
 
6.2 The Imperfections in the Current Framework Governing Ancillary Service 
Provision 
 
As we saw briefly in 1.4 A Snapshot of the Regulatory Framework, the rating industry was 
not directly regulated until 2005/06 with the Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Relief and Credit 
Rating Agency Reform Acts, with any regulatory intervention before then being to facilitate 
the industry’s development rather than constraining its conduct. The aspects considered by 
the Acts in 2005/06 were built upon and expanded by the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, in which 
the stated aim was to remove the binds that kept the economy tied to the agencies. However, 
there is very little to be said regarding the provision of additional services within these Acts, 
as the procedure is to delegate the actual setting of individual rules, on a technical basis if 
nothing else, to the SEC. The purpose of this is that this delegation is attached to the 
stipulation that the SEC must conduct extensive reports and then report back to Congress 
with its findings in a particular area. We can see this process within the SEC’s Final Rules, 
documented in 2014, which serves as the most up-to-date record of the amendments made to 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 under the direction of the Dodd-Frank Act1. 
Within the SEC’s Final Rules publication we can see the actual constraints that surround the 
agencies’ provision of ancillary services. As was detailed earlier in Chapter 5 The Issue of 
                                                 
1 Securities and Exchange Commission Final Rule Analysis: Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 
34-72936; File No. S7-18-11 (2014) 23. 
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Ancillary Service Provision2, the SEC confirms that Rules 17g-5 and 17g-6 of the Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934 prohibit the agency from rating an issuer who they have had 
contact with before concerning the corporate or legal structure, assets, liabilities or activities 
of that issuer, and that the agency is prohibited from conditioning or threatening to condition 
the issuance of a credit rating on the purchasing of additional services i.e. tying. 
The acceptance of the ‘tying’ process existing was developed in the CRA Reform Act of 
20063 as a response to the many testimonies heard by Congressional committees concerning 
the ‘abusive’ industry practices like ‘tying’, issuing unsolicited ratings with a bill, and 
‘notching’4. So, Rule 17g-6 is an example of the SEC’s response to the legislative body 
instructing it to develop countermeasures to the aspects it decides need to be addressed, 
which was an amendment initially established (tentatively) alongside the 17g-5 amendments 
in 20095. 
In confirming the scarcity of reference to the provision of ancillary services, the only other 
Rule that is concerned with the provision is Rule 17g-7, which determines that if a credit 
rating is issued it must be accompanied by a disclosure form by the agency which details 
whether or not that issuing party has paid for any additional services (before the rating was 
paid for, as there are strict limits to what the issuer may purchase after the rating has been 
paid for). Initially the SEC had differentiated the need for disclosure between solicited and 
unsolicited ratings, although this was altered when a commenter on the proposed rules raised 
the concern that an NRSRO analyst may then have the opportunity to know whether a firm 
                                                 
2 5.1 Introduction (n 6). 
3 Jerry W Markham A Financial History of the United States: From Enron-Era to the Great Recession 
(Routledge 2015) 725. 
4 Committee on Financial Services Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Relief Act of 2006: Report 109-546 (GPO 
2006) 13. 
5 Lynn Bai ‘On Regulating Conflicts of Interest in the Credit Rating Industry’ [2010] 13 New York University 
Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 278. 
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had purchased additional services from their rating firm6. Though this is logical in practice, 
there have been a number of confirmed instances whereby analysts have been directly 
involved with the marketing of ancillary services7, which is an extraordinarily troubling issue 
and is representative of the actualities of the rating industry. 
This concept of the SEC trusting in the agencies to separate the divisions within its business 
is very important, and allows us to begin to focus upon the inadequacies of the current 
framework. In Chapter 1 A Primer on the Credit Rating Domain it was explained that the 
ancillary service divisions, using Moody’s Analytics as the example, serve as the sales and 
marketing arms of the rating agencies as well as the provider of additional services. With this 
understanding we can see that the SEC do attempt to regulate the ancillary service divisions 
further when they state that ‘section 15E(h)(3)(A) of the Exchange Act provides that the 
Commission shall also issue rules to prevent the sales and marketing consideration of an 
NRSRO from influencing the production of ratings by the NRSRO’8. This ‘absolute 
prohibition’9 is clear and unwavering. Yet, we have already heard of testimonies of the 
‘Chinese Walls’, or ‘Information Barriers’ as the SEC would prefer they be called10, failing, 
with the SEC itself, whilst conducting its examinations of the agencies in the preparation of 
these final rules, finding that within the Big Three it appeared ‘employees responsible for 
obtaining ratings business would notify other employees, including those responsible for 
criteria development, about business concerns they had related to the criteria’11.  
                                                 
6 Securities and Exchange Commission (n 1) 332. 
7 Bai (n 5) 261. 
8 Securities and Exchange Commission (n 1) 99. 
9 ibid 100. 
10 Securities and Exchange Commission Self-Regulatory Organisations; International Securities Exchange, 
Inc.; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and Amendments No. 1 and 2 Thereto to Amend the Market 
Maker Information Barrier Requirements under ISE Rule 810: Release No. 34-50197; File No. SR-ISE-2004-18 
(SEC 2004) 1. 
11 Securities and Exchange Commission (n 1) 100. 
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However, this was not an isolated finding. The SEC found in 2015 that ‘one larger NRSRO 
and three smaller NRSROs did not have sufficient policies, procedures, and controls to 
manage the issuer-paid conflict or to prevent analytical personnel’s access to fee or market-
share information’. It also found that ‘an analytical supervisor (who was not authorised to 
grant such an exemption) at this (larger) NRSRO suspended analyst rotation for several 
months for a substantial number of ratings in an asset-class without obtaining the required 
written exemption’ and that a senior officer of the same NRSRO ‘violated its policies and 
procedures by sending emails to analytical and criteria-development personnel concerning an 
issuer’s decision to terminate its rating in response to revisions by this NRSRO to its 
criteria’12. The incredible violations of the law do not stop there; the SEC found instances of 
the agencies not reporting issuers who the agency suspected of committing material 
violations of the law, of issuing unsolicited ratings motivated by market-share considerations, 
and of directors who were declared as being independent but also served on the non-NRSRO 
parent companies or affiliates. 
These incredible and brazen violations of the law confirm Richard Portes’ view that ‘Chinese 
Walls will not do’13. However, it surely raises the question of why they feel so comfortable in 
breaking the law. Fortunately for our analysis, but unfortunately for society, that is a question 
that has a simple answer. The answer lies in the following statement from the SEC, a 
statement which is repeated consistently within the report on the findings of systemic law 
breaking: ‘The Staff recommended that this NRSRO enhance its internal controls to ensure 
that all personnel adhere to this policy’. This sentiment is repeated time and time again and 
simply confirms the weak and pro-business nature of the SEC; that material violations are 
treated in this manner is nothing short of outrageous. In the same report the SEC detail the 
                                                 
12 Securities and Exchange Commission 2015 Summary Report of Commission Staff’s Examinations of Each 
Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating Organisation (SEC 2015) 15. 
13 Richard Portes ‘Ratings Agency Reform’ in Carmen Reinhart and Andrew Felton The First Global Financial 
Crisis of the 21st Century (VoxEU 2008) 149. 
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disciplinary measures it has at its disposal, which include relatively small fines, limitations on 
activities and short-term censuring prohibitions (the like of which we assessed with the cease-
and-desist order given to S&P), and ultimately the revoking of an agency’s NRSRO licence. 
However, why none of these measures were utilised in response to these blatant violations is 
unknown and in truth a damning demonstration of the SEC’s inability to safeguard the public 
interest.   
All in all is it very difficult to disagree with Eichengreen’s assessment that ‘the credit-rating 
agencies, legislative handwaving aside, were able to escape significant regulation and 
reform’14. The current regulatory framework that surrounds the agencies, on all levels, is 
incredibly weak. It is not illogical to presume that an effective post-crisis regulatory effort 
would result in a systemic lowering of profits within that particular sector being governed for 
some considerable period of time, but for the rating industry to have experienced just two or 
three years of contraction before resuming and surpassing record levels of revenues and 
profits is extraordinarily objectionable, and ultimately stands as the truest representation of 
the weakness of the regulatory framework governing the ratings industry. 
It is contested here that this weakness is inherent within the SEC because of its constitution, 
although it must be stated that this contention could be applied to any number of agents of the 
State. There is an unnerving favouring of business over the public in the minds of agents 
which is demonstrated by their passive response to material violations of the law. When we 
add this understanding to the U.S. Department of Justice having to negotiate with criminally 
liable companies like the rating agencies in order to find a level of fine that was appropriate 
for the agencies, and then championing this process as a positive result for the public, the true 
nature of what lies in front of us is evident. It is in this light that the following proposal is 
                                                 
14 Barry Eichengreen Hall of Mirrors: The Great Depression, The Great Recession, and the Uses-and-Misuses 
of History (OUP 2014) 386. 
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predicated upon the notion that what is needed is not a simple reform proposal but ultimately 
a drastic sea-change in mind-set, so that the public’s protection is at the forefront of every 
agent of the State. The call for incremental and clearly-defined reform proposals that are 
based upon the understanding of the agencies as they actually are is valid, yet the 
impediments to those reforms being recognised are great, as we shall see later, and this is 
something that, although pessimistic, must not be forgotten. 
 
6.3 Precedent for State Intervention 
 
Simply put, this thesis serves as a vehicle to advance a sentiment that is solely concerned 
with protecting the public from the iniquities of the financial sector. For almost a decade we 
have witnessed extensive poverty and ‘austerity’ that is the sole result of the actions of a few. 
To present an overarching proposal to eliminate this inherent problem may be academically 
appealing but is in essence useless against such an engrained adversary. So, in what is a 
minute attempt to initiate incremental change that will allow for the credit rating industry, 
which as we know is the sole gatekeeper determining access to the capital markets, to be 
exposed to the possibility of experiencing discipline through financial penalties, the only 
discipline the State is willing to administer, this chapter will now present a reform proposal 
that calls for the absolute and irreversible prohibition of the provision of additional services 
by credit rating agencies.  
This proposal is not complex. It is not complex because simplicity is the only way in which 
one can communicate the necessity of action in this regard, and also because the wrongdoing 
that is being committed is also extraordinarily simple; the agencies incorporated a business 
for harvesting rent, this thesis proposes that that business be removed. There are however a 
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small number of elements that need to be addressed in order for the proposal to be established 
as technically credible, because even though the reality of the situation may dictate that it will 
be incredibly difficult to enact any impactful reform, establishing technically possible reform 
proposals at least provides us with an opportunity to assess the likelihood of implementation. 
Also, if a proposal is advanced in such a simple but studied manner, but is not considered, we 
then have the foundation to ask ‘why’.  
Before we take a closer look at this proposal it will be useful to examine some other instances 
where influential financial sectors have had their additional, conflict-creating side-businesses 
stripped from them in the name of public safety. Doing this will demonstrate two things: 
firstly it will show us that this issue is not unique to the rating industry, and is perhaps a 
systemic issue of exploitation in spite of the potential harm to the public; and secondly it will 
show us the potential failings of such moves so that we can incorporate the understanding of 
such failures into our proposal in order to potentially increase its possible effectiveness. 
Whilst the proposal advanced by this thesis is incredibly simple, the environment in which it 
would be enacted is anything but. 
 
6.3.1 The Termination of Universal Banking – 1933 
 
The financial collapse in 1929 that initiated one of the most destructive periods of economic 
contraction in modern history was unerringly similar to the financial collapse of 2007/08 in a 
number of ways15. Whilst the details were similar however, in that the explosion of the 
securitisation process expedited the effects of systemic greed, the response taken by the State 
                                                 
15 See Owen F Humpage Current Federal Reserve Policy Under the Lens of Economic History (CUP 2015) for 
an analysis of the comparisons with regard to financial policies. For an analysis of the economic and 
sociological comparisons see Eichengreen (n 14). 
258 
 
was radically different, although how much of that depends upon the environment at that time 
is up for debate. In this section we shall see how the incredibly powerful and influential 
banking magnates were in a heated battle with the State to protect their position, but also how 
modern analysis has portrayed this epic battle as a confrontation that was based upon a 
fabrication. In assessing the actualities of the unprecedented actions taken during the 1930s, 
in addition to the modern analyses, we shall see how it is conceivable that State agencies 
utilised the public anger directed towards the banking industry to initiate incredibly extensive 
reforms, reforms which people argue instigated the ‘Quiet Period’ of 70 years of financial 
stability, or alternatively instigated a period of cartelisation within the banking industry that 
continues to this day. 
The ‘roaring twenties’ is an era that came to define the unrestricted excesses of the free 
market within the United States. Defined by the extravagant riches that were available, the 
1920s represented the period when securities became commonplace and were peddled to the 
public on a mass and organised scale. Charles E Mitchell, President of the National City 
Bank (the ancestor of today’s CitiGroup) and its security-issuing affiliate The National City 
Company, was quoted as saying that the aim was to sell securities ‘just as United Cigar 
Stores sold cigars’16. Crockett et al confirm this escalation in the offering of securities during 
this period: ‘The number of banks operating a securities business in an internal bank 
department grew from 62 to 123 between 1922 and 1931. Even more rapid was the 
development of separate securities affiliates, which rose from 10 in 1922 to 114 in 1931’17. 
This combination of banks that served the general public in terms of accepting deposits, and 
                                                 
16 Jerry W Markham A Financial History of the United States: From Christopher Columbus to the Robber 
Barons 1492-1900 (M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 2002) 116. 
17 Andrew Crockett, Trevor Harris, Frederic S Mishkin and Eugene N White Conflicts of Interest in the 




of security-issuing affiliates or investment banking divisions, is what is referred to as 
‘Universal Banking’. 
The reasons why Universal Banking was, and indeed still is desirable to some is 
straightforward. Essentially, the commercial bank can utilise the expertise of the focussed 
affiliate to analyse securities that the commercial bank itself would then purchase (or market 
to its large customer base). The capabilities of the commercial bank, owing to its increased 
size relative to a specialised investment bank, means that the bank would have a large number 
of potential clients who could also deposit the securities with the bank, effectively 
transforming it into a ‘discount broker’ of securities18. However, this increase in scope in turn 
increased the systemic susceptibility to risk-laden security issuances, which unbeknownst to 
the public was becoming a reality at that time because of the actions of a few manipulative 
individuals. Charles Mitchell was held up as the arch-villain in the subsequent congressional 
hearings that would take place because of the centrality of The National City Company to the 
flooding of the marketplace with poorly underwritten securities. However, legislators were 
already focussed upon the issue of risky and sometimes fraudulent securities because of the 
actions of the infamous Samuel Insull19, the owner of Middle West Utilities, and perhaps the 
even more notorious Ivar Kreuger20, the spearhead of monopolies that enveloped the western 
world in the 1920s, both of whom flooded the market with securities that were built upon 
excessive risk and, in a lot of cases, outright fraud. 
                                                 
18 ibid. 
19 For more on the Samuel Insull and his impact upon the development of securities regulations see Barrie A 
Wigmore The Crash and Its Aftermath: A History of Securities Markets in the United States, 1929-1933 
(Greenwood Publishing Group 1985); J E Ketz Accounting Ethics: Crisis in Accounting Ethics (Routledge 
2006); Forrest McDonald Insull: The Rise and Fall of a Billionaire Utility Tycoon (Beard Books 2010); Robert 
L Bradley Edison to Enron: Energy Markets and Political Strategies (John Wiley & Sons 2011) 206-13. 
20 For more on the truly remarkable story of the rise and fall of Ivar Kreuger see Trevor Allen Ivar Kreuger, 
Match King, Croesus and Crook (John Long Ltd 1932); Allen Churchill The Incredible Ivar Kreuger (Rinehart 
& Company, Inc. 1957); Robert Shaplen Kreuger: Genius and Swindler (Alfred A Knopf 1960); Dale L Flesher 
and Tonya K Flesher ‘Ivar Kreuger’s Contribution to U.S. Financial Reporting’ in J E Ketz Accounting Ethics: 
Crisis in Accounting Ethics (Routledge 2006); Frank Partnoy The Match King: Ivar Kreuger and the Financial 
Scandal of the Century (Profile Books 2010); Tage Alalehto ‘Ivar Krueger: An International Swindler of 
Magnitude’ [2014] 3 Radical Criminology. 
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The result of the incorporation and spreading of this increased systemic risk was an 
unprecedented crash and subsequent Depression. To attempt to resolve this unprecedented 
failure the State sought to undertake an unprecedented regulatory response. This response 
began with an investigation by the Senate Banking Currency Committee which would come 
to be known as the ‘Pecora Hearings’, named after the eventual figurehead of the 
investigation, Ferdinand Pecora21. The investigation unearthed a number of conflicts that the 
Committee blamed upon the connection between commercial and investment banking: 
bankers were blamed for selling “unsound and speculative securities” generated by their 
security-issuing affiliates; banks were converting bad loans into security issues that were sold 
to an unsuspecting public; and also that security affiliates were conducting pool operations 
with the stock of the parent bank, which was inducing a number of personal conflicts of 
interest22. 
The legislative response, which when taken as a series of responses was branded as the ‘New 
Deal’23, began with the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Banking Act of 1933, 
and included a range of other pieces of legislation enacted as part of ‘programs’ like 
‘Economic Stimulus and Stabilisation’ and ‘Relief and Welfare’. Sections 16, 20, 21, and 32 
of The Banking Act, which when referring to these specific sections constitutes The Glass-
Steagall Act, revoked all of the securities powers of every Federal Reserve member bank 
except for their capacity to dealing with government securities. Section 20 specifically 
ordered that no member bank could be affiliated in any form with any company that was 
engaged principally in the ‘issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale or distribution at 
wholesale or retail through syndicate participation of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes or 
                                                 
21 For an insight into the life of Ferdinand Pecora and his involvement with the investigation see Michael Perino 
The Hellhound of Wall Street: How Ferdinand Pecora’s Investigations of the Great Crash Forever Changed 
American Finance (The Penguin Press 2010). 
22 Crockett et al (n 17). 
23 For just one resource that details the evolution of the ‘New Deal’ see Michael Hiltzik The New Deal (Simon 
and Schuster 2012). 
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other securities. Section 21 made it illegal for investment banks to accept deposits, and 
Section 32 stipulated that no bank officer or director could be associated with any business 
engaged in these activities’24. This prohibition, when combined with the Act’s creation of a 
Federal deposit protection scheme which sought to end runs on member banks25, represents a 
particularly strong public-protection approach that was incorporated by the Roosevelt 
administration and US Congress. 
However, whilst this prohibition represents a robust challenge to the domination of the 
financial sector, a facet perhaps proven by the Act’s influence continuing in place for over 60 
years before the deregulatory era of the 1990s26, many have found flaws in this crucial period 
for State intervention. The practical element of the State using its inherent power of 
intervention is the element from this era that this thesis is most concerned with. Yet, it is this 
element that many have criticised, and understanding why will be important for our own 
proposal.  
The first element that is important for our consideration is that the forced separation in an 
industry dictates that some members of the industry, as it was, may migrate into the newly 
created industry, which then leaves a trail between the two which has the potential to create 
conflicts. For example, Markham describes how the separation between commercial and 
investment banking, which dictated that Universal banks must choose between being 
recognised as one or the other, resulted in the separation of key personnel that maintained 
close links with their former counterparts. When J.P. Morgan separated and became known as 
J.P. Morgan & Co., a commercial bank, the new entity that moved into investment banking, 
                                                 
24 Crockett et al (n 17) 65. 
25 Murray N Rothbard History of Money and Banking in the United States: The Colonial Era to World War II 
(Ludwig von Mises Institute 2002) 315. 
26 The Federal Reserve did begin to erode the effectiveness of the Act in the 1970s however, by allowing 
security-issuing subsidiaries of holding bank companies to transact with securities that were deemed ineligible 
by the Acts of the 1930s, see Fabio Braggion ‘Glass-Steagall Act’ in Joel Mokyr The Oxford Encyclopedia of 
Economic History (OUP 2003) 423. 
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Morgan Stanley & Co., consisted of three of the original J.P. Morgan & Co. partners. Apart 
from the partners in the new firm, Henry S. Morgan, son of J.P. ‘Jack’ Morgan Jr., Harold 
Stanley and William Ewing, the majority of the other employees were also from J.P. Morgan, 
which leads Markham to state that ‘although Morgan Stanley was supposed to operate 
independently of J.P. Morgan & Co., they were closely linked’27. This raises an important 
issue for the proposal regarding the forced separation of the ancillary services of the rating 
agencies: what is the best way to move forward after the separation; forced divesture, or 
separation which then creates a new industry that is potentially closely aligned to the rating 
industry? This will be a very important consideration for the reform proposal. 
The second issue with these regulations, as developed in the literature, is that the actions have 
been considered to be politically motivated. The reason why this view has become prevalent 
is because modern analyses have found that there were very few links between the aspects of 
a bank that made it a ‘universal bank’ i.e. the collaboration between investment and 
commercial divisions, and the Crash of 1929 or the subsequent Depression28. Perhaps the 
leading scholar in this regard, who has had an enormous influence upon free-market and anti-
regulation advocates like Charles Calomiris as we saw earlier, is George J Benston. Benston, 
in his work The Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking: The Glass-Steagall Act 
Revisited and Reconsidered, describes a number of very important flaws with the 
investigation into the responsibility of the banks in causing the crisis, and also flaws within 
the regulations themselves. Ultimately, Benston concludes that there was very little evidence 
that could have emanated from the conduct of the Universal Banks because there are simply 
very few flaws in the Universal Banking model, and that in fact the fault lies with central 
                                                 
27 Markham (n 16) 169. 
28 Braggion (n 26). 
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banks29. Benston’s work initiated further research by scholars such as Kroszner and Rajan, 
Ang and Richardson, and Puri, who all found that, through assessing the default rates of 
bonds underwritten by Universal banks, the bonds were less likely to default than those 
underwritten by any other type of bank30.  
So, the enactment of regulations that were as impactful as the New Deal regulations, based 
upon very little evidence, has led scholars to suggest that the enactment of the Acts was 
politically motivated. Murray Rothbard claims that the attack upon investment banks that also 
accepted deposits, of which J.P. Morgan & Co. was easily the largest and as a result perhaps 
the most influential bank, represented a direct attack upon the House of Morgan. Rothbard 
attributes this purposeful attack on the House of Morgan to the Rockefellers, who forged 
alliances with leading Senators like Carter Glass, and also leading economic theoreticians 
like H. Parker Willis, who themselves were not enamoured with the dominance displayed by 
the House of Morgan even after the death of John Pierpont Morgan in 1913. This approach 
led to what some scholars have labelled as the ‘cartelisation’ of the banking industry, in that 
the Sections of the 1933 Act that forced separation ‘helped the commercial bankers get rid of 
unprofitable securities, and to eliminate the powerful competition of investment bankers for 
customers’ deposits’31, which would seem to be confirmed by J.P. Morgan & Co.’s decision 
to opt for continuing practice within commercial banking rather than investment banking. 
The economic analyses point to a regulatory phase which was built upon very little evidence, 
which arguably suggests that the State sought to dismantle the banking system as it stood on 
                                                 
29 Benston draws eight conclusions from his findings that suggest that the model of universal banking is 
economically advantageous and should be encouraged, see George J Benston The Separation of Commercial 
and Investment Banking: The Glass-Steagall Act Revisited and Reconsidered (MacMillan 1990).  
30 This quantitative analysis is represented by the works of James S Ang and Terry Richardson ‘The 
Underwriting Experience of Commercial Bank Affiliates prior to the Glass-Steagall Act: A Reexamination of 
Evidence for the Passage of the Act’ [1994] 18 Journal of Banking & Finance 2; Randall S Kroszner and 
Raghuram G Rajan ‘Is the Glass-Steagall Act Justified? A Study of the U.S. Experience with Universal Banking 
Before 1933’ [1994] 84 The American Economic Review 4; Manju Puri ‘The Long-Term Default Performance 
of Bank-Underwritten Security Issues’ [1994] 18 Journal of Banking & Finance 2. 
31 Rothbard (n 25) 317. 
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the back of public anger. Whilst this has received a lot of criticism from onlookers, another 
angle that could be promoted is that when faced with such an entrenched and resourceful 
adversary, the only option available to the State who wants to protect the public against such 
a behemoth (theoretically speaking) is to utilise the public anger that emanates from a once-
in-a-generation event to bring about such impactful changes. Though unethical because of the 
fabrication of culpability, there is an argument to be made that this approach is necessary 
when facing such entities. However, the redistribution of power rather than the removal of 
power suggests that this arguably unethical but effective approach was not what occurred in 
1933; the theory of an attack upon the House of Morgan is incredibly convincing, and also 
the inaction of the State after the next once-in-a-generation event, the Financial Crisis of 
2007/08, suggests that the State does not take advantage of such enormous events to bring 
about impactful change against an embedded financial sector.  
As was mentioned earlier, the New Deal represented the beginning of ‘the Quiet Period’, 
which shines a positive historical light upon that particular period of regulation, and in 
essence the notion of forced separation. Alternatively, the period simply redistributed the 
power within the sector, which was combined with a reversible legislative approach (as 
demonstrated by the deregulation in the 1990s), which would eventually cumulate in the 
banking industry becoming protected to a degree whereby they are now immune to failure. 
For our proposal the aspect of the process being subjected to internal politics is the most 
troubling and certainly needs to be considered; the process cannot be hijacked by rating 
agencies and their respective lobbyists who would want to create a system that serves them 
eventually. Therefore, the reform needs to be absolute and irreversible to guarantee the 
separation for the sake of the public, because while the New Deal regulations represent an 
instance whereby the financial sector, the banking industry in this case, was forced to remove 
additional aspects of its business to protect the public, the actual version of events shows a 
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redistribution of power that eventually led to the cementation of an industry within society; 
this cannot be repeated. 
 
6.3.2 The Forced Divesture of Consultancy Services within the Public Accounting 
Industry – 2002 
 
The events of the New Deal era showed that the State can intervene in the business of the 
private sector, and intervene to an extent where the actual business that one can provide can 
be dictated. This is an important understanding because it sets a precedent for future crises in 
that the fact that this method is an option for the state should weigh heavily on the minds of 
the leaders in the private sector (particularly in the financial sector). However, this aspect of 
private-social relations is clearly not considered when we look back over the history of the 
financial sector since the New Deal, and nowhere is this more apparent (before the Credit 
Rating Industry example at least) than with the accounting industry’s adoption of consultancy 
divisions. Financial crises usually have some element within them that can be compared to 
previous crises and, just like with the blaming of Universal banking for the Wall Street Crash 
of 1929 and the Great Depression, the accounting industry’s adoption of consultancy 
(additional) services has been directly blamed for the crisis emanating from the then-record 
bankruptcy of Enron, and later WorldCom32. 
For our analysis, the examination of the accounting industry is much more applicable than the 
examination of the banking industry during the 1930s. The examination of the New Deal 
regulations allowed us to see the first substantial example of the State wielding its power 
against the financial sector by enacting laws, developing programs for stability and even 
                                                 
32 Kathryn Cearns ‘Auditors and International Financial Reporting’ in Carien van Mourik and Peter Walton The 
Routledge Companion to Accounting, Reporting and Regulation (Routledge 2013) 386. 
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creating new regulators to govern the marketplace (the SEC). However, investment banking, 
by definition, is not the best example of rent-harvesting like we know the CRA’s adoption of 
ancillary services represents. What is a good example of another industry creating rent-
harvesting divisions, and then subsequently being regulated for it, is the accounting industry’s 
adoption of consultancy services. 
The accounting industry’s adoption of consultancy services and the effect of those services 
upon its capability to be an effective gatekeeper are extensively covered within the 
literature33. Chief amongst this coverage are the analyses of the conduct of Arthur Andersen, 
a prominent accounting firm that collapsed as a result of the Enron affair, which in essence 
initiated the public vilification of public accounting companies and heralded a new era with 
the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. Just like the rating agencies after it, the 
accounting industry developed their consultancy service divisions purposefully to take 
advantage of their central position within the procedure of the financial sector. Yet, 
accountants are older, more central to the economy, and most importantly more visible to the 
public than the rating agencies will ever be, which is reflected in their revenues when 
compared to the revenues recorded by the Big Two Rating agencies34; so whilst the adoption 
of consultancy services by the accounting industry is broadly similar to that of the rating 
industry’s adoption of ancillary services, there are crucial differences like size, role, and 
public perception that will need to be considered when making any comparisons. 
The accounting firms were developing their additional services at such a rate that regulators 
and legislators began to take notice because, as Cearns notes, they ‘became nervous in the 
                                                 
33 For what can only be just a representative view see N C Smith and Michelle Quirk ‘From Grace to Disgrace: 
The Rise and Fall of Arthur Andersen’ [2004] 1 Journal of Business Ethics Education 1; Barbara L Toffler and 
Jennifer Reingold Final Accounting: Ambition, Greed, and the Fall of Arthur Andersen (Currency/Doubleday 
2004); Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind The Smartest Guys in the Room: The Amazing Rise and Scandalous 
Fall of Enron (Penguin 2004); John C Coffee Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance (OUP 
2006). 
34 The annual global revenues for the Big Four in 2015 were: E&Y $28.7 billion; PwC $35.4 billion; KPMG 
$24.44; and Deloitte $35.2 billion. 
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1990s that the firms were providing such a wide range of services that there was a risk that 
the central function of audit, a key governance plank underpinning markets and built into 
both corporate and securities law in highly regulated markets, would become a poor 
relation’35; this fear was not unfounded because Arthur Andersen, a firm that was central to 
the fraudulent rise of the Enron Corporation, was recording revenues from consultancy at the 
end of the 1990s that amounted to a massive 44% of their total revenue36. Now that the firms 
had developed a wide array of additional services, ranging from computing and business 
process advice to actuarial and surveying services, and also that these services were 
becoming more lucrative than their foundational purpose of performing third-party audits, the 
State decided to act with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. However, a key point of note here 
is that even though both legislators and regulators were aware of the impending issue of the 
firms being conflicted to a point where their integrity was seriously in question, they still did 
not act. What it took for them to act was the collapsing of a number of colossal firms and this 
is representative of the double-edged sword that is financial policy making; there is not 
enough political capital to enact an impactful regulatory reform in a boom period and there is 
the pressing need to stabilise the economy in the immediate aftermath of a crisis, which 
obviously dictates that there is very little room for the considered implementation of a 
forward-thinking and socially-concerned reform at any point in the economic cycle. This is a 
point that will be considered when we look at the impediments for success for the reform 
proposal. 
Bankruptcies are classified by the amount of assets the company had when it filed for 
bankruptcy protection37 and the numbers concerning the bankruptcies at the beginning of the 
2000s are quite extraordinary, although as we know they would be dwarfed by the collapse of 
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36 Coffee (n 33) 149. 
37 ibid 47. 
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Lehman Brothers in 2008. Nevertheless, Enron filed for bankruptcy protection on December 
2nd 2001 and had over $65 billion in assets, whilst the filing for bankruptcy protection for 
WorldCom on July 21st 2002 went one step further and set the (then) record of $103 billion in 
assets. Such systemically impactful failures would be the trigger for the interventionist 
actions of the State, along with the revelations regarding the complicity of the accounting 
industry in helping to conceal enormous losses within these failed corporations. 
On July 30th 2002, just 9 days after the record filing for bankruptcy protection from 
WorldCom, the United States enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Founded upon 
massive sentiments such as that articulated by President George W. Bush: ‘No Boardroom in 
America is above or beyond the law’38, the Act sought to address the weaknesses within the 
corporate governance framework, chief amongst which was the introduction of new standards 
for those who audit large publicly listed companies39. To do this the Act introduced the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) which was tasked with overseeing 
the audit firms and was also given the capacity to discipline breaches as it found them; for 
our analysis Title II of the Act is the most important as it covers the issue of ‘auditor 
independence’ which is directly related to our analysis of the credit rating agencies’ 
independence. 
Title II serves as the reason for the evaluation of Moeller when he states that ‘the overall 
theme under SOX is that external auditors are authorised to audit the financial statements of 
their client enterprises and that is about all’ because ultimately the Act, through Section II, 
made it illegal for a firm to contemporaneously perform both audit and non-audit services for 
                                                 
38 Max H Bazerman and Michael Watkins Predictable Surprises: The Disasters You Should Have Seen Coming, 
and How To Prevent Them (Harvard Business Press 2004) 63. 
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a given client40. The Act determined that the non-audit services that were to be prohibited 
were: bookkeeping services; financial information systems design and implementation; 
appraisal or valuation services; actuarial services; internal audit outsourcing services; 
management functions or human resources; broker or dealer, investment advisor, or 
investment banking services; legal and expert services unrelated to the audit; and any other 
service that the PCAOB determines, by regulation41. A number of conclusions can be drawn 
from these rulings that are very important for our own analysis. Firstly, it is clear to see that 
the additional service divisions that were in operation prior to the enactment of the Act were 
no longer viable, and secondly, the Act gave the PCAOB enormous powers of discretion 
when it came to what may be deemed as prohibited non-audit services, which of course is an 
important step for the new regulatory body. 
At first glance this regulatory approach seems to be just what was needed to remove the rent-
harvesting elements of these socially important businesses. However, whereas the issue for 
this thesis when discussing the rating industry is the industry’s capacity to negate the 
disciplinary measures of the state via the income from their rent-harvesting divisions, the 
issue with the accounting industry was primarily (and still is in reality) the need to change the 
culture within the industry, so that accuracy which then translates to stability is at the 
forefront of their operations. The culture within this socially-vital industry was warped 
however, as Garner et al explain:  
There has been a change in the firms’ reason for being. The firms were now growth 
and profit oriented. Public duties, responsibilities, and professionalism were no longer 
the focus and hallmark. It was no longer central to provide the assurance needed by 
the market that clients’ financial statements were fairly presented. Instead audit 
                                                 
40 Robert R Moeller Sarbanes-Oxley Internal Controls: Effective Auditing with AS5, CobiT, and ITIL (John 
Wiley & Sons 2008) 26. 
41 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 116 Stat. 745 Title II ‘Auditor Independence’. 
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service was seen as commodity-like and used to advantage as a loss leader for 
lucrative consulting work…42. 
This notion of ‘public’ is very important when attempting to understand the decisions of the 
legislators. As Garner et al stated above, and as Brewster reaffirms in his work 
Unaccountable: How the Accounting Profession Forfeited a Public Trust, the notion of 
‘public service’ is engrained within the purpose of the public accounting industry43. The 
industry has even been called the ‘guardians of the public interest’ by some scholars44, which 
points to the fact that everything must be done to maintain the industry’s ‘Independence in 
Appearance’, which Cottell describes as the most important aspect of any financial 
gatekeeper45. When we compare this situation with that of the rating industry, it is abundantly 
clear that the accounting industry is prominent in the public eye when the notion of corporate 
governance and financial safety is invoked, whereas while the ratings of agencies may be 
common parlance i.e. ‘Triple-A’, the actual role, function, and position of the industry is 
usually reserved for those with an interest in the markets or followers of business news 
outlets; this will have to be considered when we assess the likelihood of the proposal being 
implemented because the lack of a public presence may potentially be the deciding factor 
when legislators debate whether direct intervention is appropriate. 
These are all key lessons that we can draw from the example of the early 2000s. However, 
whilst it is important to recognise the unique aspects that had an influence upon the thinking 
of legislators, what is vital is that we understand the similarities and the potentially 
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transferrable lessons that we can learn from the mistakes of the early 2000s. The structure of 
the accounting industry was, and still is very similar to that of the ratings industry. One 
scholar has suggested that the accounting industry is representative of a cartelised industry 
because competitive pressures do not ensue in the face of a lower quality output, and also that 
the ability to use the original output as a loss-leader for the sale of additional service is only 
possible when a firm is part of an oligopoly46; the similarities to the ratings industry is clear.  
In short, whilst the Sarbanes-Oxley Act seems to represent a massive triumph for the public 
against the limitless greed of a key financial sector, the actual version of events tells of a 
process that was dogged by lobbying efforts and compromises designed to allow for the 
future development of sustained rent-harvesting by the industry. The earlier attempts to limit 
the provision of consultancy services, that would have in effect made the dramatic collapse of 
Enron much less likely, were stonewalled by the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA)47. In the lead up to Sarbanes-Oxley, which was just days after the 
record collapse of WorldCom lest we forget, three out of the five global accounting firms, in 
the words of former SEC Chairman Bevis Longstreth, ‘representing solely their private 
business interests, rejected any meaningful restrictions on the free play of those interests’48. 
Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the SEC from 1993 to 2000, was leading the development of the 
regulations against the accounting industry and believed that what was required was a clean 
break between auditing and consulting duties49, although to his credit he was seeking to focus 
upon the actual, as Bazerman and Watkins explain: ‘in fact, most of the Big Five firms were 
already taking steps toward spinning off their consulting divisions, whether by choice or by 
force… But Levitt as unimpressed by those spontaneous shows of independence. As soon as 
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Andersen’s consulting limb was hacked off from the parent firm, a new, even bigger one 
sprouted in its place’50, which is a particularly strong indicator of the nature of these socially 
important financial gatekeepers. 
However, Levitt’s focussing upon the actual was not consistent, as Bazerman and Watkins 
continue by describing the approach that Levitt decided was appropriate in that the firms 
would be able to continue providing additional services to non-audit clients, which he 
hypothesised would reduce the temptation of auditors to blindly accept their consulting 
clients’ questionable accounting practices. By focusing upon the perceived nature of the 
firms, as opposed to their clear record of outright greed, Levitt underestimated the lengths at 
which the industry would go to ensure that consulting service provision would remain in 
some form, and would remain profitable. In 2000, Levitt was under considerable pressure to 
justify his position from leading Committee members, Representatives Tom Bliley (of the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), Michael Oxley (of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) and W.J. (Billy) 
Tauzin, who would hound Levitt for the duration of the hearings; such congressional hearings 
into the rule-making of the SEC were unprecedented during Levitt’s many years at the SEC 
which leads Bazerman and Watkins to conclude that Levitt had ‘underestimated the 
attachment of the Big Five to their “integrated” audits, as well as their influence on 
Congress’, and lead Levitt to conclude ‘They waged a war against us, a total war’51 – Levitt 
claims that he received forty-five letters from Congressmen and Women in support of the 
accounting industry on this matter. 
The effect of this pressure upon the development of the law is clear to see. Rather than 
prohibiting all additional services, which was justified in response to two consecutive record 
failures in the space of 9 months, the law served to allow firms the ability to continue 
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providing these services except for when they are providing audit services to a particular 
client. The effectiveness of this approach can be seen with the benefit of hindsight. Rather 
than ushering in a new ‘Quiet Period’, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act encouraged the reduction of 
consultancy divisions within the top firms for approximately 5 years when the non-compete 
agreements held with the owners of the divisions that were sold had expired; the accounting 
firms are now actively rebuilding the consultancy divisions52. Even worse, the comfort in 
breaching laws that can only come with the protective barrier that additional services revenue 
provides was clearly evident when the leading firms were all involved in the scandalous 
sector-wide race-to-the-bottom during 2007 and 2008. PricewaterhouseCoopers has been 
sued for not revealing financial imbalances at AIG, recipient of $67.8 billion in TARP funds; 
Deloitte is alleged to have uncovered very little of the problematic asset valuations that led to 
the bankruptcy of Bear Sterns in 2008; Citibank’s misvaluations of synthetic financial 
products were not exposed by KPMG; and Ernst & Young had on numerous occasions 
‘improperly’ assisted Lehman Brothers by helping it disguise its true financial condition53. 
These incredible instances of continued negligence in the search for profit at the expense of 
public safety should leave no one in any doubt as to the real nature of these firms. 
Analysing this period was incredibly important for our understanding. This thesis is 
proposing to absolutely prohibit the provision of additional services by a socially crucial 
financial gatekeeper, and the reason why should be evidently clear now that we have looked 
at the appalling conduct of the accounting industry. The incessant quest for profits and 
growth, at the cost to society, is simply unacceptable. It is clear from what we know so far, 
from our analyses of the rating industry as well as the accounting and banking industries, that 
the leading participants have absolutely no regard for the safety of the public; so, this thesis is 
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attempting to turn the tables and show no regard for the continuation of their respective 
futures. The actions taken by the State, actions which were surely forced by the public 
perception of the role of the Public Accountant, were eventually watered down by a 
concerted lobbying campaign that allowed for the re-establishment of the same divisions 
some years later (admittedly not in the same form but equally as lucrative). The inexcusable 
culture remains because of the lack of a deterrent, which is an aspect that every scholar or 
concerned onlooker who assesses regulation should eventually consider; the question of 
‘what is the deterrent?’ will always reveal the likelihood of misbehaviour. 
Now that we have looked at two examples of State intervention, we can be confident in 
saying that technically State intervention is an option. However, we saw in the analyses that 
this intervention is consistently under attack by those the State is seeking to regulate, and that 
usually the subjects have managed to monetise their engrained position and then turn those 
resources upon the Public whom they serve. What follows then is a proposal that has been 
designed to redress the balance, to align the output of the ratings industry with the public 
interest, and ultimately to protect the public from the absolutely devastating effects of 
uninhibited greed. Yes there will be plenty of opposition to its implementation, but the action 
of devising a plan that is incremental, yet rooted in the ambition of promoting the protection 
of the public, makes it a worthwhile endeavour. 
 
6.4 A Reform Proposal to Limit the Impact of the Ratings Industry upon Society 
 
So far in this thesis we have endeavoured to understand the rating industry as it actually is, 
rather than how one may desire it to be. We have seen a number of instances where the 
industry actively operates against investors, issuers, the State, and most importantly of all the 
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public. It is reasonable to suggest that a private firm should prioritise its own advancement, 
because if it does not then no one else will, but to extend beyond this mandate and actively 
harm others in order to achieve growth is not acceptable within an advanced society. When 
we looked at the revenue figures for Moody’s earlier, we saw how the revenues garnered 
from credit ratings have rebounded well after the Crisis and remain as the foundation for the 
company; the question is ‘why is this revenue stream not enough?’ 
Of course, we cannot dictate to a private company how much it can earn. But, what we can 
do, as evidenced by legislators in 1933 and 2002, is dictate how a private company can earn, 
which is what this proposal aims to do. The credit rating industry is vital in today’s economy 
that is centred upon the issuance of debt, so it is important to preserve and protect the rating 
abilities of the largest agencies. Rather than preserving and protecting this ability, it is 
preferable to propose a system whereby the quality of the ratings can actually be increased, 
which is a by-product of this proposal. 
The proposal advanced here has been mentioned throughout this thesis so, in order to be 
clear, the reform proposal can be simplified by stating that it calls for the ‘complete and 
irreversible prohibition of the provision of additional services by credit rating agencies’. 
There has been enough evidence put forward so far to support this proposal as it is stated 
above, although in an attempt to counter the claims that may be made against it we shall now 
look at the individual components that comprise the reform proposal and aim to make it 








In its 2003 report to Congress regarding the agencies’ independence, the SEC made an 
interesting point regarding the models adopted by the industry: ‘ancillary services are in some 
cases provided by the NRSRO, a non-NRSRO affiliate of the NRSRO, or in other cases, by 
both the NRSRO and a non-NRSRO affiliate’. The SEC report continues by stating that 
Section 15E imposes requirements only upon the NRSRO and rating-affiliates designated by 
the NRSRO on its Form NRSRO, thus ‘the Staff’s ability under the current Commission rules 
directly to obtain information regarding, and to examine, the effectiveness of policies and 
procedures could be affected by the choice of a non-NRSRO affiliate to provide such 
Ancillary Services’54. It is precisely matters like these that we need to consider, as it details 
the actual state of the industry as opposed to how we imagine it should be. 
Therefore, the first aspect of the proposal is that no NRSRO, nor its holding company, can 
have any stake in a company (or division) that provides ‘additional services’, nor can it 
have any ‘affiliate’ associated with it that provides ‘additional services’. The definition of 
‘additional services’ here is rather simple; any service that is not a credit rating is deemed 
to be an ‘additional service’, and is to be prohibited. Moody’s promotes the sales of what 
it calls ‘special reports’ on its Moody’s Investors Service website i.e. not Moody’s Analytics, 
that contains such elements as industry and sector outlooks, as well as outlooks by region; 
these services can be important to investors, but they are for sale and are not free. The initial 
cost of one of these reports is $750, which to an institutional investor is a very low cost 
indeed, but may be expensive for a retail investor. However, institutional investors will not 
base their investment decisions on the basis of a $750 report, and with the separation of 
                                                 




ancillary services from credit rating services anticipated to create a new, albeit much smaller 
market, the retail investor will be able to purchase that information from another source 
(there are already market forecasting companies in existence); for this reason ‘special 
reports’ will also be prohibited. 
According to Moody’s website anyone can have ‘free’ access to ‘Issuer Ratings, Events 
Calendars, Watchlists, and Rating Methodologies’, which according to this reform proposal is 
all that the company will be able to offer. The information contained within the ratings, the 
watchlists, and the methodologies, is all that an investor really needs from a rating agency i.e. 
what rating they have ascribed to an issuer, the short- to medium-term prospects of that rating 
remaining the same, and the method with which the agency came to that particular decision. 
Only the equivalent services offered by other NRSROs, taking into account differences in 
title, will be allowed to be provided by a rating agency, irrespective of market capitalisation. 
Whilst one may argue that to prohibit all non-essential services may be extreme, the 
prohibition is based on two elements. Firstly, the rating agencies have demonstrated 
consistently that they only seek to maximise their profit, so allowing for a reduced revenue 
stream will soon be countered by lobbying or reorganisation efforts so that the small gap left 
by regulation is opened up and exploited. Similarly, the SEC cannot be trusted to put the 
public at the forefront of its mind-set and remain steadfast in the face of what is sure to be 
inevitable pressure from the agencies and their supporters. For this reason, the prohibition 
will be absolute, and we shall see shortly that it has to be irreversible to counter this 





The Right to Choose 
 
Like the separation enforced in 1933, the next stage of the reform proposal is that the 
agencies will be given a choice; either provide credit rating services only, or provide 
ancillary services only, but not both. Although the side-business of ancillary service 
provision is clearly not the same as investment banking was to the universal banks, the option 
will still be put forward to the agencies to choose their line of business moving forward. If, as 
the agencies are adamant, the provision of ancillary service’s value is not tied to the presence 
of the rating division, then this should not be as spurious an option as it first sounds; lest we 
forget this is a multi-billion dollar industry at present. However, unlike 1933, the agencies 
will not be allowed to create rebranded ancillary service divisions and have partners 
move across from one industry to the other. Rather, the line of business that they decline 




After the agency chooses which line of business it would like to remain in, with it being 
highly anticipated that all NRSROs will choose to remain in the rating field, the next stage of 
the reform is that they will have a maximum of 2 calendar years from the date of 
enactment to divest the declined business entirely. The sole reason for this limitation, in 
addition to the point made earlier regarding rebranding and the continuation of close links 
between the old and new companies, is that the lobbying efforts by the agencies, even after 
enactment, would be extraordinary. Based upon what we have heard so far about this sector, 
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and indeed almost every other financial sector, the longer it takes to implement the changes 
that are required, the higher the chance there is that lobbying efforts will dilute the intended 
effects, ultimately rendering the proposed reform inadequate.  
In the event that the NRSRO does not divest the division, and indeed any affiliate, completely 
within the two-year period, administrators will be appointed to complete the sale, in a 
manner akin to bankruptcy proceedings. The market-research market has enough 
businesses within it to allow for the sale of the components of the divisions at a price that is 
not punitive to the rating agencies, so the deadline is fair and the penalties for not abiding by 




Unlike the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that mandated that certain aspects of additional 
services as provided by accounting firms were to be prohibited, which encouraged the firms 
to divest their additional service divisions, this reform proposal has clearly prohibited the 
providing of any additional services by rating agencies. In order to counter the inevitable 
backlash, and cover for all caveats, the next stage of the reform is to articulate that any 
service other than credit rating provision, the publication of watchlists, and of rating 
methodologies, are expressly prohibited. This has the effect of prohibiting any provision of 
additional services under a different title, like ‘advisory services’ for example. There are to 
be no exceptions to this rule. 
This aspect of the reform puts an end to any hopes that the agencies would have of following 
the lead of the accounting counterparts and establishing short-term ‘non-competes’ with the 
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buyers of the ancillary divisions, so that the illusion of prohibition is met whilst the long-term 
aim is to continue with the provision at a later date when the economic cycle is more 
hospitable to private expansion. 
These simple elements of absolute prohibition, the ability to choose which business one 
wants to operate in, a two-year deadline for divesture, and the articulation of irreversibility 
within the reform, would all achieve the aim of removing the rent-harvesting division of the 
rating agencies and aligning them closer to the public interest. However, in this thesis we 
have looked at a number of different angles concerning the rating industry and one thing 
should stand out above all else; things are not as simple as they appear. Whilst this reform has 
the potential to be effective, mostly through its simplicity, there is a need to address the 
actualities that would stem from this proposal. So, we shall now assess the potential 
advantages that could stem from the implementation of this reform proposal. Yet, in keeping 
with the call to assess the actual we shall also address the potential impediments to the 
implementation of this reform, because to challenge such an engrained and resourceful 
opponent will always be an extraordinarily difficult task. 
 
6.4.1 Potential Benefits of the Implementation of the Reform Proposal 
 
There are a number of potential benefits that come with the implementation of this proposal. 
Although every party that is concerned with the ratings industry, including the agencies 
themselves, can benefit from the effects of the proposal, the benefits for the agencies is 
predicated upon their accepting of a short-term loss for long-term stability; whether they have 
the capacity to do this is not known, although all the evidence points to an industry that is 
mindful of its historical brushes with extinction, and as such has become ruthless in its 
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attempt to survive – showing how the agencies can cement their position within the economy 
and contribute to the development of society at the same time is the key challenge for this 
proposal. 
The first point to make is that this proposal does not take the agencies out of business, as 
other proposals aim to do55. This is an important element because it would leave the agencies 
(using Moody’s as an example) with a revenue stream in the region of $2 billion annually as 
it stands today, which is still an incredible position to be in. What is more important perhaps 
is that one element of the conflicts which hound the industry would have been entirely 
removed, so the independence in appearance will be increased considerably; this stands to be 
potentially more profitable than the provision of ancillary services in the long-term because 
the increasingly negative reputation the agencies are garnering at present will surely reach a 
breaking point at some point in the future, perhaps when their complicity in a crisis larger 
than 2007/08 forces the hand of legislators, albeit in a less conciliatory tone than this proposal 
– it is not unreasonable to foresee this chain of events. 
This increase in reputation stemming from the implementation of the reform proposal would 
be enhanced further by the understanding that the removal of additional services tends to 
result in an increased focus on the gatekeeper’s primary function. However, this aspect needs 
to be understood in context; in relation to the response of the accounting industry to the 
prohibition on additional services, Cottell tells us that the firms began to pay more attention 
to the risk profiles of their clients as a response to the legislative attack on their business56, 
which is clearly desirable. Yet, we know from 6.3.1 The Forced Divesture of Consultancy 
Services within the Public Accounting Industry – 2002 that the accounting firms were still 
                                                 
55 See 3.2 The Oligopolistic Structure of the Ratings Industry for just some of the proposals aimed at taking the 
industry out of existence. 
56 Philip G Cottell ‘The Public Accounting Industry’ in James Brock The Structure of American Industry: 
Twelfth Edition (Waveland Press 2013) 352. 
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assisting large corporations with their fraud just seven years after the Enron scandal; so it 
must be stated that this notion of the rating agencies focussing more upon the quality of their 
ratings as a result of not providing ancillary services is desired, but a consideration of their 
actual constitution may force us to temper our hope in this regard. Also, we have seen on a 
number of occasions that the agencies hold their reputation, in actual terms, in very little 
regard, so appealing to this aspect of the agencies is not guaranteed to be effective. 
For the issuers, the removal of additional services has a number of potential benefits, 
particularly if we accept that certain conditions exist. If the provision of ancillary services is 
being used by the agencies to harvest rent, which this thesis claims is the case, then the 
obvious conclusion that can then be made is that issuers (and subsequently investors) are the 
ones paying this rent to the agencies. In addition to this reduction in cost for issuers, the 
theoretical understanding that the issuers are not technically bound to the agencies means that 
the agencies would not be able to attempt to offset the losses experienced through the 
prohibition of ancillary service provision by raising the prices of their ratings. As opposed to 
the accounting market whereby publicly listed companies must be audited (the accounting 
firms did increase their prices post-SOX57), the rating market is constricted by pricing 
pressures which means the agencies cannot simply alter their prices to suit their needs; it is 
not hard to imagine that large issuers would not take kindly to an increase in price, even by 
one or two basis points. Again however this benefit must be placed in context because it 
operates on the desired version of events being true, when we know that the actuality is that 
the issuers are still bound to the agencies even after Dodd-Frank, which means there is a 
potential for the agencies to pass the losses onto their customers (although this would 
arguably still be less than subscription to the ancillary services – the issue then would be that 
the issuers cannot buy favour or protection). 
                                                 
57 ibid 350. 
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However, the aim of this reform proposal was not to appease the agencies, but to protect the 
public and in this regard the objective would be achieved. The absolute and irreversible 
prohibition on additional services results in the limitation of the potential resources that 
agencies can use to negate any disciplinary measures that may be taken against it. This 
concept of protecting the public has to be at the forefront of everyone’s thinking, because 
rather than a financial crash affecting the bottom lines of large multinational corporations, the 
Financial Crisis, which we know the rating agencies directly facilitated (amongst others), has 
resulted in the increase of global poverty58, homelessness59, and suicides60, amongst a host of 
other societal ills; it is not farfetched to make this connection, and in fact is important for the 
future of society that this connection is made whenever possible. 
The State may have opted to remove the deterrent of custodial sentences from the upper 
echelons of the financial sector, but even though this awful development has made the 
prospect of protecting the public that much more difficult, there is a way in which the weak 
deterrent chosen by the State can be turned to the public’s advantage, and that, with regard to 
the rating industry, is to remove its rent-harvesting division and expose it, to a greater extent, 
to the fines that are given to it. Franklin Strier agrees with this position, and in what seems 
like a fitting way to end this section, he states: 
                                                 
58 Overseas Development Institute The Global Financial Crisis: Poverty and Social Protection (ODI 2009); 
Bilal Habib, Ambar Narayan, Sergio Olivieri, and Carolina Sanchez-Paramo The Impact of the Financial Crisis 
on Poverty and Income Distribution: Insights from Simulations in Selected Countries (Centre for Economic 
Policy Research 2010).  
59 Nicole Fondeville and Terry Ward Homelessness During the Crisis: Research Note 8/2011 (European 
Commission 2011). 




The rating agencies’ loss (in consulting revenue) could be the public’s gain… From a 
utilitarian viewpoint, the loss of rating agency fees pales before the projected public 
good of more independent rating agencies61. 
 
6.4.2 Potential Impediments to the Implementation of the Reform Proposal 
 
There are indeed a number of benefits that could come with the implementation of this 
reform proposal. However, actually getting the reform proposal implemented in the first place 
is an entirely different matter altogether. This thesis has attempted to provide the context for 
the need for this reform by examining the majority of issues that surround the ratings industry 
today (and historically to a certain extent). As a result, we have been able to understand that 
the ratings industry is a particularly mighty adversary to the public interest. Not only does it 
amass incredible resources through the conflict-laden issuer-pays remuneration model, as 
well as the rent-harvesting ancillary service divisions, but it has also been embedded within 
the modern economy, so much so that apparently generation-defining legislative attempts to 
remove the binds that keep the industry wedded to the modern economy have had no effect 
on the fortunes of the industry and on its position within the economy. This thesis has 
endeavoured to promote a new understanding of the ratings industry in that we have to 
consider the industry for what it actually is, rather than what we may desire it to be, and in 
that light it is important that we attempt to ascertain the potential impediments to the adoption 
of this reform proposal. 
The most obvious impediment to adoption of the reform would be the mobilisation of the 
industry’s vast resources which, in reality, has and will again stymie impactful reform 
                                                 
61 Franklin Strier ‘Rating the Raters: Conflicts of Interest in the Credit Rating Firms’ [2008] 113 Business and 
Society Review 4 546. 
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proposals. We have seen evidence in this thesis that almost guarantees that the Big Three, if 
not other members of the rating industry, would mobilise their considerable resources to 
instigate a concerted and effective lobbying campaign62; if they mobilised for Dodd-Frank, 
they would certainly mobilise to protect their ancillary service divisions. Moreover, we have 
also seen evidence of this tactic being used across the financial sector, from banks to 
accountants, which shows the opposition that would almost certainly be presented. 
This lobbying campaign brings into focus another issue and that is the susceptibility of 
leading political figures to be captured by private interests. We saw in 6.3.1 The Forced 
Divesture of Consultancy Services within the Public Accounting Industry – 2002 that the 
mobilisation of the accounting industry’s resources to fund a concerted lobbying campaign 
led to a large number of U.S. Congress Men and Women coming out in support of the firms’ 
ability to provide additional services that were at the very heart of two record financial 
catastrophes63; the implication is truly staggering. The implication is staggering because for 
any impactful reform to be implemented we will need the support of precisely those people 
who are being captured by private interests, so the imagining of a Faustian situation is 
particularly apt when considering the choices facing these leading politicians.  
Also, the SEC has been admonished by this thesis for being weak with their administering of 
penalties for breaches of the law64, which raises another issue; the absolute removal of 
ancillary service divisions, based upon the need to remove the nullifying effects of the 
resources generated by the provision, but also upon of the inability of the SEC to effectively 
contain the naturally exploitative demeanour of the agencies, means that the adoption of the 
reform would be a massive blow to the reputation of the SEC. It is certainly not unreasonable 
                                                 
62 See 4.3 A Reality Check (n 33). 
63 6.3.1 (n 52). 
64 6.2 The Imperfections in the Current Framework Governing Ancillary Service Provision. 
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to ask the question of how supportive the SEC would be of such a proposal given the 
reputation capital they would lose as a result. 
In the most recent analyses of the accounting industry’s rebuilding of their consultancy 
services we can see a trend that would be directly applicable to this reform if it were not 
applied in an absolute fashion. Business journalists have noted that the firms were able to 
continue their operations because the prohibiting rules only applied to the U.S. Jurisdiction65, 
which brings about another issue for our reform proposal, because the reform simply cannot 
be adopted in a fragmented fashion – it is an all-or-nothing reform. The issue it raises is that 
for the nullifying effect of ancillary service divisions to be completely eradicated, the reform 
would have to be globally implemented, which for the ratings industry essentially means the 
implementation by the E.U. and the I.O.S.C.O. as well as the U.S. Though the anti-rating 
agency sentiment is high enough in the E.U., judging from their extensive reforms after the 
Crisis, these are still additional hurdles that the reform would have to pass, which would also 
allow the agencies further opportunities to scupper the reform. 
However, irrespective of the resources that the agency would commit to the challenging of 
this reform, the hurdles that would be presented by the need to present a global front against 
the industry, and of the important aspect of timing (the regulatory fertile post-crisis era has 
passed), the biggest impediment to success lies in the minds of our societal leaders. It was 
mentioned earlier that the public perception of the accounting profession, when allied to the 
extraordinary failures that came as a direct result of the criminal actions of the accounting 
firms, forced the hands of our leaders to make a stand against the industry66; what we can 
draw from this analysis is that the public perception of the rating industry, which is simply 
not the same as the accounting industry, dictates that the leaders have not, and probably will 
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not have their hand forced by the failures of the industry, which is incredible given the extent 
of the damage caused by the rating industry. What this ultimately means is that the decision 
to implement impactful reforms of the rating industry will be down to the will of societal 
leaders to reject the financial benefits of being captured and strive to protect the public from 
the inherently destructive nature of the financial industry; whether one believes that this may 
happen is down to one’s outlook, as has been demonstrated by the variance in opinion 
regarding the best way to advance our society i.e. free-market proponents as opposed to those 
arguing for stronger regulations for example, but one thing that is for sure is that there is little 
evidence of this will being demonstrated by those who are in the position to do so.  
To counter this lack of willingness to protect the public from the iniquities of the financial 
sector, this thesis has proposed a reform proposal that is remarkably simple, but which is 
based upon clear evidence of wrongdoing and rent-harvesting behaviour that in turn has the 
effect of negating any financial punishment. My claim is that the legitimacy of this reform, 
fundamentally, turns on a proper conception of the role of the financial sector within society. 
It is surely untenable to suggest that society is there to serve the financial sector. In fact, it is 
the other way around and this is a sentiment that must be remembered at all times, regardless 
of the personal benefits that come with ignoring it. This thesis has demonstrated very clearly 
the past dangers of ignoring the proper relationship between the role of the financial sector 
and the interests of society. To fail to address this risks repeating the mistakes of the past, and 
leaves this and future generations susceptible to a crash that society will perhaps not be able 







The aim of this chapter was to present the raison d’être for this thesis. In attempting to 
present a reform proposal that would align the output of the rating industry closer to what is 
required by the public, the chapter contained the details of the call for the absolute and 
irreversible prohibition of the provision of additional services by credit rating agencies. To 
give this proposal the best chance of being implemented the chapter sought to show the 
weaknesses within the current regulatory framework that governs the current provision of 
additional services, some historical instances of state intervention in private affairs, and 
ultimately the strengths and weaknesses of the proposal itself. 
The current regulatory framework that governs the provision of additional services is 
incredibly weak. We saw how the framework is built upon concessions and collaboration, 
aspects that have resulted in the direct exploitation by the rating agencies. There are a number 
of rules that have been adopted by the SEC which seem to make sense, with the prohibition 
of contemporaneously providing rating and ancillary services being banned as mandated by 
the CRA Reform Act of 2006 providing a good example. This is positive, yet the mind-set of 
the SEC undermines any advances in this area. We saw a number of instances where the 
SEC’s response to material violations of the law was the recommendation to change the 
behaviour that was causing the breach; this approach would not be accepted in any other form 
of the justice system, and ultimately is illustrative of the position of the SEC – it is difficult to 
provide a reasoned argument that says the SEC is championing the rights of the investor over 
the financial sector in this particular area. 
The understanding of the weaknesses of the SEC is one of the underlying inspirations for the 
call for absolute prohibition; simply put, the SEC cannot be trusted to regulate a limited 
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version of the provision of additional services. Based upon this same sentiment the chapter 
then moved onto look at some ‘inspirations’ for the call for prohibition, although the notion 
of these instances providing inspiration was tempered because each instance contains serious 
flaws. We saw how in 1933 the US State took on the powerful banking sector and enforced 
the break-up of the Universal Banks, so that the banks would either be commercial banks, or 
investment banks, but could no longer operate as both. Whilst the endeavour seemed a noble 
one that was aiming to address the public harm created by the sector, we saw how modern 
analyses points to the realisation that the evidence used to support such an unprecedented 
move was essentially fabricated. This realisation led to two potential understandings; either 
the State was seeking to cartelise the banking industry and attack the previously impervious 
House of Morgan, or the State was using the underhanded tactic of exaggerating evidence so 
that the all-powerful banking industry could be restrained on the basis of public anger. Whilst 
the second understanding is, in the viewpoint of this thesis, acceptable in those simplistic 
terms, because the protection of the public is the most important goal, the evidence compiled 
in this thesis alone suggests that the State does not operate for the protection of the Public. 
There are simply too many instances whereby the State has actively taken the lead in 
supporting the private sector in its assault upon society, which results in the realisation that 
the generation-defining ‘New Deal’ financial regulations represents the origin of the awful 
position we find ourselves in now with a banking industry that cannot fail; also, lest we 
forget, this era was the first time the rating agencies were incorporated into the financial 
regulatory framework. 
The actions taken by the State in response to the Accounting industry’s complicity in two of 
the biggest financial collapses on record at that point in 2002 represented the second instance 
of state intervention into the affairs of a financial industry. The most important aspect to take 
away from the analysis for our understanding is that the legislative process was incredibly 
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weakened by a concerted lobbying campaign despite the increased levels of public anger. As 
a result, the legislators allowed for compromises to be included within the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act that has allowed for the rebuilding of the very divisions the Act sought to dismantle. 
Additionally, the tempered approach had little effect upon the culture of the industry, with the 
leading proponents conducting themselves in the very same negligent manner just seven 
years later to the equally-destructive effect as seen in the early years of the new millennium; 
the lesson to be learned here is simple – one cannot negotiate with such entities. The 
conviction of the State must be absolute when regulating industries that are inherently self-
interested and ruthless in securing their survival. 
So, the reform proposal that aims to redress the imbalance within the rating industry’s 
relationship with society was introduced in a simplistic and straightforward manner. The 
proposal, that agencies are absolutely prohibited from providing any service other than rating 
services, are forced to choose between continuing in the rating or market-research industry, 
and are banned from ever providing such services again, was developed to promote clarity in 
a field that has utilised conscious complexity for a number of years. We saw how the 
agencies would benefit in the long-run, how issuers would benefit, and most importantly how 
society would benefit immeasurably from a constrained ratings industry. However, whilst 
there were a number of benefits that came with the proposed reform there were also a large 
number of substantial impediments to its implementation, all of which hinted at inherently-
systemic problems. 
In order for such an impactful reform to be considered within the financial sector, the aspects 
that must change are simply incredible. The susceptibility of leading politicians to ‘capture’ is 
the biggest impediment by far, because any reform would have to be enacted by the very 
people who are susceptible. The difference between the accounting industry and the ratings 
industry, in that the accounting industry has much more of a public presence, is perhaps the 
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leading component of the industry’s ability to avoid impactful reforms. As we saw with the 
banking industry in 1933 and the accounting industry in 2002, the driving force with those 
reforms was the public anger that came from the crises created by the respective industries. 
However, Charles E Mitchell was something of a celebrity, and the public trials of Jeffrey 
Skilling and Arthur Andersen bosses brought them to the forefront of the public’s thinking 
when related to financial issues; it is not hard to imagine that the asking of the question ‘who 
is the CEO of Moody’s Investors Service?’ to a sample of the general public would be met 
with a muted response, and herein lies the issue. 
What is required then is further research that is conducted upon two beliefs: the need to focus 
upon reality is paramount; and the need to widen the availability of that research is crucial. 
By developing honest and uncompromising research into these destructive industries, and 
then communicating that in as many public mediums as possible, the chances of enacting 
meaningful reform will rise dramatically when compared to the current situation. Whether the 
research is quantitative, qualitative, or normative, is immaterial - it must be based upon these 
two foundations; if it is, then it is conceivable that we will be in a much better position to 
hold up these destructive industries to the public for their derision when they inevitably 
become involved in the next societal breakdown. The shame of this lies in the many people 
who are currently experiencing extraordinary hardships as a result of these actors’ callous 
disregard for society; in a just world they would be imprisoned for their crimes, but in this 
actual world we must be ready to develop public anger to a level that forces the hand of 
political leaders immediately after the next catastrophe – the increased education of the 
























There is a power generated by activism and committed campaigning for social goals67 
 
This thesis endeavoured to assess the effectiveness of the discipline afforded to the rating 
agencies in light of their conduct before, during, and after the Financial Crisis of 2007/08. 
Inspired by the spectacle of the leading rating agencies recommencing their unprecedented 
growth just two years after the largest financial collapse since the Great Depression, the 
thesis aimed to understand how Standard & Poor’s, as a representative of the Big Two, was 
able to absorb the ‘record’ financial penalty of $1.375 billion given to it by the US 
Department of Justice for knowingly defrauding investors in the lead-up to the Crisis.  
After analysing the effectiveness of the legislative measures taken against the agencies, just 
two or three years before the height of the Crisis, this thesis can conclude that the rating 
agencies exploited their position by incorporating additional service divisions to ‘harvest’ 
profits from the sector that would lead the world to the brink of financial ruin; this is how the 
agencies were able to absorb the record penalties. Yet, the analysis conducted by this thesis 
revealed a far more pessimistic view in that investors, issuers, and indeed the state, all benefit 
from this warped anti-social arrangement. In fact, the only losers in this arrangement are the 
public, who have borne the brunt of the costs of this arrangement, and have suffered a distinct 
breakdown in the fabric of society as a result. 
Whilst it would be easy to surrender to this reality and accept the role that the public must 
seemingly play in reaping no reward but receiving all of the costs, this thesis argues that by 
detailing this reality in clear and unobstructed terms there stands an opportunity to reverse 
this sentiment that has taken hold. By producing research of this nature, and then striving to 
disseminate as far as possible within the public realm, the hope is that the next financial 
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collapse, and the regulatory response to the last one dictates that future collapses will occur, 
will take place within a world where the actors are widely known and vilified as a result. It is 
only by increasing the awareness of the schemes and participants of those schemes that seek 
to extract wealth from society can we stand a chance of reducing the public’s exposure to the 
harm that inevitably comes with such a venal crusade. 
So, in order to achieve that aim the thesis had a number of clearly defined research questions 
which when answered would paint the picture of a system that needs to be constrained for the 
protection of the public. In answering those research questions the reason for the prohibiting 
reform proposal was formed, in that it was revealed that to trust in the agencies, or indeed the 
regulators, to maintain a limited form of additional service provision was simply not a viable 
option based upon their history of exploiting gaps for their own gain, often at the expense of 
societal health.  
The first question that was posed in the introduction to this piece was what is the current role 
and status of the rating industry, and why does that role require regulation? In order to answer 
that question effectively it was important that we had a sufficient knowledge of who the 
rating agencies that make up the industry actually are. To that end we were introduced to the 
agencies via a ‘primer’ which detailed for us the identity of the leading agencies, their 
organisational structures, and also their position within the industry, which in relation to the 
rating industry is an important consideration. It is important because we saw that the industry 
is dominated by ‘The Big Three’, although there is an argument that it is actually dominated 
by ‘The Big Two’: Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s. This basis understanding allowed us to 
move forward and look at the role the industry plays within the financial sector, and to 
achieve that goal the opening chapter analysed what the industry does for certain parties. We 
saw that, quintessentially, the industry serves a number of roles which includes signifying the 
health of a debt-issuing entity to the market, and also protecting confidential information so 
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that the act of issuing debt to the market remains a viable and beneficial practice. In the 
second chapter, we also saw that the investor utilises the ratings of agencies to protect their 
position, mostly by way of using the ratings as gauges that can be inserted into debt 
agreements i.e. ratings triggers. Not only do issuers and investors depend on the agencies to 
lower their respective costs, but the state is arguably the biggest benefactor of this cost-
reducing capacity of the rating agencies. The state, in quintessentially seeking to promote 
safety in the economy, delegates its supervisory power to the agencies so that investors can 
invest with confidence at little cost to the State. It is for this reason that regulation in this 
particular field is vital, and also it is vital that the regulation that is adopted does not lead to 
imbalances, in order to preserve that confidence. Also, the centrality of the agencies, through 
the dependence demonstrated by all concerned parties, means that any divergence from the 
agencies’ stated role will lead to a systemic collapse, which is a clear reason for regulation in 
this realm. 
Yet, whilst this is true and has been since the rating agencies were incorporated into the 
burgeoning capital markets in the mid-1970s by the SEC, the industry was not formally 
regulated until 2005/06, which is an incredible understanding which answers the next 
question posed in the introduction: what was the regulatory landscape prior to the financial 
crisis? The Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Relief Act of 2005 (enacted fully in 2006) and the 
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 represented legislative attempts to reduce the hold 
the agencies had upon the marketplace. A response to their performance surrounding the 
Enron and WorldCom affairs, the Acts sought to increase competition in the industry and 
allow for the SEC to have more of an effect in an industry that it had helped to fortify. 
However, we saw in Chapters 1 and 4 that these Acts actually represent for us the 
ineffectiveness that has allowed for the agencies to continue their growth despite their 
appalling performance. Legislators, knowingly or not, aimed to achieve the desired version of 
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events, i.e. increased competition fostering increased transparency and accuracy based on 
increased reputational pressure, but in doing so failed to consider the actualities of the ratings 
industry; the industry is a ‘natural oligopoly’ and increased competition will only raise the 
costs for concerned parties, which would go some way to negating the point of dealing with 
the ratings industry in the first place. 
The financial crisis therefore represented the ideal opportunity to learn about the 
ineffectiveness of such an approach. Unfortunately for society, the crisis revealed that aiming 
to bring about the desired version of events without considering the actual dynamics of the 
industry can only result in ineffectiveness; the target the legislation is aiming at does not 
exist, so it cannot be successful. Therefore, the next question posed of what can we learn 
from the financial crisis about the effectiveness of pre-crisis legislation has a simple answer. 
The misunderstanding of the ratings industry is at the heart of the failings that led to the 
financial crisis. This cannot be stated enough, because the financial crisis would simply not 
have been possible if the rating agencies were to have performed their role as they should, a 
role which should have been mandated by effective and considered legislation and regulation. 
In a similar vein the question of what regulatory reforms were introduced post-crisis, and 
what has been their effectiveness, was next to be posed in the introduction. The analysis in 
Chapter 4, which sought to analyse the relative section of The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, 
ultimately revealed the same mistake being repeated by legislators, albeit with a slightly 
perverse twist. This time the legislators entrusted a large part of the reform to the SEC, an 
agency which has been repeatedly criticised for its role in the financial crisis, and even after 
the enactment of Dodd-Frank has embarked upon a CRA-friendly campaign of lenient 
punishments and alleged attacks upon credible opposition to the Big Three68. However, the 
biggest development was the State removing itself from the equation. Up until the enactment 
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of Dodd-Frank there was a credible argument to be made that the failings of the rating 
agencies was forced upon the market by the state via regulations that forced certain parties, 
institutional investors or large banks for example, to use the ratings of agencies in their 
operational processes. Now, as a result of Dodd-Frank, that argument has been removed 
because any reference to the rating agencies has been struck from federal regulations. While 
this development has been sold as a positive for the economy, what it has done has removed 
any recourse for complaint from the victims of rating agency transgressions; the 
embeddedness of the agencies has not been reduced at all, as evidenced by their growth since 
the enactment of Dodd-Frank. One thing is for sure however, and that is that agencies 
continue to transgress even after a seemingly generation-defining legislative strike upon their 
business. 
These transgressions were the focus of this thesis. More specifically, what allows them to 
continually transgress is of the utmost importance for this thesis and one reason for that 
continuation is revealed to be the provision of ancillary services. In answering the final 
question posed in the introduction, ‘how does the provision of ancillary services support the 
agencies’ ability to transgress, and what affect would the prohibition of ancillary service 
provision have upon their capacity to transgress’, Chapters 5 and 6 sought to provide a clear 
picture of the importance of tackling this lesser-developed line of enquiry. After being 
introduced to the ancillary service divisions of S&P and Moody’s in the opening section of 
Chapter 5, in which we saw the increasingly important contribution of the divisions to the 
companies’ overall health, we saw how the literature understands that the provision of 
additional services serves to insert pressure into the relationships the agencies have with 
interested parties, so that they may pressure issuers into paying for additional services via 
threatening to lower their ratings, or alternatively how issuers may threaten agencies with 
non-purchase of those additional services unless a favourable rating is granted. However, the 
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thesis made the important contribution of adjoining the economic study of ‘rent’, and more 
specifically ‘rent-harvesting’, to the study of rating agency additional service provision. As a 
result, it became clear that the agencies incorporated the additional services in preparation for 
their culpable involvement in the pre-crisis securitisation process, so that they could garner 
excessive income from a non-essential division that would essentially protect them from the 
inevitable financial penalties that would ensue. 
Before this thesis concludes it is worth looking forward. This thesis is operating on the claim 
that what is required is increased research into the actual conduct of the rating agencies, 
together with the increased dissemination of that critical research. So, to that end, what 
follows are some potential avenues for future research in this socially-important field of 
study. 
 
7.1 Avenues for Further Research 
 
Whilst there are difficulties that must be overcome if we are to have the aim of establishing 
reforms that prioritise the interests of the public over the interests of the private sector 
realised, there must be a continuation in the research to support such a move so that the calls 
for change become too loud to ignore. Before this thesis concludes it will be advantageous to 
discuss some potential avenues for future research, although it will be very important to apply 
the actual v. desired notion to the potential effects of these research ventures because what is 
required, more than ever, is that we seek understand the industry and its effects as it actually 
is, rather than what we may desire to be. To achieve this task the chapter will now provide 
just three potential avenues for further research under the headings of quantitative, 






The inspiration for some potential quantitative research that may be conducted derives from 
the work of Jiang, Stanford, and Xie, who endeavoured to understand the impact that the 
issuer-pays remuneration model had upon the ratings provided by the Big Two agencies69. 
The scholars found that the issuer-pays remuneration model had a direct effect upon the 
ratings provided by the agencies in that the ratings rose across the board after the adoption of 
the model. In that same vein, the first avenue for research will be to ascertain the effect that 
the provision of ancillary services has upon the ratings given by the agencies to the procurers 
of the additional services.  
However, whilst the records are readily available to show who purchased the additional 
services at what time, which could then be matched to the purchasing of a credit rating, there 
are a number of issues that would have to be considered. Firstly, one of the claims regarding 
the issues with the provision of additional services is that the purchasing of the services 
serves to protect the issuer’s rating, so in this sense the effect could not be seen in the 
findings; one would see the purchase of the additional services but no change in the rating, 
which means that one would have to make the assumption that there is an influence which is 
something that can be done without the quantitative research. Secondly, the effect of the 
purchasing of ancillary services may not be immediate, so one would have to decide on a 
timeframe as to when the change in rating may take place so as to point towards the presence 
of influence stemming from the purchasing of additional services. There is enough scope to 
conduct this research which would prove a valuable addition to the calls for prohibition, 
                                                 
69 See 3.3.2 The Effects of the Issuer-Pays Remuneration Model (n 88). 
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although another aspect is that the perceived conflict alone is enough to call for the 




Qualitative research has the potential of being very useful indeed, with the caveat being that 
the subjects of the research would have to disclose their honest opinions. What the field needs 
to know is the purchaser’s opinions on the value of the additional services that are offered by 
rating agencies, and in what particular element that value lays. An example of the research 
that could be conducted would be the development of a questionnaire, or set of questions to 
be asked in an interview, all on the basis of anonymity, that could be given to a sample of 
leading management figures within the leading purchasers of additional services over a given 
time period. Questions may take the form of ascertaining why their company purchases the 
services, what effect the services have upon their ability to compete, their personal view on 
the connection between the services and the rating services, and whether or not they believe 
the purchasing of additional services has an impact upon their credit rating. 
However, there is one outstanding issue here and that is to do with incentive. It is reasonable 
to assume that leading management figures within these large companies would have very 
little incentive to provide incriminating details, or even thoughts, against the agencies, even 
on the basis of anonymity. This is mostly because, as was mentioned earlier, the prohibition 
of additional services removes the potential for issuers to pressure rating agencies into 
awarding a rating higher than what is deserved, which we saw was at the heart of the 
Financial Crisis. Whereas rating agencies have decided they have no stake in the 
advancement of society, the same sentiment can equally be ascribed to other parts of the 
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financial sector, with issuers of structured-finance products being particularly callous in their 
regard for the advancement of society; this element would need to be considered before one 




The last avenue for future research that is being advanced by thesis is concerned with the 
continuation of the study of the difficulties of regulating financial cartels, cartels that are 
usually the result of government intervention. This normative research is incredibly abstract, 
simply because of the obvious negative outcome from the statement; it is obviously very 
difficult to regulate financial cartels that the State has helped to create i.e. the ratings 
oligopoly or the banking cartel.  
Therefore, what is required is that one must look at some small element of this issue and 
focus upon that in order to attempt to make some incremental advances in the battle against 
financial cartels. In a similar vein to this thesis, calls for action against such powerful entities 
must be based upon simplistic but real analyses, so that opposition to the endeavour can be 
categorised as part of the problem. The first step in these analyses would be to provide 
enough evidence to quash any argument regarding the socially destructive nature of the given 
industry; this is important because an understanding of the inherent nature of the given 
industry means that any calls to compromise and work alongside the industry can be 
dismissed as passive and potentially collaborative, revealing the position of that particular 
entity. Once this evidence is established, the next aim would be to present a simplistic reform 
proposal based upon the same ideals as the actual v. desired framework so that the reform has 
the potential of being impactful. 
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All in all the aim of any future research must be to focus upon the reality whenever possible. 
This thesis has demonstrated that regulating an embedded entity based upon illusory beliefs 
regarding the capacity of the target will only lead to failure. Whether future research looks at 
the banking, credit rating, accounting, insurance, or shadow-banking industry, to name but a 
few, the application of an analysis that is rooted in reality is the only chance of attaining truly 





“This historic settlement makes clear the consequences of putting corporate profits over 
honesty in the financial markets” 
 
The statement above represented the opening of the thesis and it is fitting that it represents the 
closing as well. Towards the end of the thesis a conscious decision was made to examine the 
potential future ahead, in terms of looking at what may be achieved, and how we may go 
about doing so. Conducting critical research and then disseminating that research widely, so 
that the public can be more aware of the system that is costing them so much, is a particularly 
worthwhile endeavour and one that this thesis hopes to represent. However, the potential 
effect of that research will only come to fruition if we as researchers are brutally honest with 
our critique. The statement above says that the historic settlement makes clear the 
consequences of putting corporate profits over honesty, and it is absolutely correct. The 
historic settlement makes absolutely clear that there are no real consequences to putting 
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corporate profits over honesty in the financial realm. To punish fraud, committed by divisions 
within S&P that have clear organisational structures so that we know who made the decisions 
to defraud millions of investors, with a $1.375 billion fine when the profits earned from their 
fraud outweigh that fine, and then some, sends a clear message to anyone else wondering 
whether they can get away with fraud in the financial sector in future upturns. The focussing 
upon aspects of the rating industry that stand no chance of reducing their capability to 
transgress not only sends a clear message to the agencies that their transgressions can 
continue unabated, but should send a message to all of us that the system as it currently 
operates does not do so in the name of protecting citizens.  
If we are to see a world in which the protection of the citizen is considered in economic 
policy, which it should be given the centrality of the economy to modern society, then a 
period of concerted social campaigning is what is required. That is not to say that one must 
reject their views on how the system should operate entirely, but we must all primarily seek 
to eliminate the social ills that financial catastrophes create. It is simply not justifiable that the 
rate of suicides, homelessness, unemployment, disease, and familial breakdown should 
increase because of the quest for excessive profits by multinational firms. This thesis has no 
qualms with the idea of profit, or the quest for it, but it should be stated emphatically that the 
quest for profit at all cost is not capitalism, it is greed. It is not something to be lauded, it is 
something to condemn. It is, essentially, something that we must aim to constrain, or better 
still eradicate, if society is to move forward. Placing any other values at the forefront of our 
thinking will only lead to the continuation of the system that, in 2007/08, left a lasting and 
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